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In the present article the author continues 
and expands the critical analysis of peripheral 
capitalism which he began in another that 
was published in the first issue of this Review. 
His central contention is that in peripheral 
societies the development process —whereby 
the accumulation of capital in the form of 
goods and training of human resources makes 
it possible to step up the productivity of the 
labour force and thus to increase the total 
product— is not carried out with the necessary 
efficiency at the social and even, in many 
cases, at the economic level. 
The object of the entire article is to 
explain the causes of this phenomenon, from 
those most directly linked to the internal 
dynamism of the peripheral societies and 
pivoting upon the process of generation, 
appropriation and use of the fruits of tech-
nical progress, to those connected with the 
extermal relations of the societies in question 
and in particular with the spread of the 
consumption patterns of the centres, the 
presence of the transnational corporations 
and the siphoning-off of peripheral income. 
The interaction of these factors, in 
combination with many others to which the 
author draws attention in the course of the 
article, ends by setting up a type of society 
—the 'privileged-consumer society', con 
trasting with the 'sub-consumer society'— 
which cannot satisfy the exigencies of social 
and political democratization, and is entering 
upon a crisis that can be resolved only by 
means of changes as fundamental as its 
causes. 
•Director of the Review. 
To develop in the image and likeness of the 
centres has been and still is the bent of imitat-
ive capitalism in the Latin American region 
of the periphery, to which the present article 
is confined. If the centres have succeeded in 
spreading welfare to the masses, notwith-
standing certain disconcerting effects de-
riving from the ambivalence of technique, 
why should we not be able to do the same? 
To judge from the experience of the 
past few decades, we are very far from at-
taining this end. Moreover, that experi-
ence, in my opinion, shows social disparities 
to be growing wider rather than diminishing. 
For in actual fact peripheral capitalism 
tends to exclude vast masses of the popu-
lation in the lower strata of the social struc-
ture from enjoyment of the fruits of devel-
opment; and it becomes increasingly 
'while this article is concerned with Latin 
America in general, the interpretation of the devel-
opment phenomena of each individual country must 
take into account the conditions in which these 
phenomena make their appearance, the phase of 
transformation through which the socio-economic 
structure of the country concerned is passing, and 
the concomitant changes in political power. 
I have pleasure in taking the present oppor 
tunity to thank my colleagues in CEPAL who have 
collaborated in the critical revision of this article. 
Manuel Balboa has discussed with me the theory 
of the surplus and has offered constructive sug-
gestions; Aníbal Pinto has patiently and meticul 
ously perused the text and has helped to clarify 
it and to modify it in respect of some important 
points of economic theory; Jorge Graciarena has 
made extremely useful comments, especially in 
the sociological field; and Octavio Rodríguez, with 
his intimate knowledge of CEPAL thinking, has 
assisted me in bringing certain significant linkages 
to light. Last but not least, Adolfo Gurrieri, my 
immediate collaborator, kept in constant touch 
with me while I was working out my ideas, and put 
forward points of view that have been of great help 
to me in my thinking; and, in collaboration with 
Gregorio Weinberg, editor of the Review, he has 
edited the text with scrupulous care. 
m 
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conflictive as the democratization process 
makes headway. 
I attempted to explain these phenom-
ena in my previous article, and am now con-
tinuing my analysis in the conviction that 
in order to exert deliberate influence on the 
real situation, or rather to change it, the 
first requisite is to understand it and to probe 
into the reasons why the hopes entertained 
have gradually faded, especially among 
those who have succeeded in ridding them-
selves of dogmatic preconceptions. 
The contradictions apparent in the sys-
tem are very serious: prosperity and some-
times opulence at one extreme; relentless 
poverty at the other. 
A few decades ago the remarkable mo-
mentum gained by industrial development, 
the ability, initiative and drive of many en-
trepreneurs, and the increasing aptitudes 
of the labour force at its different levels of 
skills, could hardly have been conceivable. 
High rates of growth have been achieved, 
and the region is learning to export manu-
factures in defiance of internal and external 
obstacles that once seemed almost insur-
mountable. And technical progress is 
penetrating into areas that is was slow to 
reach, in particular traditional agricul-
ture. 
But from the social standpoint develop-
ment has been going astray, and much of the 
vital energy of the system is being wasted 
as far as the collective welfare is con-
cerned, because it is expended within the 
limited sphere of the privileged-consumer 
society.^ 
My conclusion is categorical: the con-
sumer society is incompatible with the inte-
gration into the system of the masses that 
stagnate in the sub-consumer society. I have 
no doubt whatsoever that in the consumer 
The term 'privileged-consumer society', or 
simply 'consumer society', whichever is preferred, 
denotes excessive and premature imitation of the 
consumption patterns of the centres. 
society great economic efficiency can be 
achieved; but neither do I hesitate to assert 
that the system is fundamentally lacking 
in social efficiency. This, however, is not the 
only conclusion to be drawn. There is also 
another of grave import; and I am stating 
them here as pointers to what I am driving at. 
The privileged-consumer society is 
irreconcilable, in the long run, with the 
march of democracy. In can function 
smoothly only when, in accordance with the 
phase through which the socio-economic 
structure is passing, the democratization 
process is contained, or when, after having 
gained great impetus, it is suspended by the 
use of force. And the reason lies not so much 
in the intrinsic defects from which demo-
cratization is assuredly not free, as in the 
deep-seated flaws in the system. 
Among the latter, the most striking re-
late to income distribution, which is the area 
where the aforementioned widening dis-
parities are found. In peripheral capital-
ism the appropriation of the fruits of techni-
cal progress is largely the arbitrary result 
of the play of power relations arising out of 
the social structure. This interplay obeys no 
regulating principle inspired by consider-
ations of equity, for these are alien to the 
operation of the system. Income distri-
bution has its own special dynamics, which 
in the course of development manifest itself 
through increasingly conflictive phenom-
ena; and these, in the course of time, culmi-
nate in a crisis of the system. 
My contention here is that all this, if I 
may put it simply, stems from the fact that 
the fruits of the higher productivity which 
accompanies the propagation of the tech-
nique of the centres in the periphery are 
largely concentrated in the upper income 
strata, principally by virtue of the latter's 
economic power. In other words, they are 
not disseminated as is assumed in the neo-
classical theories, which have blossomed 
out again and are influencing the develop-
ment praxis, but which are formulated in 
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the abstract, at a level remote from the socio-
economic structure, whereas the appropri-
ation of the fruits of development is of an 
essentially structural character. Disre-
garding the structure means straying down 
a blind alley. 
These upper strata, then, are the basis 
of the privileged-consumer society, in which 
a limited sector of the labour force, charac-
terized by social power, also participates. 
Within the narrow ambit of that society in-
come can rise at rates so high as to call forth 
admiration both at home and abroad. 
But here a question arises: how is it 
possible to develop imitation of the con-
sumption of the centres on these lines and at 
the same time to accumulate capital in order 
to further the propagation of their tech-
nique? 
2. The surplus and insufficient 
accumulation 
Let us now look at one of the points in my 
theoretical interpretation which I want to 
underline because it is of considerable sig-
nificance. I refer to the surplus, i.e., that 
part of the fruits of higher productivity 
which, owing to the great heterogeneity of 
the socio-economic structure, is not dis-
tributed among the labour force and re-
mains in the hands of the owners of the 
means of production. These means are in-
increasingly concentrated in the upper 
strata, thanks to the evolution of the system 
itself; thus the growth of the surplus deriving 
from them is ceaseless, and furthermore, 
as I shall endeavour to show, rapid enough. 
to outstrip the growth rate of the overall 
product of the economy. And thus, com-
mensutarely with the advance of develop-
ment, the surplus attains dimensions which 
enable the upper strata to imitate more and 
more closely the consumption of the 
centres, and, at the same time, to introduce 
increasingly productive and capital-inten-
sive techniques. 
Higher productivity implies less em-
ployment of labour per unit of capital. But 
at the same time it steps up capital accumula-
tion potential. If full use were made of this 
potential, absorption of labour would be 
multiplied and the income of the labour 
force would progressively increase. The 
system would therefore gradually improve 
its social efficiency. 
But this does not happen. For much of 
that potential is frittered away in the con-
sumer society and in the siphoning-off of 
peripheral income into the centres with 
which that society is so closely linked. 
It might be asserted that the higher the 
rate of increase of productivity, the higher 
the rate of capital accumulation should rise, 
thanks to the growth of the surplus; but 
the progressive development of the consu-
mer society precludes this. On the contrary, 
the more productivity increases, the more 
the consumer society tends to immure itself 
in the interplay of market laws. Thus its dy-
namics may reach an impressive pitch, to the 
manifest detriment of the social efficiency 
of the system. Not only is the upward ab-
sorption of the lower strata weakened, but 
redundancy of labour supervenes, and 
these redundant workers eke out a living 
somehow in the strata where they are, or 
manage to get spuriously absorbed into the 
middle strata, particularly in the orbit of the 
State. 
This is where the myth of the unlimited 
expansion of peripheral capitalism and 
its essential role in the diffusion of human 
welfare melts into thin air. The expansion 
is for the few but not for the many. The dy-
namics of the privileged-consumer so-
ciety, strictly speaking, could not be 
generated without the surplus. And the 
surplus could not be formed if the labour 
force that is being absorbed in the system 
were not in so weak a position to share in the 
fruits of increased productivity, under the 
rule of market laws. 
Nevertheless, the consumer society's 
tendency to develop intensively within its 
own bounds cannot be kept up indefinitely, 
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without facing any opposition, since in the 
course of development another tendency 
emerges, running counter to the first, and 
seeking to extend the advantages of devel-
opment downwards, albeit without extir-
pating the root causes of distribution dis-
parities and of the system's insufficient ca-
pacity for absorption. Conflict between the 
two trends- is only a matter of time. 
What happens is that while the social 
structure is undergoing the changes that 
accompany the propagation of technique, 
the middle strata expand, and this makes 
democratization possible, though there are 
major obstacles in the way. And accord-
ingly the disadvantaged labour force in 
these strata acquires increasing trade-
union and political power, which enables it 
to improve its levels of consumption both 
of goods and of State services, at the expense 
of the growth of the surplus. 
The fact that the surplus grows faster 
than the overall product affords room for 
this improvement in certain phases of struc-
tural change. But as these changes pro-
ceed, the disparity between the two growth 
rates lessens, not only on account of the 
redistribution struggle waged by the mid-
dle strata as they increase their capacity 
to claim their share and to defend the 
ground already won, but also because of 
the sometimes considerable expansion of 
State services and, among these, of military 
expenditure, likewise in imitation of the 
more and more costly patterns of the 
centres. Another contributory factor, 
too, is the spurious absorption of the 
labour force. 
3. The crisis of the system and 
liberalism 
A point is thus reached at which the surplus 
ceases to grow more rapidly than the overall 
product. True, it has reached its maximum, 
and if it could stay at this, increasing at the 
same rate as the total product, it could con-
tinue to develop regularly and to act as the 
driving force of the consumer society, pro-
vided that the redistribution struggle were 
to stop at that limit. But there is no reason 
why it should stop there, when there is still a 
vast amount that could be redistributed. As 
already noted, the play of power relations is 
not guided by any regulating principle of 
equity. And as the struggle advances be-
yond the aforesaid limit, the upper strata 
show that although they have had to share 
political power with the middle and also the 
lower strata, they still have at their disposal, 
thanks to their economic power, some very 
important weapons. These are the monet-
ary mechanisms whereby they can recoup 
themselves for the effects of the struggle and 
of State expenditure, shifting the burden to 
others by means of price increases. Thus 
the inflationary spiral coils upward in a new 
type of social inflation which frequently 
combines with the traditional inflationary 
pressures. 
The spiral brings with it economic dis-
order and social disintegration. And this, 
sooner or later, induces the upper strata to 
resort to another of the State's instruments: 
the instrument of force. Its use serves to 
restore the dynamics of the surplus, which is 
at the same time the dynamics not only of 
accumulation but also of the privileged-
consumer society, since the two are insep-
arable in the system. The trouble is that 
this is done at the expense not of the few that 
consume much but of the many that consume 
little. 
The political and social cost of the re-
establishment of the privileged-consumer 
society is therefore huge. 
The march of democracy, then, would 
appear to be incompatible with a society of 
this type. Once certain structural phases 
have been left behind, the political process 
tends to move faster than the economic pro-
cess, since the latter, although very inten-
sive, evolves within the narrow confines of 
the consumer society, whereas advancing 
democracy strives to extend the benefits 
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of development to large social groups to 
which the play of market laws is unfavou 
rabie. 
It is true that the crisis of the system 
becomes more remote when abundant re-
sources obtained by the State from the ex-
ploitation of a country's natural wealth 
make it possible, over a more or less pro-
longed period, to meet at one and the same 
time the demands of the privileged strata 
and the redistribution pressures of the dis-
advantaged labour force. But not on that 
account does the tendency to exclude the 
lower strata disappear. 
It is not surprising that the upholders 
of economic liberalism attribute the crisis 
to the violation of market laws by the inter-
vention of the trade-union and political 
power of the labour force. This is a funda-
mental misconception which it is worth while 
to expose forthwith, in order to give a clearer 
idea of the nature of the system, although 
in due course we shall expatiate further on 
so important a subject. 
Liberalism resorts, of course, to neo-
classical theories to substantiate its as-
sertion. But these theories overlook the 
structural phenomenon of the surplus, since 
they argue that an increase in productivity, 
in a fully competitive system, will spread its 
influence throughout the community via a 
rise in the pay of the labour force and a fall 
in prices. It is my aim to show that the 
surplus is generally retained and augmented 
under the sway of market laws, even though 
competition may be fully and unrestrictedly 
operative. 
The surplus derives from the economic 
power of the upper strata and forms an in-
tegral part of the system, as does likewise 
the power of participation of the labour 
force at advanced stages of its evolution. 
It is true that the conflicts which this in-
volves inevitably lead to a crisis. But such 
is the system with its exclusive and conflic-
tive tendencies. 
To these tendencies neoclassical theory 
turns a blind eye. It maintains, on the con-
trary, that the system, left without inter-
ference to its own devices, tends to strike a 
balance wherein both economic and social 
efficiency are achieved. The line of reason-
ing followed is strictly logical, but it starts 
from unrealistic premises. 
The fact that the neoclassical argu-
ments are out of keeping with the realities 
of peripheral capitalism does not imply that 
they lack practical influence. Economic 
theories, indeed, are not as a rule accepted 
solely for their intrinsic value, but to satisfy 
interests and aspirations on the part of those 
who carry enough weight to impose them. 
Thus, when the use of force is invoked as a 
means of dealing with the crisis of the system, 
conditions become favourable to the appli-
cation of certain principles of economic 
liberalism, suitably brought into line, how-
ever, with the interests and aspirations in 
question, and not always followed with in-
telligence and virtuosity. Te only thing 
is that this belated reflorescence of econ-
omic liberalism entails the stifling of 
political liberalism. 
Although both spring from the same 
philosophical source, they end in spectacu-
lar antagonism. Nor could it be otherwise, 
owing to the distortion of economic liber-
alism by the serious implications of that 
strange phenomenon, the appropriation of 
the surplus, so alien to the lofty spirit of its ar-
guments. 
4. Centre-periphery relations 
This resurgence of economic liberalism 
likewise extends to centre-periphery re 
lations, since neoclassical theories stub-
bornly disregard the structural disparities 
that make for external bottlenecks in the 
periphery, as well as the play of power re-
lations, which exert so great an influence 
on the international distribution process 
under the hegemony of the centres, es-
pecially that of the main centre of capital-
ism. Nor is it other than incongruous, 
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although very understandable, that econ-
omic freedom is invoked in order to promote 
the expansion of the transnational cor-
porations in the periphery, as if they were 
the most authentic expression of free com-
petition irt the peripheral markets. 
The transnational corporations date a 
long way back into the past. Formerly they 
exploited the natural resources and public 
services of the periphery —and to some ex-
tent still do so— and now they are zealously 
exploiting innovations which in the centres 
are ceasing to be such. And their oli-
gopolical characteristics are manifest. 
Nevertheless, the transnational could 
not have assumed so important a role in the 
periphery without the privileged-consumer 
society, although in their turn they have done 
much to place it on its exalted footing. In 
fact, a very strong bond of reciprocal in-
terests is being forged between the trans-
nationals and the advantaged strata. 
Let there be no misunderstanding. 
This supremely important role of the trans-
national corporations should not beguile us 
into carrying its interpretation too far. If 
they were to vanish by magic from the per-
iphery, the surplus would not therefore disap-
pear, nor would the system be cured of 
its exclusive and conflictive tendencies. 
Neither would that event alone remedy the 
structural disparities in centre-periphery 
relations. But the all-too-well-known 
phenomena of dependence would undoubt-
edly be mitigated. 
We have already said in another study 
that if full use were made of the surplus for 
capital accumulation purposes, i.e., if the 
privileged strata earmarked a larger pro-
portion of their income for accumulating 
more capital, instead of indulging in ex-
travagant consumption, the rate of ab-
sorption of the labour force would be 
speeded up, especially in the lower strata, 
and distribution would be progressively 
improved. The system would approach 
social efficiency. But instead of relying 
on its own accumulation effort, it resorts 
to the transnationals, so that others' hands 
may do what could largely be done by its 
own, through full utilization of the surplus 
potential. 
Whichever way one looks at it, if the 
advantaged strata accumulated more capi-
tal, the privileged-consumer society would 
not expand to so striking an extent; and the 
transnationals would not find such fertile 
soil for exploiting the innovations which 
give an exaggerated impetus to demand, 
if no such social aberration of peripheral 
capitalism occurred. 
5. The role of the market 
Economic liberalism assigns to market 
laws the leading role in the regulation of 
development. And its refutation frequently 
leads to a corresponding repudiation of the 
market. 
I do not believe for a moment that the 
market is the supreme regulator of the econ-
omy. Nevertheless, it does have a great deal 
of economic and also political significance. 
This I unreservedly acknowledge in order 
to clear up possible confusions at the 
outset. 
The market is invoked as a spontaneous 
mechanism for the allocation of capital and 
other productive resources, as a function 
of demand, and always provided that com-
petition is working properly. But the de-
mand in question derives from a particular 
distribution of income which, in turn, is the 
product of a specific socio-economic struc-
ture and of the power relations stemming 
from that structure and from the changes 
taking place in it. As we have already 
seen, this distribution is highly inequi-
table, and moreover, leaves, a consider-
able proportion of the population on the 
sidelines of development. Market laws 
might therefore be said to represent a 
rational solution, though only for the pri-
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vileged strata: it is by no means rational 
from the standpoint of the community at 
large, an assertion which of course involves 
a value judgement. And there can be no 
doubt that neither is rationality achieved 
when the trade-union and political power 
of the middle strata attempts to counteract 
market laws. 
Nor is it possible to speak of the sover-
eignty of the consumer from the angle of 
demand. Under a competitive system, no-
body forces anyone to buy what he does not 
want; people buy what they want when they 
have the means to do so. But what they want 
is largely the product of the art of collective 
suggestion which is practised increasingly 
with the prodigious development of the mass 
communication media. Sovereignty subject 
to direction! A very clear case in point is 
the ambivalence of technique: it serves to 
inform, but also at the same time to deform. 
The negative side of this ambivalence is set 
over against the positive with respect to the 
sovereignty of the consumer. And there is 
no counterweight whatever in the mass 
communication media at the service of the 
consumer society. 
Strictly speaking, the market has no 
social horizon. Under a system which had a 
horizon of this kind, that is, which would 
solve the accumulation problem on col-
lectively rational lines and at the same time 
progressively reduce the great distribu-
tive disparities, the market might come 
to be an efficient mechanism. 
Of course the way to give the market 
such a horizon would not be by changing its 
traditional name. Some liberal economists 
of the periphery nowadays talk of the social 
market economy; a fresh proof of the intel-
lectual dependence prevailing in our coun-
tries, since that term was coined in very 
highly developed countries where poverty 
has been eliminated —save in a few of its 
strongholds— thanks to a long period 
of capital accumulation. Nevertheless, 
although the distribution struggle has 
taken a disconcerting turn, the social con-
tent of development is very high in those 
countries. Could the same be said of the 
periphery? 
Needless to say, the market is respon-
sible neither for the great distributive dis-
parities nor for the waste of capital accumu-
lation potential which prevents the social 
integration of the lowest strata. The market 
cannot be held responsible: but neither can 
we talk of a social market economy if the 
major defects of development are reflected 
in it. The important thing is to ascertain 
what lies behind the market in the social 
structure. 
Much more serious still is the incon-
gruity seen to be when it is recalled that the 
use of force to bring the system back into 
smooth operation means sacrificing the 
consumption of vast social strata so that the 
upper strata may regain and even improve 
their position in the privileged-consumer 
society. 
Nor has the market a time horizon. 
When enterprises calculate the combina-
tions that are in their best interests they do 
not include in production costs the effects 
of their decisions on the ecological and 
human environment, or on the future avail-
ability of non-renewable natural resour-
ces. Their concept of economic efficiency 
does not generally stretch much farther than 
their immediate interests, which must be 
distinguished from the collective interest 
as viewed from a long-term standpoint. 
In short, it is a mistake to blame the mar-
ket for the faults of the system; rather is it 
the expression of those faults. This point 
needs stressing because it is sometimes 
maintained that to avoid those defects the 
transformation of the system would have to 
include the abolition of the market. 
Such a step would inexorably lead to 
summit decisions as to what should be con-
sumed and what produced. It implies, in 
fact, the abolition of economic freedom 
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—even that limited measure of freedom that 
the play of market forces permits. 
6. Change and development ethics 
The transformation of the system must 
give the market social efficiency, and, 
further, ratify the individual's essential 
right to be free to choose his work and ex-
press his consumer preferences: all this 
as an integral part of a broader human con-
ception whose impairment cannot but be 
attended by very grave consequences. It is 
a question of one of the basic rights of man, 
vitiated though they now are by the socio-
economic structure. 
If the aim pursued were to abolish the 
market altogether, all the means of pro-
duction would have to be concentrated in 
the hands of the State, so that it could adopt 
the necessary decisions on consumption, 
production and employment. 
This socialization of the means of pro-
duction, by handing over their entire man-
agement to the State, would endow it with 
invincible political power, totally at vari-
ance with the conception of a democratic 
society and of human rights, the attain-
ment of which, in despite of great historical 
vicissitudes, counts as one of the loftiest 
achievements of Western civilization. 
A fundamental distinction must be 
drawn between socialization of the means 
of production and the social use of the sur-
plus for the purposes of capital accumu-
lation and income distribution. Indepen-
dent management of the means of pro-
duction is perfectly compatible with this 
social use of the surplus. I am speaking of 
the independence of major enterprises in 
relation both to the State and to the private 
interests which at present hold most of the 
means of production in their hands. 
Two centuries of belief in the efficacy 
of the market as a regulating mechanism 
have prevented the emergence of a develop-
ment ethic, which would seem to be an indis-
pensable requisite in face of the ambiv-
alence of technique. Thanks to technique, 
an almost unimaginable increase in human 
welfare has been achieved for most of the 
population of the centres. A Utopian 
dream has become reality. And the per-
iphery has the singular privilege of enjoy-
ing acces to all that the centres had to spend 
a long time envolving, at the cost of con-
siderable sacrifices. Technical progress 
has afforded us benefits that a few gener-
ations back would have been inconceivable. 
But all this has gone hand in hand with very 
serious and flagrant negative conse-
quences. 
The fact is that the private-interest 
motivation which is the driving force be-
hind the application of technique is not 
calculated to resolve the problems of eco-
logical deterioration or the irresponsible 
exploitation of non-renewable natural re-
sources. Even if some futurologists ex-
aggerate the danger that this represents, 
there is an undeniably essential need to try 
to envisage the future, in the light of very 
potent ethical considerations. 
Neither market forces nor politics, as 
a rule, look beyond immediate consider-
ations. In the case of politics, attention is 
generally confined to the aspirations and 
interests of those who are already living on 
this planet, but no thought is given to its 
future inhabitants, though the future con-
stantly draws closer to the present. Who are 
the representatives of those that do not yet 
exist? Only an ethical concept which intro-
duces into politics a time horizon, a great 
sense of responsibility to the future, can 
provide an answer to this question. 
What relevant knowledge we already 
have calls imperatively for foresight; and 
so does the knowledge that might be gained 
through scientific research. Voices fully 
authorized to utter such an opinion agree 
that biological research, in its present 
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phase, has reached a degree of potential 
for catastrophe with which it would be im-
possible to cope without the guidance of 
certain ethical principles. 
A concept of moral responsibility in 
demographic questions is also required, 
since those who are not yet born are not 
yet represented either, and if that re-
sponsibility is not shouldered the future 
will bring with it grave problems of human 
coexistence. 
The lack of moral responsibility in the 
face of a present whose evils are glaring, 
and a future which holds out both promises 
and threats, is leading to a tremendous 
frustration of development: a frustration 
which has not yet been reflected, either in 
the centres or at the periphery, in a change 
of attitude that may promote the trans-
formation of the system. 
As part of this change of attitude, the 
surplus too must be viewed in the light of a 
development ethic. It would then have to 
be asked: To whom does the surplus rightly 
belong? There is no scientific reply to this 
question. 
Since the. surplus consists in that part 
of the fruits of technical progress which is 
not transferred to the labour force because 
of the great heterogeneity of the peri-
phery's socioeconomic structure, it might 
be thought that it is to the labour force that 
the surplus should belong. To which 
labour force? To that employed at higher 
levels of productivity thanks to capital ac-
cumulation? Let us assume so for a mo-
ment. If in the play of power relations the 
surplus were transferred to these workers, 
the capital accumulation problem would 
not thereby be resolved; rather would it be 
aggravated, and thus intensify the exclus-
ive tendency of the system, to the serious 
detriment of the lower strata. 
A Latin American sociologist, refer-
ring to these strata which the system fails 
to absorb, and which consequently do not 
generate a surplus, asserts that the system 
exploits them by extension. In that case, 
if the surplus were distributed to the la-
bour force absorbed in technological 
layers of increasing productivity, would 
this latter also assume the role of ex-
ploiter, by extension, of those remaining 
in the lower layers of technology, and 
therefore in the lower strata? 
And in the case of a natural resource 
whose extraction, thanks to technical pro-
gress, requires a relatively small labour 
force, should the surplus thus obtained fall 
to the labour force concerned? 
And what is the part played by the 
scientists and technologists responsible 
for the innovations that increase pro-
ductivity? Should the surplus be assigned 
to those who are participating in the pro-
cess today, or is it also the due of those who 
did so yesterday? If we were to adopt the 
latter criterion, would it not be somewhat 
like trying to do retrospective justice to 
those great artists of the past who lived and 
died in penury, while nowadays fabulous 
prices are paid for their works? 
Here again there is no scientific sol-
ution. The solution is fundamentally ethi-
cal: to build up the surplus and use it for 
capital accumulation purposes in order to 
convey the advantages of development to 
all; and to do so, moreover, with a distribu-
tive discipline based on ethical consider-
ations that could never justify the arbitrary 
element at present implicit in the play of 
power relations. 
7. The attitudes of'the centres 
It must be acknowledged that the centres 
are increasingly aware of the serious prob-
lems deriving from the ambivalence of 
technique; but they obstinately close their 
eyes to the effects of technique when it pen-
etrates into the socio-economic structure 
of the periphery. Of course they attach 
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importance to its enormous potential for 
human welfare, but not to the new and in-
tricate problems which it poses. Among 
us, too, very few have come to be convinced 
of the contradictions involved. I have no 
hesitation in saying this, for the deeper 
I go into these questions, the less I share 
certain attitudes on the part of those who 
seek to absolve us of our own moral res-
ponsibility by laying the blame for all the 
evils of the periphery upon the centres. 
Responsibilities must be shared. And 
the brunt of them must be borne by the 
powerful. In this case the powerful are 
not only the centres but also those who en-
joy in the periphery the privileges of the 
consumer society. 
To put it bluntly, the responsibility 
for transforming the system is our own. 
But the discharge of this responsibility, 
extremely difficult in itself, would be 
much more so still if the centres were to 
shirk their own responsibility for co-oper-
ation, which, after all, apart from its moral 
aspect, is also a matter of their own econ-
omic and political interest, if they look 
far enough ahead to rise above the short-
term interests by which they are ruled. 
There are few symptoms of their hav-
ing any inclination to do so. Moreover, 
they are a long way from understanding 
the problems of the periphery, although 
understanding them is not everything. As 
U Thant, used to say, their respective pos-
itions are very well understood both by the 
spider and by the fly caught in its web! 
In the thirty years of CEPAL's existence 
I have watched a whole procession of un-
comprehending attitudes on the part of 
the centres and the periphery alike. And 
something more than uncomprehending, 
for in the case of the centres they were ac-
companied, especially in the early days, 
by a certain intellectual condescension, if 
not arrogance, vis-á-vis the initial efforts 
to achieve authenticity in the interpret-
ation of our own development phenomena. 
In those early days the old theory of the 
international division of labour prevailed, 
and was fully endorsed by the periphery; 
hence CEPAL'S thesis of industrialization 
as an indispensable requisite for develop-
ment. 
Equally serious was an attitude which 
is far from having disappeared, and which 
consists in selecting some partial and 
fragmentary aspects of development on 
which to preach 'sound doctrine', some-
times, often in fact, in admonitory accents. 
The solution of the development prob-
lem, we were told over and over again, is a 
question of population. Take deliberate 
measures to influence its growth, and leave 
the forces of the economy free to act, with 
the transnational to help them on! In 
this way the need for financial co-oper-
ation was also evaded. Did not a leading 
figure in the United States say that one 
dollar spent on birth control was worth a 
thousand dollars in contributions of in-
ternational resources? 
Next it was the turn of education. Who 
can deny its significance, not only econ-
omic but also cultural? But in this frag-
mentary view of a global phenomenon it 
was often forgotten that the education 
problem could not be dealt with or resolved 
outside the context of development and of 
the inescapable need to speed up accumu-
lation and alter the composition of capital. 
8. The discovery of peripheral poverty 
The accent has now been placed on critical 
poverty and basic needs. Some econ-
omists in the centres have belatedly dis-
covered this phenomenon of poverty. 
They are, of course, unaware that with ref-
erence to Latin America critical poverty 
is- another of the serious problems that we 
have sought to highlight, above all in 
various CEPAL reports dating from some 
time back; and among them the last that 
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it fell to me to present to the governments, 
in the year 1963. I do not hesitate to re-
produce here what was stated then: 
"On the basis of conjectural data, it 
may be estimated that about half the exist-
ing population has a tiny average personal 
income of 120 dollars a year. And this vast 
social aggregate accounts for only about 
one-fifth of total personal consumption in 
America, showing the highest coefficients 
of undernourishment, poor clothing and 
worse housing, as well as of disease and 
illiteracy; and, at the same time, the 
highest rates of reproduction. 
"It is here that the development effort 
must primarily be concentrated. The 
notion, which dies hard, that development 
takes place spontaneously, without a 
rational and deliberate effort to achieve 
it, has proved to be an illusion, both in Latin 
America and in the other peripheral re-
gions of the world. For a century now our 
economies have been linked to the inter-
national economy, and fifty per cent of the 
population is still stagnating in pre-capi-
talist conditions which are incompatible 
with its growing economic and social as-
pirations. 
"Even so, average per capita income 
in Latin America is appreciably higher 
than in other peripheral regions, and thus 
affords an advantageous starting-point 
for the realization of what is no longer a 
Utopian dream; the eradication of poverty 
and its inherent evils, by virtue of the 
tremendous potential of contemporary 
technology and the possibility of assimil-
ating it more quickly than was the case with 
the capitalistic evolution of the more ad-
vanced countries. 
"However, this rapid penetration of 
technique demands and brings with it rad-
ical changes: changes both in the pattern 
of production and in the structure of the 
economy which could not be effectively 
brought about without a basic reform of 
the social structure".' 
Language of this kind might have been 
described as extreme in those days of 
lively ideological contention between the 
two superpowers, reflected as it naturally 
was in the mirror of imitative peripheral 
capitalism. 
When this question is raised in the 
centres its deep significance is seldom 
grasped. Judging from the copious litera-
ture on basic needs that has appeared of 
late, I greatly fear that the intention is 
to deal with the problem of poverty in 
isolation, perhaps with a praiseworthy 
measure of philanthropy, but thereby 
sidestepping the fundamental issue of the 
transformation of the system and inter-
national co-operation. 
Since the time of which I was speaking, 
however, a lot of water has flowed under 
the bridges, and today we have Mr. Mc-
Namara, President of the World Bank, 
drawing the attention of governments in 
moving terms to the persistence of poverty 
alongside prosperity, even in peripheral 
countries where the rate of development is 
high. And in his persuasive address Mr. 
McNamara eloquently declares: 
"Not only are the central public 
services often out of financial and geo-
graphical reach of the poor, but such fa-
cilities as are in place may be so inap-
propriately designed as to be virtually 
irrelevant to their needs; impressive four-
lane highways, but too few market roads; 
elaborate curative-care urban hospitals, but 
too few preventive-care rural clinics; pres-
tigious institutions of higher learning, but 
too few village literacy programmes. 
"Public services that are not designed 
modestly and at low cost per unit will al-
CHPAI., Towards a Dynamic Development 
Policy for Latin America fe/cN. 12/680/Rev. 1), 
United Nations publication, Sales N°: 64.M.C.4, 
pp. 3-4. 
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most certainly end by serving the privi-
leged few rather than the deprived 
many." 
Absolutely true. But a further step 
needs to be taken along this road on which 
the President of the World Bank has made 
so timely a start. The extravagances that 
so rightly cause him concern go along with 
the privileged consumer society. The 
problem of poverty cannot be effectively 
combated unless the brakes are energeti-
cally applied to that society in order to ac-
celerate the rate of domestic capital ac-
cumulation, and unless new relations with 
the transnational are established. 
I am not suggesting that Mr. Mc 
Ñamara overlooks the need for capital 
accumulation. On the contrary, he more 
than once stresses the necessity of speed-
ing up its pace. The President of the World 
Bank has shown that he really has a clear 
and vigorous conception of peripheral 
development and of its international co-
operation requirements. 
I am inclined to think, however, that 
his choice of rural poverty as the keynote 
of his address perhaps reflects his discon-
certment at the persistent reluctance of 
the centres and the periphery to face up 
resolutely to the basic problems. 
And in the centres there are a good 
many who believe that to combat critical 
poverty with a modicum of international 
resources would have the merit of mitigat-
ing the periphery's tenacious insistence 
on the need for a new international econ-
omic order. 
Of course, to eliminate rural poverty, 
agricultural productivity must be in-
creased and substantial changes in the 
land tenure regime must also be faced. 
But here comes into play a universal law, 
Address by Robert S. McNamara to the 
1977 Meetings of the Boards of Governors, Sum-
mary Proceedings, World Bank, Washington D.C., 
1977, pp. 25-26. 
well-known and alien to economic systems, 
i.e., that an increase in productivity over 
and above certain fairly narrow limits 
creates a labour surplus; and these redun-
dant workers could only be absorbed if the 
rate of capital accumulation were stepped 
up in industry and in other activities. Fur-
thermore, how would it be possible to raise 
the productivity of the marginal workers 
of the periphery, from hawkers and ped-
dlers to bootblacks? A problem of absorp-
tion in higher-productivity layers of tech-
nology! 
In the lower strata there is, of course, 
a potential demand for goods and basic 
services; but that does not mean that it will 
be converted into effective demand, since 
incomes are very small. And they are small 
because the labour force in these strata is 
working in very low-productivity layers of 
technology. What is more, the labour force 
already absorbed in technological layers 
with higher productivity has been unable 
to raise its income correlatively because 
of the regressive competition of the man-
power left in the low-productivity layers 
or in the ranks of the unemployed. 
It is therefore essential to shake off the 
far from uncommon propensity to single 
out particular aspects of an overall prob-
lem. And the worst of it is that this mistake 
is sometimes committed by people of in-
tellectual authority. Perhaps the follow-
ing reminiscence may serve to illustrate 
the point. 
When I visited a number of governments 
on the eve of the first Conference on Trade 
and Development, I went to a meeting in 
the Department of State in Washington, at 
the end of 1963, if I remember rightly. As 
I urged, among other requirements, the 
need for the periphery to undertake and 
expand industrial exports under the aegis 
of a preferential regime, an eminent pro-
fessor, well-known for a book on develop-
ment that was in vogue for a time, raised an 
objection in roughly the following terms: 
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Why think of that if the solution lies in 
increasing the productivity of agriculture, 
which is so low in the periphery? My reply 
was short, and based on the logical sequence 
of CEPAL's arguments: higher agricultural 
productivity, vigorous encouragement of in-
dustrialization, and expansion of indus-
trial exports in order to achieve a degree 
of economic eficiency which could not be 
attained by merely going on whith import 
substitution policy. 
A simple and categorical conclusion. 
To insist separately upon any one of these 
partial aspects, although it has indisput-
able merits, incurs the risk of diverting 
attention from the global development 
problem, which calls for fundamental 
transformations, as well as for far-reaching 
changes in the conception of international 
co-operation. 
9. A global theory 0/peripheral 
development 
The foregoing comments once again 
demonstrate the need for a development 
theory such as will not only have scientific 
validity as a response to the peripheral 
situation, but will also clear the way for 
a rational transformation of the system: 
ethics to promote the transformation, 
rationality to carry it out. 
Neoclassical theories will be of little 
use for that purpose. In them, as in others 
opposed to them, worked out in the centres, 
there are some theoretical observations 
which have helped to elucidate peripheral 
development phenomena, alongside some 
interpretations in which a disconcerting 
tendency to over-simplify is apparent. 
These theories are widely preached in 
the periphery in default of a complete 
and autochthonous interpretation of the 
phenomena in question: in default of a 
theory with scientific validity, a theory of 
global scope. 
Global in a twofold sense: regarding 
peripheral development as an integral 
part of the overall phenomenon of capital-
ism, and, in addition, interpreting it as a 
process that is far from being merely econ-
omic. An interpretation of development 
cannot be confined within such narrow 
bounds. 
In my inability to conceive of a purely 
economic theory of development, I come 
up against strong opposition on the part of 
the neoclassical economists who skim over 
the periphery's social structure and its 
great disparities with the structure of the 
centres as if they were walking on hot coals. 
In fact, they are blind to these structures, 
as they are blind to the structural phenom-
enon of the surplus; and they disregard 
social and political elements as exogenous 
factors which disturb the harmonious 
course of events. 
As regards the first requirement —that 
of a global approach-— the theories formu-
lated in the centres make a false claim to 
universality. The neoclassicists, like the 
Marxists and the Keynesians, disregard 
the periphery. Perhaps they have no need 
to take it into account, since their start-
ing point is a dogmatic notion that the 
interpretation of the capitalist process in 
the centres is valid for the periphery too: 
a notion which has a logical corollary, 
namely, that what is good for the centres 
will be good for the periphery as well. 
Obviously, what is required is a univer-
sal development theory, not one theory for 
the centres and another for the periphery. 
A theory is needed that covers centres and 
periphery in all their complexity, analys-
ing the structure of both as well as the 
wide disparities they present, the power 
relation that emanate from the different 
structures, and the processes of propa-
gation and irradiation from the centres, 
with their effects on the imitative capital-
ism of the periphery - processes which de-
velop under the hegemony of the centres, 
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especially of the main dynamic centre of 
capitalism. 
The development of peripheral capi-
talism is part of a universal manifestation 
of the evolution and expansion of technique, 
which in the past originated, and still 
ceaselessly continues, in the great capi-
talist centres. Hence our centre-periphery 
model, far from being a static conception, 
has been gradually enriched with new and 
deeper contributory elements. 
I said a little earlier that development 
could not be confined within the narrow 
bounds of an economic theory, since in it 
intervene technical, social, political and 
cultural factors, in addition to those of a 
strictly economic character. If methodo-
logical considerations have led theorists 
to examine them separately, prompted at 
times by an understandable itch for theor-
etical specialization, the time has now come 
to deal with them in all their intricate 
complexity and elucidate their inter-
relationships. And this must be done in 
order to get closer to the reality which it is 
sought to transform. To talk of economic 
solutions in relation to peripheral develop-
ment without taking into account the other 
components referred to above, as is the 
habit of those addicted to neoclassical 
theory, is a tragic error from which, unques-
tionably, we are not exempt at the present 
day. Let the political and social obstacles 
hampering the free play of economic forces 
be removed —it is once again urged— and 
the system will become perfectly efficient! 
The only trouble is that thus to attain the 
plenitude of economic liberalism and 
surmount the crisis of the system entails 
the sacrifice of democratic liberalism, 
with all that it means for individual liberty 
and the validity of human rights. 
10. Need for new options 
However, this political regression cannot 
continue indefinitely, because of the very 
wear-and-tear of the use of force and the 
reactions this brings in its train. Sooner or 
later the return to democratization beco-
mes inevitable. But if the process is not 
accompanied by a substantial transform-
ation of the system, I greatly fear that it will 
once more end in an interplay of power 
relations which, with the passage of time, 
and not much time at that, will again upset 
the regular functioning of the economy 
and bring about social disintegration. 
I am deeply concerned lest the system, 
because of its serious imperfections, may 
have its outcome in a succession of political 
cycles, with periods of democratization 
followed by periods of political repression 
and aggravation of social inequality. 
In face of this disconcerting prospect 
a heavy responsibility is incumbent upon 
those of us who have to do with peripheral 
development phenomena: a responsibility 
which we are very far from having effectively 
shouldered hitherto. But what options 
have we been able to present to the politi-
cal decision-makers and to the agents of 
force? Only two extreme alternatives: that 
of economic liberalism, which inexorably 
demands the sacrifice of democratic 
liberalism; or that of transferring the 
means of production to the State and con-
centrating their management in the hands 
of those who hold political power at its 
summit levels —a political power which 
thus becomes unassailable. 
Under the first of these options, the 
democratization process is suspended. 
Under the other, it is replaced by a funda-
mentally different conception of the politi-
cal regime and of human rights. 
Thus it is easy to understand the tor-
mented perplexity of those who believed 
in the feasibility of the advancement of one 
of humanism's greatest conquests, which, 
despite the inestimable values implicit in 
it, has not yet found expression in a distri-
bution ethic. On the contrary, any such 
ethic the system flagrantly disregards. 
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It would seem that new lines are now 
being opened up in the evolution of avant-
garde political thought. The concept of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, or what-
ever it may be called, is being abandoned, 
and in its place the concept of demo-
cratic pluralism is gaining strength. But 
will pluralism be possible if economic and 
political power are concentrated in the 
hands of the few that direct the whole 
system? 
Long experience and earnest thought 
have led me to the conclusion that this con-
centration of the means of production and 
their management is incompatible with 
the progress of democracy. We cannot, 
therefore, shirk the responsibility of which 
I spoke. A new way must be sought to reform 
the system on the basis of a strong sense 
of economic efficiency and distributive 
equity, and, at the same time, of observance 
and progressive reinforcement of the es-
sential principles of democratic liberalism. 
1. Nature of peripheral capitalism 
Peripheral capitalism is essentially imi-
tative, in contrast with the innovative capi-
talism of the centres. Under the hegemony 
of these latter, it opens its doors wider and 
wider to their capital and to their technique; 
to their consumption patterns and other 
cultural manifestations; to their ideas. 
ideologies and institutions. 
These processes of propagation and 
irradiation are occurring within a socio-
economic structure —that of the periph-
It is the option of an all-embracing syn-
thesis which cannot be much longer deferred. 
Unquestionably, this calls for changes 
in the power structure, since no radical 
transformation could be brought about 
without them. But what is to be done after-
wards? In what does the transformation of 
the system consist? This is the question that 
must be discussed with lucid objectivity, 
though not, of course, without deep human 
feeling too. But it must be done in full knowl-
edge of the system that is to be transformed, 
in precise awareness of where its great de-
fects lie. 
The object of this second article of mine 
is to contribute to the discussion in question, 
and at the same time subject my ideas to 
the refining influence of criticism, however 
implacable it may be. It follows my former 
article on "A critique of peripheral capi-
talism" and precedes a final one on a 
"Theory of change". 
ery— which, as will be seen later, is 
fundamentally different from that of the 
centres, owing, among other factors, to the 
long time-lag with which development has 
been taking place. 
Thus peripheral capitalism differs 
from that of the centres in major respects; 
it is evolving in accordance with its own 
specific character, however much it may 
propose to do so in the centres' image and 
likeness. 
The peripheral socio-economic struc-




gely determine the striking disparities 
apparent in the distribution of the fruits 
of the increasing productivity that the pro-
pagation and irradiation of technique 
brings in its train. Herein lie the origins of 
the exclusive and conflictive tendencies 
that characterize the system. 
The rate of development depends pri-
marily upon the rate of accumulation of 
capital (in the shape of goods and training 
of human resources): capital accumulation 
which makes it possible to absorb in more 
efficient and higher-productivity layers of 
technology the labour force employed in 
preceding technological layers of lower 
productivity and efficiency. 
2. The surplus and its structural 
significance 
The disparities referred to above have their 
roots, in the last analysis, in the appropri-
ation of the fruits of increasing productivity 
by the owners of the means of production 
—whether land or capital— in the course 
of the labour-absorption process. 
These are essentially structural phenom-
ena; in the periphery a considerable degree 
of heterogeneity exists in the socio-
economic structure, in which there is a 
vast labour force with scant productivity 
and efficiency employed in lower layers 
of technology where traditional production 
patterns prevail. This prevents the labour 
force that is obtaining employment in 
higher layers, where technical progress is 
incessantly taking place, from increasing 
its earnings correlatively with the increase 
in productivity. Only a relatively small 
fraction of this labour force has the capacity 
to share spontaneously in the fruits of 
technical progress. Thus the owners of 
the means of production retain in their hands, 
in addition to their entrepreneurial re-
munerations, that part of the fruits of 
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higher productivity which we have called 
the surplus. The growth of the surplus, 
and its indefinite retention and circulation 
are of fundamental significance in the 
dynamics of peripheral development. 
3. Concentration and inequality in 
possession of the means of production 
Ownership of the means of production is 
also very unequally distributed, and this 
inequality is becoming more marked. The 
new technological layers which peripheral 
enterprises superimpose on the preceding 
layers generally require a steadily increas-
ing amount of capital, which is more readily 
available, thanks to the surplus, to those in 
whose hands capital is concentrated in the 
upper strata of the structure. And since 
these new layers mean higher productivity, 
the resulting additional surplus which is 
partly earmarked for the accumulation of 
capital, thus tends to become more con-
centrated still. 
Accordingly, concentration breeds 
concentration. In this way the economic 
power of the upper strata is strengthened in 
the spontaneous interaction of market laws. 
The lower one looks down the scale 
of possession of means of production the 
smaller the surplus becomes, not only 
because the means of production decrease 
in volume, but also because this quantitative 
decrease makes it difficult to adopt more 
advanced techniques. 
Ownership of capital is minimal in the 
lower strata, and consequently so is the 
surplus; the principal component of its 
owners' income consists in their meagre 
entrepreneurial earnings. The propaga-
tion of technique thus tends to benefit the 
strong at the expense of the weak. 
4. Increasing income disparities 
Similarly, the market laws make for more 
and more inequality in the earnings of the 
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labour force. Under their rule, the small 
proportion of this latter which is in a 
position to share in the fruits of higher 
productivity is that equipped with the ever-
increasing technical, administrative, execu-
tive and professional skills demanded by 
the propagation of technique and the com-
plexity of development. 
The acquisition of these skills is largely 
dependent upon the social power of the 
upper and upper-middle income strata, 
whose financial position enables them to 
take advantage of the educational and 
training opportunities provided mainly by 
the State. 
Participation in the fruits of greater 
productivity is on a diminishing scale. In 
the middle strata, while market laws 
operate unrestrictedly, the capacity for 
participation of most of the labour force 
absorbed in technological layers where 
productivity is increasing is all the smaller, 
the more it is exposed to the regressive 
competition of the many working in lower-
productivity layers of techonology. 
Moreover, with the progress of develop-
ment a tendency emerges to exclude this 
labour force employed in the less productive 
technological layers, where most of the lo-
wer strata in the social structure are to be 
found. 
This tendency is fundamentally due 
to waste of the capital accumulation po-
tential of the surplus. It is wasted because 
the strata favoured by the distribution 
pattern imitate the consumption of the 
centres, and because part of the surplus 
is siphoned off by the centres themselves. 
The strata in question are those that form 
the privileged-consumer society. 
A pause must now be made for an 
explanation, in somewhat brief outline, 
which will give a clearer idea of the nature 
of the labour absorption process and the 
exclusive tendency of the system. 
5. The labour-absorbent role of 
capital accumulation 
The pace of absorption depends both 
upon the growth rate of productivity and 
upon that of reproductive capital accumu-
lation. Ceteris paribus, if both rates were 
constant, that of absorption would also 
be so, as well as the growth rate of the total 
product. 
The rate of increase of the surplus, 
however, would not be constant but rising. 
As we already know, part of the increment 
in productivity is not correlatively trans-
ferred to that great majority of the labour 
force which distribution leaves at a disad-
vantage. Consequently, the latter's in-
come increases less and the surplus more 
than the product. 
Now if the surplus were allocated in 
its entirety to reproductive capital accumu-
lation, the rate of accumulation would rise, 
and so would the rate of absorption and, 
therefore, the growth rate of the product, 
even if the rate of productivity were to 
remain constant. But with this more in-
tensive absorption of manpower from the 
low-productivity layers of technology the 
differences between technological layers 
would diminish. In this way two highly 
important effects would supervene; in the 
first place, the tendency to exclude the 
lower strata would be weakened; and, sec-
ondly, the capacity of the middle strata 
to share in the fruits of higher productivity 
would improve, as the labour force was 
absorbed in new layers of increasing pro-
ductivity. The system would gradually ac-
quire social efficiency. 
But this does not happen, because of 
the persistence of the privileged-consumer 
society and its waste of the capital accumu-
lation potential of the surplus. The more 
this potential is squandered, the feebler 
become labour absorption and the capa-
city for participation of the middle strata, 
under the rule of market laws. 
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6. Redundancy and spurious 
absorption 
In addition to the tendency to exclude the 
lower strata, there is another aspect of the 
absorption problem which aggravates the 
social inefficiency of the system. I am 
referring to redundancy, Le„ the situation 
of the manpower which, owing to the in-
crease in productivity, cannot find jobs, 
or is turned off, and fails to be spontaneously 
incorporated into the system because in-
sufficient use is made of the capital accumu-
lation potential. 
Redundancy is essentially due to the 
rise in the rate of productivity resulting 
from the incorporation of new layers of 
technology, and to the increase in the 
growth rate of the labour force. 
The higher the growth rate of pro-
ductivity, the higher the rate of reproduc-
tive capital accumulation will have to rise, 
if the rate of absorption of the labour force 
is to be kept constant. This could be 
achieved by virtue of the larger surplus 
which that increasing productivity brings 
with it. But here once again we come up 
against the privileged-consumer society 
and the siphoning-off of income by the 
centres. Since the increment of the surplus 
is dissipated in this way, instead of being 
allocated to reproductive capital accumu-
lation, part of the labour force is left re-
dundant in consequence of the higher rate 
of productivity. 
If, as in the foregoing case, there is no 
improvement in the rate of reproductive 
capital accumulation, a rise in the growth 
rate of the labour force of course aggravates 
the redundancy problem. 
7. Economic efficiency and social 
efficiency 
The preceding explanations afford a better 
understanding of the dynamics of peri-
pheral capitalism. The concentration of 
the means of production in the upper strata, 
and the fact that the surplus grows more 
rapidly than the product, thanks to the 
rise in productivity, have a twofold result: 
the strata in question can expand their 
consumption and at the same time a high 
enough rate of reproductive capital ac-
cumulation can be achieved for the surplus 
to continue to increase. But these two 
effects, characteristic of the privileged-
consumer society, are obtained, as has 
already been remarked, at the expense of 
the absorption of the lower strata and a 
better chance for the bulk of the middle 
strata, whose capacity for participation 
is only slight. 
Thus a high degree of economic ef-
ficiency within the narrow limits of the 
privileged-consumer society may be ac-
companied by increasing social inefficiency. 
It will now be understood why we have 
stressed the importance of propagation 
and irradiation from the centres in the 
social structure of the periphery. The 
diffusion of technique and the unequal 
structural distribution of the fruits of in-
creasing productivity facilitates the pro-
pagation and irradiation of the centres' 
consumption patterns through the ever-
strengthening influence of the mass com-
munication media and the penetration of 
the transnational corporations. Meanwhile 
the techniques that protect and prolong 
human life make for a high rate of po-
pulation growth, which generally rises all 
the more, the lower down one looks in the 
social structure. 
In this structural distribution of the 
fruits of increased productivity great im-
portance attaches to the economic power 
of the owners of the means of production 
concentrated in the upper strata, as well 
as to the social power of a modest fraction 
of the labour force in those and —prin-
cipally— in the upper-middle strata. 
There are undoubtedly individual 
differences, both among the owners and 
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within the labour force. Those who have 
the most drive, dynamism and individual 
ability rise above their social stratum and 
find a niche in the strata higher up. Thus 
they acquire economic and social power 
which augments their capacity for par-
ticipation and their imitation of the con-
sumption patterns of the centres. In this 
way they may contribute to the economic 
efficiency of the system while at the same 
time aggravating its social inefficiency. 
8. Diversification of demand and 
employment 
As productivity increases, the growth 
rate of the total product outstrips that 
of the labour force; this is, in essence, 
the meaning of development. And as the 
product grows, total income grows too, and 
so does demand, which is ceaselessly di-
versified by virtue of technical progress, 
in respect of both goods and personal and 
State services. 
Since great disparities exist in income 
distribution, they are also to be found in 
the degree of diversification of demand; 
and the more rapidly the income of the pri-
vileged strata rises, the more widely di-
versified does demand become. 
This shows how close is the link bet-
ween structure and diversification, since 
the economic and social power of the pri-
vileged strata is, after all, the determin-
ing factor in the unequal growth of demand. 
Diversification is accompanied by very 
important changes in the composition of 
the capital accumulated and in the em-
ployment of the labour force; and these 
changes in their turn influence power 
relations, income distribution and diver-
sification itself. Such is the mutual in-
terdependence of these phenomena. 
As far as goods are concerned, diver-
sification is relatively slight in respect of 
foodstuffs, for well-known reasons, whereas 
it is increasingly extending to industrial 
goods. 
This disparity in demand accounts 
for the shift of labour from agriculture 
to industry, and also to those services which 
are diversified in consequence o f the 
increase in productivity. 
Thus agriculture and the agricultural 
labour force are apt to be relegated to the 
bottom of the social structure; low-pro-
ductivity layers of technology prevail in 
them, and low social strata with tiny in 
comes. The waste of the surplus inde-
finitely postpones the absorption of this 
labour force into technological layers 
where productivity is increasing, while at 
the same time the relatively slow pace at 
which demand for foodstuffs rises, in 
comparison with demand for other goods, 
tends in itself to create redundancy in 
agriculture, which remains unremedied 
because of the system's insufficient ab-
sorption capacity. Situations like this 
occur mainly in agriculture for domestic 
consumption; and they are made worse by 
the increase in productivity which takes 
place in agriculture for export when ex-
ternal demand encourages capital accumu-
lation and technical progress. The re-
dundant manpower remains on the land 
or migrates to the towns. 
Thus regressive absorption supervenes. 
This is not upward absorption in tech 
nological layers where productivity is 
increasing, but the kind of absorption 
that takes place mainly when the strata 
that distribution favours enjoy personal 
services which are wretchedly ill-paid. 
This regressive absorption would not 
occur if accumulation of reproductive ca-
pital were adequate. 
9. Deterioration of income relations 
The social inefficiency of the privi-
leged-consumer society becomes apparent, 
therefore, principally in the agricultural 
labour force and in the personal services 
representing regressive absorption. The in-
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come of these workers tends to deteriorate 
in the course of development, especially 
in relation to the income of the labour force 
which has some capacity to participate in 
the fruits of increased productivity. The 
deterioration is still more serious when 
the earnings of these strata relegated to the 
bottom of the social structure are compared 
with the incomes deriving from the surplus 
at the top. 
Both this deterioration and the redun-
dancy described above are likewise obser-
vable, although generally in a less acute 
form, in the production of goods which, 
not being very advanced, suffer the con-
sequences of the shift of demand, as di-
versification proceeds, towards more tech-
nically refined and costly goods. And 
the relative prices of such goods may also 
deteriorate. This happens mainly in the 
case of agricultural commodities, especially 
when there is land available to increase 
production; and still more when pro-
ductivity and supply outgrow demand. 
And if, in contrast, land is in short supply, 
its product —the agricultural surplus— 
is appropriated by the landowner in whose 
hands it is concentrated. Price relations 
will deteriorate very slightly or not at all, 
or may even improve, but income relations 
will always worsen as long as the absorp-
tion of the lower strata is indefinitely 
deferred. 
10. Reproductive and consumptive 
capital 
Diversification, given the social structure 
and the changes it undergoes, usually 
accentuates the exclusive tendency of the 
system. The more and more technically 
advanced goods in which it manifests itself 
require that the proportion of non-repro-
ductive (or consumptive) capital be raised 
in the accumulation process. 
Reproductive capital is that which 
helps to step up productivity and to mul-
tiply employment in so far as the fruits of 
this higher productivity are allocated to 
capital accumulation. Whereas non-repro-
ductive or consumptive capital, instead 
of increasing productivity, improves the 
efficiency of goods as well as their re-
sponsiveness to considerations of social 
status and to the constant manipulation 
of the so-called sovereignty of the consumer. 
Of course, the two forms of capital com-
position combine together and are closely 
interlinked. Diversification entails an in-
crease in the proportion of non-repro-
ductive capital, but this would not be 
feasible unless productivity and the sur 
plus had already acquired very large 
dimensions by virtue of the accumulation 
of reproductive capital. This is what 
happens in the capitalism of the centres; 
whereas in the peripheral countries it is 
the inequitable income distribution that 
prematurely fosters this and other un-
desirable forms of accumulation of non-
reproductive capital —private and pu-
blic—, prejudicially to reproductive capital 
accumulation and therefore to the social 
efficiency of development. 
A similar phenomenon is to be seen in 
the education and training of the labour 
force, which is consonant with the in-
creasingly high-grade and complex skills 
that diversification demands as higher-
productivity technique is propagated. 
This applies equally to labour engaged in 
the production of goods and to that em-
ployed in personal and State services. 
Training in these skills, in turn, necessi-
tates increasing capital accumulation. But 
as diversification is intensified because 
of the inequitable distribution pattern, 
the proportion of consumptive capital used 
in the training of the labour force also 
oversteps the mark, and consequently its 
unfavourable incidence on the accumulation 
of reproductive capital is likewise excessive. 
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11. Power relations and the sharing 
of the fruits of development 
The displacement of the agricultural 
labour force is reflected in an impressive 
degree of population concentration in the 
larger towns, and this not only because of 
the requirements of technique, but also 
owing to the great disparities in distribu-
tion. Demand and employment encourage 
urban growth, and this in turn attracts yet 
more demand and employment. 
The middle strata, which thus expand 
in urban conglomerates as a result of 
technical progress and the diversification 
of demand, gradually clear the way for 
the democratization process, in despite of 
major obstacles and vicissitudes. And 
democratization is manifested in the in-
creasing trade-union and political power 
of these middle strata. 
Trade-union power helps to strengthen 
the weak sharing capacity which in the 
free play of market forces characterizes 
the labour force that is progressively ab-
sorbed by the higher-productivity layers 
of technology. It limits the regressive 
competition of the labour force employed 
in preceding technological layers and 
of its natural increment. 
As the formerly disadvantaged middle 
strata strengthen their sharing capacity 
in this way, they participate more and more 
in diversification, together with the labour 
force which is placed in a favourable posi-
tion largely by its social power. But the 
process does not extend to the lower strata. 
In the market sphere, the principal 
source of increase in the productivity of 
the system is capital accumulation; and, 
in turn, the income accruing from this 
higher productivity gives great impetus to 
State services. 
In the State, as the political organ of 
the system, power relations also play a de-
cisive role in the distribution of its services 
as well as in their diversification. It is true 
that the State performs very important 
services which are of importance to the 
whole community and not only to the 
power groups in the system, but even in 
this case these power groups exert great 
influence on the levying of the fiscal 
resources with which such public services 
are generally covered. 
Apart from these latter, there is another 
form of distribution of State services, 
supplementary to that stimulated by 
market forces, but increasingly important. 
This supplementary distribution is 
carried out through political power and 
the changes which occur in its composi-
tion, reflecting those that take place in 
power relations concomitantly with the 
changes in the social structure discussed 
above. And in this way power relations 
exert a considerable influence on the use 
of the State's institutional machinery to 
obtain its services and share out the tax 
effort which pays for them. 
Thus, the economic power of the upper 
and the social power of the uppermiddle 
strata allows them to resort to this machi-
nery, on the one hand, to maintain their 
structural position and their capacity to 
appropriate the fruits of technical progress, 
and, on the other hand, to hold out against 
sharing the fruits in question with those 
lower down the ladder. 
It has already been shown, however, 
that the evolution of the middle strata 
enables them to acquire, in addition to their 
trade-union power in the market, political 
power as well, with the advance of the de-
mocratization process. Thus these strata 
too can have recourse to the aforesaid 
institutional machinery, or to other new 
mechanisms, in order to strengthen their 
capacity for sharing in Sate services. 
Over and above this participation, 
power relations affect the absorption of 
the labour force, its income, and State ser-
vices, which in consequence of their own 
dynamics are prone to hypertrophic 
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growth. The again, part of the labour 
force which is not absorbed in the market 
sphere finds a place in State Services, 
where it is not really needed: this is a 
spurious absorption of groups which 
manage to secure it, with or without social 
power, by virtue of their political influence. 
Lastly, political power enables some 
people to obtain rates of pay higher than 
those current in the market, or to gain 
income through forms of collusion between 
the spheres of the market and the State. 
These reflections lead me to mention 
another of the important manifestations 
of political power, particularly th at of 
the middle strata. I am referring to public 
enterprises, which develop when the State, 
outside the market sphere, sets up enter-
prises or takes them over. Here too power 
relations intervene, generally under the 
impulse, at least at firts, of other motiv-
ations: those of restricting or preventing 
the incidence of capital from abroad, or 
of counteracting the economic and pol-
itical power of domestic capital. Be this 
as it may, a public enterprise can hardly 
avoid falling prey to some who, thanks to 
their political power, use it as a means to 
spurious absorption or to incorporation 
into the privileged-consumer society. 
No doubt there are public enterprises 
which succeed in containing political 
pressures; but those that are unable to do 
so help to waste the accumulation potential 
of their own surplus or of the surplus ge-
nerated by private enterprise. 
It is common knowledge that in private 
enterprise, according to the competitive 
circumstances, a criterion of economic 
efficiency prevails. But in so far as the 
accumulation potential gained thereby is 
wasted, the attendant result is the social 
inefficiency of the system. 
The contest for the surplus assumes 
a different significance when the State has 
at its disposal abundant resources deriving 
from the exploitation of a natural source 
of wealth. In this case it can meet the de-
mands of the political power of the middle 
strata without sacrificing —rather, indeed, 
enhancing— the power to appropriate the 
fruits of increased productivity which the 
upper strata wield by virtue of their 
ownership of capital. Far from losing 
anything, the latter, in such conditions, 
usually avail themselves of their political 
power to defend their surplus against tax 
pressure. 
The relegation of the lower strata con-
tinues, however, as this considerable po-
tential for the accumulation of reproductive 
capital is frittered away in the exaltation 
of the consumer society. Still, some of 
the prosperity of those higher up filters 
down to them. 
12. The critical limit of pressure 
for participation 
As was stated above —and is worth repeat-
ing— the growth rate of the total surplus 
is higher than that of the product because 
a more or less significant proportion of 
the labour force has little capacity to share 
in the fruits of technical progress. 
As changes take place in the social 
structure, however, the trade-union and pol-
itical power of that disadvantaged labour 
force allows it gradually to remedy the 
weakness of its ability to obtain its share, 
and likewise the inadequacy of the system's 
absorption capacity. Thus it improves its 
private consumption and its consumption 
of State services, but it does so, as has been 
shown, at the expense of a growth rate of 
the surplus superior to that of the product. 
Similar effects are produced by the 
exaggerated expansion of the State's pub-
lic services, in which a considerable pro-
portion usually corresponds to military 
expenditure, not dissociated of course, 
from the imitation of the technology of the 
centres. And to all this must be added the 
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spurious absorption of labour observable 
chiefly in the shpere of State activities. 
Accordingly, as these various forms of 
participation evolve, a moment is reached 
at which the growth rate of the surplus be-
comes equal to that of the product, and the 
greater the exent to which political or 
trade union power spreads to the lower 
strata, the sooner will that moment occur. 
This is the limit beyond which the partici-
pation of the disadvantaged labour force 
cannot go without causing trouble, under 
the sway of market laws. 
Within that limit the consumer society 
thrives, and could continue to function 
smoothly if redistributive power were to 
stop there; but in this there is no regulatory 
principle, any more than in the growth of 
the surplus. And once the capacity to 
share has been acquired, the formerly 
disadvantaged labour force tries to con-
tinue increasing its private consumption 
and its consumption of State services, as 
well as its employment in these, at the 
expense not only of the growth of the surplus 
but of the surplus itself. The long and the 
short of it is that the full florescence and the 
accumulation capacity of the privileged-
consumer society are impaired, to the 
serious detriment of the dynamics of the 
system. 
The are however institutional mech-
anism whereby the owners of capital can 
recoup themselves for the decrease in 
the surplus: the same whereby they were 
able to appropriate the structural surplus 
and retain it indefinitely in their hands. 
These are monetary mechanisms, and how-
ever strong the opposition put up by the 
responsible athority, the economic and 
political power of the owners of capital 
prevails in the end. Inflation then becomes 
inherent in the system itself when it reaches 
and advanced stage of its development: 
social inflation, differing from inflation 
as it was known in the past, although the 
two forms are usually found in close com-
bination. 
Inflation upsets the system and causes 
its social disintegration, and this sooner 
or later culminates in recourse to another 
of the State's institutional instruments: the 
use of force, determined either by a de-
cision on the part of those who hold it in 
their hands, or by the influence of politi-
cal power at the summit of the system. The 
object of the use of force is to overrule or 
suppress the trade-union and political 
power of the masses, thus seriously under-
mining their sharing capacity. In this way 
it becomes possible to re-establish the 
dynamics of the consumer society, with 
the further consequence that the upper 
strata are enabled to accumulate more 
capital and consume more and better-
quality goods and services, the same 
being true of the favoured segments of the 
middle strata. 
In any event, these results have a high 
social cost, apart from their political cost, 
since they are obtained at the expense of 
the greater participation in income and 
employment previously achieved by the 
bulk of the middle strata, as well as by the 
lower strata where trade-union and politi-
cal power had spread to them. 
Far be it from me to suppose that the 
use of force, when it supervenes at an 
advanced stage in the development of the 
system, accounts for all the political vicissi-
tudes of the periphery; I only wish to stress 
one of the consequences of the restoration 
of the dynamics of the system, which is 
usually aggravated by unfavourable trends 
in the external situation. 
I am therefore inclined to conclude 
that the democratization process has failed 
to solve two fundamental problems: that 
of the accumulation required for social 
efficiency and that of equitable distribu-
tion. Hence the evidence suggest that 
democratization has taken a wrong turning 
and is headed towards self-destruction. 
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13. Determinism and deliberate action 
From all this the inference would appear 
to be that there is an element of deter-
minism in the development of peripheral 
capitalism, which is strengthened in the 
course of the various stages of structural 
change. This determinism certainly does 
not rule out human action; but men act 
within the system and cannot escape from 
its internal dynamics. I am speaking, of 
course, of the system, not of its transforma-
tion, which is a matter of human decisions. 
In the market sphere, those who have 
individual drive, capacity and dynamism 
help to increase the surplus already in 
circulation and continually expanding. 
Clearly, if this surplus were fully utilized 
the system would steadily gain in social 
efficiency, but the waste of the accumu-
lation potential prevents this from happen-
ing; as a result of which, the system's 
absorption capacity is weakened, and the 
lower strata are excluded from the de-
velopment process, as has so often been 
said. 
In the sphere of the State, two opposite 
currents contend in the interplay of power 
relations. On the one hand, dynamic 
leaders emerge who represent the econ-
omic and social power of the upper 
strata, and who seek to channel certain 
State services and the corresponding in-
vestment towards increasing productivity 
and the surplus in the market sphere. They 
also try to contain or regulate the redis-
tributive action of trade-union and politi-
cal power. 
On the other hand, structural changes 
allow dynamic individuals of another type 
to come to the fore, who represent the 
trade-union and political power of the 
middle and possibly of the lower strata 
in their endeavours to share in the benefits 
of development; these are the trade-union 
and political leaders who play a highly 
influential part in the distribution strug-
gle and its conflictive evolution. 
Whether the system absorbs these lat-
ter dynamic elements, of whether they free 
themselves fro m their subordin ation to 
the upper strata, largely depends upon 
structural change. But in any event, 
nothing prevents the exercise of some 
individual influence either to moderate or 
to spur on the conflicts that arise within 
the dynamics of the system. 
While the conflicts are taking place, 
those other dynamic individuals of course 
emerge, who have force at their disposal 
and use it. Herein too there is a measure 
of determinism, since in their intent to 
rescue the system, from its state of crisis 
they are faced with only two major options, 
both of them lacking in authenticity and 
revealing the intellectual dependence of 
the periphery: economic liberalism or con-
centration of economic power in the 
hands of the State. Both alternatives, 
notwithstanding their diametrically-opposed 
character, are incompatible with the ad-
vance of democratization. They are an 
expression of the propagation and ir-
radiation of ideologies from the centres 
which are quite out of keeping with the 
specific phenomena of peripheral de-
velopment. 
These ideologies also strike root in 
those who, in face of the great and in-
creasing social disparities, and perhaps 
because they feel frustrated at not having 
gained a foothold in the system, propose 
to destroy it by violence; their violence on 
the one hand, and the counterviolence of 
the State on the other, end by shipwreck-
ing elemental human rights. 
14. The laissez-faire State 
In the light of this brief exposition of the 
structural components of the system and 
the changes they undergo, and of the phe-
nomena of propagation from the centres, 
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it may well be asked whether the image of 
the laissez-faire State, deriving from the 
ideas of economic liberalism, is in any 
way consonant with the reality of peripheral 
capitalism —that is, with the reality of its 
internal dynamics, to which we have con-
fined ourselves for the moment, leaving 
its complex relations with the centres, 
under their hegemony, to be tackled later. 
There is no such thing as the laissez-
faire State. It cannot be said to exist 
when those in whose hands economic 
power is concentrated avail themselves 
of some of the State's institutional me-
chanism in order to seize or retain the 
lion's share of the fruits of technical pro-
gress; nor can it when, in the course of 
structural change, the labour force dis-
advantaged by market laws endeavours 
to improve both its private and its social 
consumption by resorting to State me-
chanisms, thanks to its trade-union and 
political power. Nor is it possible to speak 
of a laissez-faire State when recourse is 
had to the institutional expedient of force 
in order to free the privileged-consumer 
society from disturbances... Economic 
efficiency —although not always even 
that— at the cost of serious detriment' to 
the social efficiency of the system. 
15. Structural disparity in centre-
periphery relations 
Let us now take the same sort of brief glance 
as before at the intricate complex cons-
tituted by the centre-periphery system. 
The great structural disparities bet-
ween the centres and the periphery and the 
corresponding power relation, together 
with the propagation and irradiation so 
often mentioned, largely determine the 
nature of what occurs within the complex. 
Capital accumulation, technical pro-
gress and demand tend to be concentrated 
in the centres by their very dynamics: 
the centripetal dynamics of capitalism. 
And the same is also true of trade in ma-
nufactures encouraged by diversification 
Thus trends emerge among the centres 
towards international integration of pro-
duction of increasingly advanced goods: 
integration among equals or quasiequals. 
The periphery lags behind in this 
process of generation of technical inno-
vations with its dynamic effects on pro-
duction and trade, because among non-
equals no tendency to integration exists. 
But, as everyone knows, the periphery 
is by no means backward in the propaga-
tion and irradiation of the more and more 
technically advanced patterns of con-
sumption. Consumption —the consumer 
society— is therefore being rapidly inter-
nationalized, whereas in contrast formi-
dable obstacles are encountered by the in-
ternationalization of production from 
the standpoint of foreign trade. 
The spontaneous expansion of ca-
pitalism from the centres to the periphery, 
over and above the appendicular role 
of the periphery in respect of primary 
exports, is nothing but a myth; an outdated 
myth which is coming to life again of late 
with the image of the transnational cor-
porations and the exploitation of their 
technical innovations. 
The time-lag in peripheral development 
caused by centres' concentrative ten-
dencies is reflected — although with a few 
exceptions — in a definite trend towards 
disparity between demand in the centres 
for primary goods from the periphery and 
demand in the periphery for goods re-
presentative of the diversification cease-
lessly going on in the centres. Here again 
we find one of the effects of the great struc-
tural differences characterizing centre-
periphery relations. 
From this disparaty stems the peri-
phery's inherent proneness to an external 
bottleneck, aggravated by the siphoning-
off of income mentioned before. And the 
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centres neither have taken nor are taking 
any serious steps to mitigate, not to men-
tion eliminate, these external contradic-
tions in the system. 
Accordingly, the periphery is striving 
to counteract the disparity in question by 
resorting to import substitution, based on 
protection in view of the technical and 
economic superiority of the centres. But 
this protection is often carried much too 
far. 
Substitution is not a static phenomenon; 
far from it. It moves towards saturation 
point in respect of products already cov-
ered, while the increasing diversification 
going on in the centres means that new 
lines of important substitution must be 
undertaken to counteract the trend 
towards a bottleneck. 
But as these advances are made in 
import substitution, growing technical 
complexities emerge which also call for 
broader markets. Thus the gates are 
thrown open to the transnational corpora-
tions, and these first enjoy the advantages 
of the domestic market favoured by pro-
tection and then, with the incentives 
afforded by subsidies and other inci-
tements, begin to develop exports. 
It is a fact that, hitherto at least, the 
transnational have displayed little 
interest in exporting to the centres, where 
successive innovations decisively in-
fluence their entrepreneurial action. In 
the periphery they really prefer to pro-
duce goods corresponding to earlier in-
novations, which in the centres are being 
left behind by others still newer. Nor are 
the centres making efforts to open their 
doors to imports of these and other goods 
which are within the reach of the technical 
and economic capacity of the periphery. 
Rather do the trasnationals try to exploit 
those earlier innovations by exporting 
them to less-developed peripheral coun-
tries; and sometimes they succeed in doing 
so to a surprising extent. But in this way 
they help to shift the external bottleneck 
from some peripheral countries to others, 
since the peripheral countries have made 
on 1 y modes t attempts to con struct an 
adequate framework for the development 
of their own reciprocal trade. 
16. Co-existence with the centres and 
the use of force 
In pursuance of their incongruous policy 
vis avis the periphery, the centres pro-
mote and support the expansion of the 
transnational corporations. These share in 
the economic and political power of the 
upper strata, and even outrival it: and 
to this internal power is added the con-
siderable power they wield in the centres. 
Thus, under the hegemony of the latter, 
new forms of dependence emerge, which 
induce a peripheral country to do what 
otherwise it would not, or not to do what 
otherwise it would. 
Dependence has its counterpart in 
financial co-operation, which usually in-
creases in proportion to the ease and room 
for manoeuvre with which the trans-
nationals operate in the ambit of the 
periphery, or the responsiveness of the 
peripheral countries to other hegemonic 
interests of the centres. 
Since the transnational participate 
in the parry and thrust of power relations, 
they play an active part in the periphery's 
internal distribution struggle and in its 
movement towards a crisis. And as this 
crisis is gradually generated in the very 
dynamics of the system itself, with the 
advance of democratization opposition 
is also put up in the periphery against those 
forms of dependence in which the time-
honoured hegemony of the centres is 
manifested, especially that of the prin-
cipal dynamic centre of capitalism. 
Accordingly, the conflicts in the sys-
tem tend to spread outwards, often with 
the aggravating circumstance of an un-
favourable external situation. Thus the 
erring peripheral country finds itself up 
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against the formidable constellation of 
interests which hold sway over the com-
plex of centre-periphery relations. And 
in this dramatic climax of dependence 
punitive attitudes are often adopted. 
By the use of force the sentiments of 
national identity which strive against 
dependence in the periphery can be 
temporarily stifled. Once relationships 
with the centres —relationships mainly 
confined to the privileged-consumer so-
ciety— have been thus re-established, 
a broader horizon is opened up for the 
transnational, allowing them to give new 
impetus to imitative capitalism, within 
the limited sphere of the privileged-con-
sumer society. 
An unsuspected dualism then comes 
to light in the centres. On the one hand, 
human rights are ardently defended 
1. A preliminary explanation of the 
surplus 
Thanks to the accumulation of capital in 
the shape of physical goods and training 
of human resources, the total product of 
the economy tends to grow faster than 
employment of labour as a results of the 
increase in productivity. 
The fruits of this higher productivity 
—as already stated— are primarily 
appropriated by the owners of the means 
of production, and only a small fraction 
of the labour force has a share in them. 
The rest remains in the hands of the owners 
aforesaid in the form of a surplus, over and 
above the remuneration they receive, 
—not without a certain selectiveness— 
and, on the other hand, high praise is 
accorded to the virtues of a system which 
in order to gain great dynamic momentum, 
obstructs democratization in one way 
or another or even, when it is making real 
strides forward, suppresses it altogether, 
to the serious detriment of human rights. 
In short, the linkages between the 
centres and the privileged-consumer society 
cause those major external contradictions 
which, when superadded to those of an 
internal character, accentuate the exclusive 
and conflictive trends of this type of society. 
An their combined effects lead to the use 
of force to reach a purely surface solution, 
affecting outward facts but not the inner 
heart of the structure, with all the extra-
vagantly high social and political cost 
involved. 
where the case arises, for the performance 
of entrepreneurial activities. 
We will now attempt to explain, in the 
first place, why the owners of the means 
of production are able to appropriate the 
surplus; next, why this surplus tends to 
remain in their hands; and subsequently, 
why it increases and continuously circulates 
in the system. 
It is worth while to stress the structural 
origin of the surplus, because the way I 
put the matter in my former article may 
perhaps have left the impression that it 
was more in the nature of a monetary 
phenomenon. I will now try to rectify that 
imperfect explanation. The monetary aspect 
is undoubtedly important, but it relates 
II 
The surplus: its appropriation, growth and 
circulation 
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only to the manner of appropriation and 
retention, and not to the generation of the 
surplus itself, which is a process stemm-
ing from the social structure. 
The structural origin of the surplus, 
however, does not account for its retention 
by the owners of the means of production. 
It is retained because the productivity 
increment is accompanied by an increase 
in demand which manifests itself in the 
monetary expansion inherent in the pro-
duction circuit; and this greater demand 
prevents the higher productivity from 
bringing down prices, and allows the in-
crease in goods in which it is reflected to 
remain in the hands of the owners of the 
means of production, in so far as it has not 
been shared by the more advantaged labour 
force groups. 
In other words, the surplus is constituted 
by that part of the productivity increment 
which is not transferred to the labour force 
through the spontaneous action of market 
forces. 
This phenomenon, at once structural 
and dynamic, is of the greatest importance 
in the development of capitalism; but we 
shall deal with it only in relation to peri-
pheral capitalism. 
As long as the disadvantaged labour 
force does not acquire sufficient capacity 
to share in the surplus, this latter continues 
to grow faster than the total product. 
Thus it attains, in the course of develop-
ment, dimensions which enable the owners 
to expand their consumption, in imitation 
of the centres, and furthermore to introdu-
ce higher-productivity and more efficient 
techniques, thanks to the increase in ca-
pital accumulation. 
As the participation of the labour 
force gradually slows down the growth 
rate of the surplus in relation to that of the 
total product, a limit is reached which 
cannot be overstepped in the dynamics of 
capitalism; be the size of the surplus what 
it may, its growth rate cannot fall below 
that of the product without producing 
seriously disturbing effects. Suffice it to 
make this assertion for the moment in order 
to show the matter in its true perspective. 
We will only add that before that limit is 
reached the surplus has come to be an es-
sential ingredient in the privileged-con-
sumer society. And this means that no 
brake can be applied to its growth, since 
it is based on indefinite mainenance of 
the great distribution disparities. 
Lastly, a word must be said in advance 
on the continuous circulation of the 
surplus. It should be recalled that the 
surplus is retained because the increase 
in productivity is accompanied by an in-
crease in demand and the corresponding 
monetary expansion. This additional de-
mand does not evaporate within the system, 
but continues to circulate, changing in 
composition concomitantly with the in-
crease in goods that higher productivity 
has brought with it. Otherwise, prices 
would fall. 
The present chapter will be devoted to 
discussion of these questions. 
2. The structural phenomenon 
It has already been pointed out that the 
owners of the means of prodution, 
principally in the upper strata of the 
social structure in which most of them are 
concentrated, primarily appropriate the 
fruits of the higher productivity which the 
penetration of technique brings in its 
train. Thus the surplus comes into being. 
We might define it as that part of the 
fruits of productivity which, in so far as it 
has not been shared by a part of the labour 
force in the spontaneous interplay of 
market forces, tends to remain in the 
hands of the owners of the means of pro-
duction, over and above the remuneration 
for their entrepreneurial activities which 
they earn by their ability, initiative and 
dynamism, as well as in return for the risk 
they run. 
Incidentally, in conventional theory 
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a clear distinction is drawn between this 
remuneration and entrepreneurial profits. 
The latter tend to peter out under the 
pressure of competition as the system 
moves towards dynamic equilibrium. 
Herein precisely lies the difference bet-
ween profits, with their transient charac-
ter, and the concept of the surplus, which is 
habitually retained in the manner that 
will be shown in due course-
In peripheral capitalism the owner 
of the means of production and the entre-
preneur are, in most cases, one and the same 
person. But the tendency to separate them, 
so marked in the centres, shows signs of 
developing as concentration of capital 
takes place and the dimensions and 
complexity of enterprises increase. The 
owner continues to appropriate the surplus, 
even if he does not fulfil entrepreneurial 
functions. 
And now, after this brief digression, 
let us pick up the thread of our analysis. 
The key to development lies in the pro-
pagation of the production technique of 
the centres by means of the accumulation 
of physical capital and training of human 
resources that the said technique requires. 
Technique is propagated through the 
continual super imposition of what we have 
called layers of technology, in which the 
innovations of the centres are introduced. 
Albeit with the characteristic time-lag in 
relation to the centres, and with certain 
limitations, technological layers of increas-
ing productivity and efficiency are added 
to preceding layers in which productivity 
and efficiency are less, and at whose lowest 
level precapitalist or semicapitalist tech-
niques are still to be found. As this super-
imposition process takes place, the higher 
technological layers gradually absorb, 
more or less rapidly, the labour force em-
ployed in the technological layers im-
mediately below, as well as its natura! 
increment. But the earnings of the labour 
force thus absorbed do not rise correc-
tively with the improvement in its produc-
tivity. Great disparities can be seen. That 
comparatively small fraction of the labour 
force which can meet the increasingly 
exigent demands of the new technological 
layers in respect of skills is in a better 
position to share in the fruits of higher 
productivity. In these new layers the re-
lation between demand for labour and 
supply is usually close; but the lower down 
the social structure one looks, the more 
supply expands in relation to demand, and 
sharing capacity dwindles until it becomes 
negligible in the lowest income strata. Such 
is the action of market laws. 
The heavier the incidence of competi-
tion from the labour force already employed 
in preceding technological layers of 
lower productivity, the weaker the capaci-
ty to share in the fruits of technical progress 
becomes, with the descent from one level 
of the social structure to another; and the 
larger the proportion of unskilled or less 
and less skilled labour, the greater that 
incidence will be. Rightly considered, 
this is a socially regressive form of com-
petition. 
As long as a sizable body of workers 
remains in such conditions in the lower-
productivity layers of technology, this 
situation will continue to represent a 
considerable obstacle to pay increases, 
even for the manpower that is absorbed in 
technological layers where output per 
worker is higher. 
In passing, the difference between 
technological layers and income strata 
should be noted. In all layers, whatever 
their productivity per man, different 
income strata of the labour force are to be 
found, given the disparities in sharing 
capacity. But in the higher layers of 
technology, the upper income strata are 
predominant, whereas the low-producti-
vity layers comprise mainly lower income 
strata. This point will be more clearly 
understood when the subject of structural 
change is tackled. 
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3. An unrealistic hypothesis 
The significance of the rate of capital ac-
cumulation will now be realized. And 
here a foretaste may be given of what is to 
be said in another chapter. The primor-
dial source of such accumulation is the 
surplus. And the more intensively the 
surplus is allocated to the attainment of 
this objective, the more the rate of absorp-
tion will be speeded up, and the greater' 
will be the ability of the labour force to 
improve its income, in the play of market 
forces, correlatively with the increases in 
productivity. 
In other words, were this to happen the 
differences in productivity would progres-
sively decrease as little by little the higher-
productivity layers of technology displaced 
those below them. 
Undoubtedly, in this dynamic process 
of relative homogenization of technique 
there would also be a gradual lessening of 
structural disparities in earnings although 
not of functional inequalities, i.e., those 
which under the sway of market forces 
would correspond to the differences in 
the ability and dynamism of the individual 
workers and their contribution to the 
production process. Thus, with the passage 
of time — perhaps a long time —, something 
like the suppositions of the neo-classical 
economists would actually occur. 
To put it another way, through the 
spontaneous play of market forces the 
congenital weakness of the bulk of the 
labour force in respect of sharing in the 
fruits of technical progress would be 
progressively remedied. 
But this does not happen, because 
imitation of the consumption patterns 
of the centres, and the siphoning-off of 
resources by these, result in the waste 
of a large proportion of the surplus, that 
is, of the capital accumulation potential 
which productive technique brings in its 
train. Hence the exclusive tendency of 
the system. 
Stress must be laid on this point, since 
it constitutes manifest proof of the re-
gressive significance of market laws in the 
social structure of the periphery. 
It is generally urged, and often over-
insistently, that the social exclusion in 
question is imputable to the tendency of 
the technique propagated from the centres 
to employ less and less labour. Then there 
is talk of the need to work out a technology 
appropriate to peripheral conditions. 
There can be no doubt that if high-
productivity techniques requiring less 
capital could be discovered, peripheral 
development could take a completely 
different turn. While not wishing to 
pour cold water on such hopes, I am incli-
ned to approach this problem from another 
angle, although I do not overlook the 
desirability of a well-organized effort to 
select and adapt the techniques that are 
propagated from the centres. 
In my opinion, the problem has its 
roots in the social structure into which 
the technique penetrates, rather than in 
the nature of the technique itself. For 
although it tends to employ less and less 
labour, thanks to its rising productivity, 
it also brings with it a steady increase 
in capital accumulation potential. If this 
potential were used effectively, technical 
progress would unceasingly multiply em-
ployment ; but th is does not h appen. 
Much of the potential is wasted, and herein 
lies one of the more important phenom-
ena of peripheral development, if not the 
most important of all. 
''A CEPAL interpretation that dates a long 
way back. See CEPAL, Theoretical and practical 
problems of economic growth (E/CN. 12/221), 
Santiago, Chile, mimeographed tex, May 1951. 
(Printed in Spanish, September 1952 and 1973.) 
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4. Say's law and the dynamic process 
The difference between the neo-classical 
concept of entrepreneurial profits and the 
concept of the surplus has already been 
noted above. It should be recalled that 
according to neo-classical theory, profits 
tend to disappear in the long run as a result 
of inter-entrepreneurial competition, either 
because of pay increases or because of 
falling prices. 
It has just been shown that in actual 
fact wages do not rise owing to the existing 
social heterogeneity. As has been repeated 
over and over again, much of the labour 
force fails, in the interplay of market forces, 
to obtain pay increases correlatively with 
the increase in productivity. 
According to the neo-classical ar-
guments, prices would be bound to fall 
in so far as wages did not rise. But this is 
not so, since demand expands. Whence 
does this greater demand originate? This 
is what we propose to consider now, refin-
ing upon the interpretation presented in 
our previous article. 
Perhaps this explanation would be 
more readily understandable if we were 
to recall the law formulated long ago by 
Jean Baptiste Say, according to which 
supply created its own demand; or, in other 
words, the income generated in production 
was converted into demand for the goods 
produced. 
But as in all these classical and neo-
classical arguments, the time factor, 
among other, is overlooked. The income 
generated in the production of the final 
goods which at a given moment are on sale 
in the market creates demand not for 
those but for other final goods which 
appeared on the market earlier. This is a 
matter of the time it takes to complete the 
production circuit from its primary phase 
up to the sale of goods on the market. 
Owing to the time factor, today's supply 
does not generate today's demand; it has 
generated demand before-demand, to put 
it briefly, not for today's goods, but for 
yesterday's. It is not the current supply 
that creates its own demand, but the in-
come paid out by enterprises in the course 
of production circuits that will end in a 
future increase in supply. This is an es-
sentially dynamic process. 
Clearly, however, if the economy were 
stationary, if production remained cons-
tant, and if there were no change in the 
employment of labour and no increases 
in productivity either, the result would be 
equivalence between the income curren-
tly paid out and the current supply, pro-
duction of which would have begun some 
time before. 
But what would happen, in the mean-
while, if productivity were to be stepped 
up by the superimposition of new layers 
of technology, and also improved in the 
preceding layers? The income paid out 
to the labour force engaged in production 
of the future supply would simply not be 
sufficient to absorb the present supply, 
increased as it would be by higher pro-
ductivity. Prices would then necessarily 
have to fall, in so far as earnings had not 
risen. 
What prevents this from happening is 
the increase in employment, and in the 
corresponding income, required for the 
expansion of future production. Herein 
lies the origin of the larger volume of 
demand which enables entrepreneurs to 
appropriate t ^ surplus. 
The growth of employment is a dynamic 
process, not static as the classical and 
neo-classical arguments are wont to be. 
These arguments conceive of reality as a 
series of positions of static equilibrium 
succeeding one another through time. 
Keynesian theory itself went astray in 
this type of reasoning. This is not how 
things work out, and it is therefore necessary 
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to go rather more deeply into the matter, 
at the risk of indulging in repetition.' 
5. Production circuits under way 
The dynamics of development calls for 
successive increases in fixed capital for 
the purposes of expanding production. 
Each capital increment inaugurates a 
production circuit which takes a varying 
length of time according to the type of good 
concerned. Completion of that circuit is 
followed by completion of another, and so 
on in succession. We will leave aside these 
fixed-capital increments for the moment, 
and confine ourselves to the production 
circuits. 
Each circuit, as has been pointed out, 
covers various stages, from primary pro-
duction to the sale of final goods on the 
market. If we stop to look at any given 
period in these successive phases of pro-
duction, we shall find one circuit ending 
in that period, while another is beginning, 
and others again are under way and will 
be completed in future periods. 
In the upward movement of production 
each circuit calls for more employment 
than the one before, and, in consequence, 
generates more income and more aggregate 
demand. And this greater demand partly 
accounts for the fact that the prices of the 
goods whose circuit is completed do not 
fall correlatively with the increase in pro-
duction due to additional employment and 
higher productivity. 
A point worth emphasizing is that if 
demand for the goods which in a given 
period appear on the market at the end of 
each production process were determined 
by the income paid out in the course of that 
'' For the sake of simplicity, we will omit 
foreign trade and other transactions. Besides, these 
are topics with which we have dealt in an earlier 
study. At all events it should be noted that they 
make no essential difference to our line of argu-
ment. 
same process, it would be insufficient to 
absorb the finished goods produced, and 
prices would fall correlatively with the 
increase in productivity. 
But this does not happen, because de-
mand for the goods appearing on the 
market is not generated in the correspond-
ing production circuit but in the circuits 
next under way, which are designed to 
increase production and will be completed 
in future periods. 
6. Graph of appropriation 
For clarity's sake, let us have recourse to 
a graph. It is a rather rough approxi-
mation to reality, but does not impair the 
logic of the argument. 
We will examine two different cases of 
increased production. In the first of these 
the increment is uniform, or, in other 
words, it neither increases nor decreases, 
and the corresponding production circuits 
are reproduced in constant form once the 
increase in final goods has been obtained. 
In the second case, production increments 
mount steadily, so that the new circuits 
give rise to higher income than their pre-
decessors. 
Each circuit is represented by horizon-
tal bars, along which, in the course of the 
time taken by the process, the various 
phases succeed one another until in a 
specific period they end with the final 
goods that find their way on to the market. 
For example, circuit A begins in period I 
and progresses during the intermediate 
periods until it is completed in period v. 
During the same period V circuit B is 
under way, which began in period II and 
will end in period VI, and so on in succes-
sion up to circuit E, which starts in period 
v and will be completed five periods later 
(not shown in order to simplify the graph). 
The income paid out during period v, 
in the different circuits, is represented by 
the corresponding vertical bar 5. 
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In the case of uniform production in-
crements, this vertical line is the same 
length as horizontal bar A, which means 
that the demand generated by the income 
paid out during period V is equivalent to 
the income paid out previously in order to 
produce the goods pertaining to the com-
pleted circuit A. 
To revert to Say's Law. Supply A does 
not generate its own demand since the 
income paid out in order to produce it was 
converted into demand for goods produced 
earlier. Those who earned this income 
during the course of the circuit did not wait 
for its completion before buying what they 
needed. On the contrary, the demand that 
absorbs circuit A's supply in period v is 
generated by the income paid out during 
the same period in circuits B, C, etc., whose 
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Consequently, coincidence between sup-
ply and demand is attributable not to the 
cause assumed in Say's Law but to the 
static conception of the problem which in 
this as in other cases has distorted the in-
terpretation of what really occurs. 
But what would happen in the postu-
lated case of a uniform production in-
crement if productivity were to increase? 
Simply this: the demand represented by 
vertical bar 5 would not be sufficient to ab-
sorb circuit A's supply augmented by 
the increase in goods deriving from higher 
productivity and represented by the shad-
ed area added to supply A. This insuf-
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Let us now pass on to the second case, 
i.e., that of steadily mounting production 
increments, which are a closer approxi-
mation to reality. For this purpose, each 
of the bars representing a production circuit 
is broader than the one before, owing to the 
increase in employment and the income 
accruing from it. 
Thus, the income paid out in the various 
production circuits during period v is no 
longer equal to the income paid out during 
the time covered by circuit A (which began 
in period I), but is higher, and all the more 
so, the more intensive the expansion of pro-
duction under way for use in subsequent 
periods. Thus the demand generated by 
this income in period V exceeds the income 
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previously paid out in order to obtain the 
final goods produced in circuit A. And 
it is precisely this greater demand that al-
lows the increase in goods resulting from 
higher productivity (and represented as 
in the other case by a shaded area) to be ab-
sorbed without a fall in prices. 
Let us take a closer look at so important 
an aspect of the process under consider-
ation, in which the key to our theoretical 
interpretation lies. The conclusion to be 
drawn from this exercise is, in my opinion, 
categorical. If prices do not fall in accord-
ance with rising productivity, and in so far 
as the latter is not correlatively reflected 
in higher earnings, the reason is to be found 
in the expansion of demand generated in 
the circuits that are to increase future pro-
duction. 
This explains why the surplus remains 
in the hands of the owners of the means of 
production. We have already pointed out 
that the surplus is a structural phenomenon; 
but it could neither be appropriated nor 
retained without the increase in demand 
stemming from the dynamics of production 
itself. 
7. The monetary expansion inherent 
in the production process 
But how is this increase in demand paid for? 
Herein lies the monetary element in our ex-
planation. 
This too is an aspect of the question 
which is often passed over in conventional 
theory, as if monetary expansion could be 
considered separately from the production 
process. Monetary expansion is inherent 
in the expansion of production; and perhaps 
in my earlier article, in my attempts to 
incorporate it, I ended by over-empha-
sizing it, without realizing that I might be 
regarded as assigning a purely monetary 
explanation to what is, as I have said before, 
an essentially structural and dynamic 
phenomenon. 
Let us now introduce the monetary el-
ement. Up to now, in the preliminary ap-
proximation previously presented, I have 
confined myself to saying that the increase 
in demand generated by the income paid out 
in the various production circuits under 
way made it possible to absorb the final goods 
corresponding to the completed circuits, 
plus the productivity increment. But the 
process is more complex, as we shall go on to 
explain. 
Enterprises resort to monetary expan-
sion in order to pay out the income gener-
ated in the production circuit under way. 
This operation is in line with the orthodox 
principles of the system and consonant 
with certain rules in which these principles 
are reflected. 
The growth of income and the corre-
sponding monetary expansion generate 
demand which must be al least sufficient to 
absorb the final goods emerging, aug-
mented by the productivity increment, if 
this increment is not to be reflected in a fall 
in prices. 
I said that it must be at least suf-
ficient, because not all the demand cre-
ated is directed towards the final goods in 
question. This is a highly important point 
which calls for emphasis. Part of the de-
mand is deflected towards personal and 
State services. Thus it circulates in this 
sphere, becoming converted into recipro-
cal demand for such services, and only 
part of it returns to the sphere of final goods. 
Accordingly, the demand which thus 
returns at the end of a given period, plus that 
created during the same period and di-
rected towards the final goods emerging in 
the period in question, must be sufficient 
to absorb these goods, including the in-
crement resulting from higher pro-
ductivity. 
But what is there to ensure this corre-
spondence between demand and supply? 
There is certainly no exact adjustment mech-
anism. The process is rather one of trial and 
error wich the monetary authority has to 
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undertake, thereby demonstrating its abili-
ty to act as a regulator in the spontaneous 
play of market laws (that is, when the trade-
union and political power of the disadvan-
taged strata does not put up opposition to 
the economic and social power of the strata 
that are favoured in the income distri-
bution process). Incidentally, the rules 
of the game are then very clear and effec-
tive, both when attempts are made to con-
tain expansion and when it has been exces-
sive, as happens if fixed investment, or 
private consumption or State expenditure 
an d investment, are covered with in -
creases in the money supply that overstep 
certain fairly narrow bounds. If we seem to 
be harping on a familiar theme, it is in order 
to maintain later, in the appropriate con-
text, that these rules of the game are not ap-
plicable when the contest for the surplus, 
in the evolution of power relations, renders 
another type of inflation inherent in the 
system, i.e, social inflation. 
To return to the point at issue, the mon-
etary authority is guided by symptoms. 
If demand falls short of supply, the piling-
up of final goods in inventories and the 
slump in prices induce it to expand the 
money supply further and to generate a 
corresponding increase in demand, either 
in so far as the growth rate of current pro-
duction is stepped up or inasmuch as re-
course is had to other forms of expansionist 
policy; and if demand exceeds supply and 
prices start to rise, a brake is applied to ex-
pansion. 
These internal price movements are re-
lated to international prices. If the latter 
show an inflationary upward trend, as is the 
case at present, the higher nominal prices 
of exports and imports offer a wider margin 
for the growth of the internal surplus, wich 
is no longer entirely due to productivity 
increments. It may be said in passing that 
the cyclical movements in the centres thus 
exert a powerful influence on the periphery. 
During the upswings the boom in demand 
generally raises the prices of primary ex-
ports in relation to the price of the final 
goods which they are used to produce in the 
centres; and in this way the periphery's 
internal surplus is compounded by an in-
crease of external origin. The opposite 
takes place during the downturns of the 
cycle in the centres. 
If the relative deterioration of export 
prices is persistent, part of the fruits of 
higher productivity in these activities is 
thus transferred abroad, with serious ef-
fects on peripheral development. 
We shall revert to this point when dis-
cussing the crisis of the system. 
It only remains to examine what part the 
surplus plays in this circulation of money 
which accompanies the movements of de-
mand. We have just referred to the money 
which, in a given period, returns from the 
sphere of services to that of goods, an is 
added to the part generated in the latter 
during the same period and allocated to de 
mand for goods. Its role is to absorb the 
supply of final goods, including the in-
crement due to the rise in productivity over 
the period in question. In this way enter-
prises recover the money they have spent 
on paying the labour force during that 
period. And since the income flowing in 
is higher than that paid out during pro-
duction of the goods that reach their final 
phase in the same period, the difference is 
returned to the enterprises in the shape of 
a surplus. 
Attention is not devoted here to cyclical 
movements, which merit special treatment, al 
though in close connexion with the subject-matter 
of the present article. In my first article I did 
briefly touch upon the topic. Suffice it to recall 
on this occasion that the amount of goods in pro 
cess of production and of final goods deriving 
from them is governed by these cyclical movements, 
an so is the surplus. But this does not invalidate 
my interpretation of the structural phenomena of 
development. 
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The surplus thus received by enter-
prises is in its turn converted into demand 
for goods and services; and it circulates both 
in the sphere of services and in that of goods, 
like the income paid out either to the labour 
force or in the form of remuneration for 
entrepreneurial functions. 
Accordingly, the surplus that accrues 
to enterprises in consequence of rising 
productivity reverts to them, one part 
through its conversion in a specific period 
into demand for final goods, and another 
part after having circulated in the sphere 
of services. 
To this movement new surpluses are 
continually being added, thanks to success-
ive productivity increments, and to the 
extent that these latter are not transferred 
to the labour force; and with these additions, 
what we have called the global surplus gradu-
ally increases. Consequently, it is re-
newed and grows, whether it is allocated to 
final consumer goods or to capital goods. 
The growth of the global surplus is ex-
posed to the risk of interruption owing to 
certain cyclical phenomena which prevent 
its development and lead to a temporary 
contraction, as, for example, when by virtue 
of the very mechanics of the system part of 
the surplus is used to pay out higher income 
to the labour force. At the present moment, 
however, I should prefer not to deviate from 
my main line of argument. 
8. Other characteristics of the surplus 
I referred above to the demand which is de-
flected from goods towards services: i.e., 
which for the time being abstains from pur-
chasing goods. If this were not so, demand 
might prove to be greater than was required 
to absorb the final goods augmented by the 
increase in productivity, with the resultant 
familiar reaction on the part of the monet-
ary authority. 
It should be noted here that if recourse 
were had to savings, instead of to monetary 
expansion, to pay out the income corre-
sponding to the production under way, 
demand would be insufficient to absorb 
the final goods. This is, in my opinion, a 
situation typical of a certain phase in the 
economic cycle. Keynes attributed it to 
the tendency of the system to generate an 
excess of savings which reduced consump-
tion, in contravention of Say's Law. His 
thesis, of course, referred to the centres, and 
is highly controversial. But a similar tend-
ency to over-saving could not be ascribed 
to the periphery: yet another testimony 
to the fallacy of the assumption of univer-
sality implicit in the theories of the centres. 
These somewhat tedious explanations 
show why the fruits of higher productivity 
are not reflected in a persistent price de-
cline. This is prevented by the continuous 
growth of demand deriving from the pro-
duction process itself. And as the surplus 
is converted into demand, it returns to the 
enterprises in the manner explained above, 
i.e., it is continually renewed in the process 
of circulation. 
It is not, therefore, through a fall in 
prices that the fruits of technical progress 
are passed on to the community, as is as-
sumed by the neo-classical school. Redis-
tribution is effected in a very different and 
highly inequitable fashion, largely dic-
tated by the interplay of power relations. 
From another standpoint, it should be 
stressed that the composition of the global 
surplus undergoes continual change. 
Demand is subject to constant trans-
formations. It is diversified in conse-
quence of the evolution of technique and 
income distribution, as will be seen in 
another chapter; and the surplus shifts all 
the time. Under the impetus of expanding 
demand, it favours those goods in respect 
of wich the growth of demand is most vigor-
ous, to the detriment of others where it is 
relatively weak. Such is the contrast be-
tween industrial products, in which diver-
sification is incessant, and agricultural 
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commodities, where it is very slight. This 
question is further complicated by differ-
ences in productivity. But in any event, the 
increment in demand does not vanish and 
allow prices to fall, however unrestrictedly 
competition between enterprises may oper-
ate. 
Restrictions on competition, which 
are frequently imposed, also contribute to 
the changes in the composition of demand 
but do not alter its total volume or the 
amount of the global surplus, except in the 
case of tariff protection, which, by allowing 
internal prices to rise above international 
price levels, increases the surplus at the 
expense of the income of the rest of the 
community. A case in point is that of an 
industrial product in respect of which the 
income-elasticity of demand is high and, at 
the same time, the increase in productivity 
is much greater than in the case of other 
goods in the aggregate. If competition were 
fully operative, prices would decrease in 
relation to those of other goods, which would 
benefit by the larger disposable income 
that consumers would thus possess. If 
competition were restricted, however, en-
terprises would be able to contain the down-
ward movement of prices; but in neither 
case would the volume of global demand, 
the surplus or the overall price level be 
affected. 
There is one very important instance in 
which the surplus does not shift but tends 
to crystallize. Land is a means of production 
of which the supply is limited, and whether 
it is rural or urban the characteristic phenom-
enon of land rent makes its appearance. 
The increase in global demand taking place 
in the dynamics of development also moves 
towards the land and raises land rent, a 
phenomenon too well-known to be dwelt on 
here. It should merely be stressed that in 
this way a part of the fruits of the higher 
productivity of the entire system is trans-
ferred to the landowners, simply because 
the land is in their hands. 
Furthermore, the land rent deriving 
from the overall increase in productivity 
becomes larger when technical progress 
finds its way into agricultural activities 
themselves and raises their productivity. 
If demand for the corresponding goods is 
brisk, this rise in productivity is reflected 
in a surplus, which likewise crystallizes in 
the form of higher land rent. In contrast, 
when both land and labour are plentiful and 
the growth of demand is relatively slow, 
the productivity increment tends to switch 
away from agriculture through a fall in 
prices. 
The expansion of overall demand,, the 
limited amount of land available and, at 
the same time, urban concentration, ac-
count for the ceaseless upward movement 
of land rent in the larger towns. As in the 
case of land in rural areas, a part of the 
fruits of the higher productivity generated 
throughout the system is passed on to urban 
land likewise. And urban land rent also 
grows because of technical progress in trans-
port and construction. 
But in neither of these two instances is 
any part of overall demand or of the sur-
plus wiped out. 
The surplus has given impetus to capi-
talism in a very different manner from that 
assumed in neo-classical theory. I venture 
to assert that capitalism has never func 
tioned as the latter suggests. It is invariably 
subject to a historical constant, namely, 
the appropriation of the fruits of technical 
progress in different ways, thanks to the 
concentration of the means of production 
in a few hands, at the expense of the rest of 
the community. Before the industrial rev-
olution the surplus crystallized in the 
tenure of the land by economic power or by 
the power of the military or the Church; and 
since the industrial revolution, as a result 
of the prodigious technical progress to 
which this has given rein, it has been appro-
priated by the owners of the means of pro-
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duction in which the innovations that con-
stantly raise productivity are embodied. 
A final reflection is called for at this 
point. I have already had occasion to say, 
elsewhere in this same article, that neo-
classical thinking has not the merit of ex-
plaining development phenomena. When 
they discuss prices, the theoretical expla-
nations of the neo-classicists are incontro-
vertible, as long as they confine themselves 
to the analysis of what happens in the de-
velopment of enterprises taken separately, 
in particular as regards competition, pro-
ductivity and the income-elasticity of 
demand for their goods. But there is a fun-
damental difference between such cases 
and the global phenomena occurring in the 
dynamics of development. Thus, when a 
single enterprise succeeds in improving 
its productivity and reducing its costs, im-
pelled by the incentive of profit, it will in-
crease its output, and that will bring down 
The first step here is to explain in few words 
the role of capital accumulation —in terms 
of both physical goods and training of 
human resources— in the absorption of 
labour. 
This labour-absorbent role is twofold. 
On the one hand, an increase in reproductive 
capital involves a direct or indirect 
H
 Enterprises use reproductive capital and 
'consumptive' or non reproductive capital. Until 
the time comes to deal with this aspect of the ques 
tion, suffice it to say for the moment that the 
former can act as a multiplier of employment and 
accumulation;the latter cannot. 
the prices of its goods, if certain bounds are 
overstepped. To expand production it will 
be necessary to employ more labour and pay 
it more. But as a general rule this is of no sig-
nificance in the rest of the economy, since 
its influence is virtually imperceptible. The 
fragmentary reasoning of neo-classical 
theory, therefore, remains fully valid. But 
when the expansion of production is gen-
eral, as becomes the case in the dynamics of 
development, the series of pay increases 
received by the labour force prevents prices 
from falling, and a surplus is generated 
which is retained and circulates as already 
explained. To overlook this global aspect, 
then, represents a very serious defect if the 
reasoning of neo-classical theory is ex-
tended to development; the increase in total 
demand which is inherent in the dynamics 
of development should be introduced into 
the argument in order to reconstruct the 
theory of prices, taking due advantage of 
the valuable elements it contains. 
increase in employment. On the other 
hand, the additional income and the sur-
plus thus generated are converted into 
demand for the goods deriving from this 
process, as well as for personal and State 
services; and in this demand the indirect 
effect of capital accumulation on employ-
ment makes itself felt. 
In turn, the income generated in ser-
vices gives rise to demand for goods and 
services. Thus there is a mutual interde-
pendence between demand and employ-
ment, although the initial dynamic impulse 
comes from capital accumulation in enter-
prises. 
HI 
Structural changes in employment 
1. Capital accumulation and absorption 
of labour 
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The growth of the enterprises' output 
is determined by the direct increase in 
employment of labour and the rise in pro-
ductivity due to technical progress; and 
upon this fundamentally depends demand 
for personal and State services, and their 
product. 
In services, technical progress is re-
flected mainly in improvements in their 
quality and efficiency, rather than in in-
creases in productivity like those occurring 
in production of goods. But in so far as such 
increases in productivity do take place, 
this constitutes an autonomus factor of 
expansion of demand for goods. 
From another standpoint, as personal 
income rises in production of goods,a pro-
cess of diversification of demand goes on, 
in respect not only of goods but also of servi-
ces. And this implies a characteristic tend-
ency to raise the proportion of employment 
in services in relation to total employment. 
We said at the outset that productivity de-
pends upon accumulation of capital in 
terms of both physical goods and training 
of human resources. In physical capital 
are embodied the technical innovations 
which result in higher productivity and in 
better-quality and more efficient goods; 
while that same technical progress calls 
for training of the labour force in a wider 
range of more complex skills, without 
which the increase in productivity that 
should accompany physical capital would 
be partly thrown away. 
It should also be borne in mind that 
certain personal services, as well as State 
services, contribute in one way or another 
to more effective utilization of capital, 
with the consequent increase in the pro-
ductivity and efficiency of the system. 
These preliminary explanations having 
cleared the way, we will now consider the dy-
namics of accumulation and employment. 
From the standpoint of the propa-
gation of technique, development consists 
in an endless super imposition of techno-
logical layers characterized by increasing 
productivity and efficiency upon preceding 
technological layers where productivity 
and efficiency are lower. In the course of 
this process the latter tend to disappear; 
and the labour force which was employed in 
them is mainly transferred to technologi-
cal layers of increasing productivity and 
efficiency, promoting the homogeneity of 
the structure. 
In the periphery this process necess-
arily takes a fairly long time, in view of the 
large proportion of the labour force em-
ployed in layers of technology where pro-
ductivity is very low and incomes are tiny, 
and even the use of semi-capitalist or pre-
capitalist techniques is not uncommon. 
Despite the many decades that have gone 
by since industrialization gave its decisive 
push, the proportion in question is still very 
significant. 
The size of the labour force that has to be 
absorbed reflects the heterogeneity of the 
social structure. There are some countries, 
including most of those of Latin America, 
where at the time when industrialization 
began there were large numbers of the 
labour force that had been traditionally 
employed in activities using pre-capitalist 
techniques and yielding them a mere pitt-
ance. In such countries, the absorption 
process was bound to be longer and more 
difficult than in others where the corre-
sponding labour force was relatively small. 
Let us now try to account for this state 
of affairs. At bottom, the persistence of so 
great a mass of lower strata in the socio-
economic structure, over and above the 
exceptionally rapid increase in the labour 
force, is clear evidence of the insufficiency 
of reproductive capital. And on top of this, 
there are the effects of the increase in the rate 
of productivity which accompanies the 
new layers of technology, as well as of its im-
provement in the preceding layers. 
To examine these various elements let 
us start from this very simple concept. 
Accumulation involves a rise in pro-
ductivity, and this in turn makes it possible 
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to step up capital accumulation. The 
intensity oí this accumulation process 
depends upon the proportion of the fruits 
of higher productivity which is allocated 
to capital formation. 
As we have already seen, that consider-
able portion of the productivity increment 
which is not transferred to the labour force 
is the surplus. And the surplus constitutes 
the primary source of reproductive and 
non-reproductive capital accumulation. 
Accordingly, we will confine ourselves to 
it in the present argument. 
The surplus has one characteristic 
wh ich should be underlined because of 
its great dynamic significance. The glo-
bal surplus, which is gradually formed by 
the aggregation of successive surpluses, 
tends to increase faster than the product 
under the rule of market laws. 
For the sake of a better understanding 
of this tendency we will introduce the con-
cept of rate or tempo. If the rate of capital 
accumulation is constant, and so is that of 
the rise in productivity and of increasing 
absorption of labour in new and higher 
layers of technology, the growth rate of the 
product will also be constant, if the product/ 
capital ratio does not vary. Why, then, does 
the surplus grow faster than the product? 
The explanation is very simple and of a 
structural character. Owing to the socio-
economic structure, the growth of pro-
ductivity at a constant rate brings with it 
the familiar wide disparity in the dis-
tribution of its fruits, since, while that part 
of its fruits which is transferred to the bulk 
of the labour force increases less than pro-
ductivity, the part which remains as the 
surplus increases more. And as the growth 
rate of the global product is constant, that 
of the global surplus will obviously be 
faster. 
Constant rates have been postulated 
for simplicity's sake. But even if they were 
not constant, the distribution disparity 
would still be the cause of the difference 
between the growth rates of the product 
and the surplus under the rule of market 
laws. 
Herein lies the origin of the privileged-
consumer society. For in the course of de-
velopment the increase in the global surplus 
enables the owners of the means of pro-
duction in the upper income strata to expand 
their consumption —at the expense of an 
increase in the consumption of the rest of 
the community— without reducing the rate 
of reproductive capital accumulation. But 
even if this rate remains constant, the 
growth of the surplus still outstrips that of 
the product. 
Perhaps I may be allowed a brief di-
gression here. Not all that part of the 
increment of the surplus which does not go 
to capital accumulation is deflected to the 
consumption of the upper strata. When 
market laws are opposed by the trade-union 
and political power of the disadvantaged 
labour force, this latter improves its capacity 
to share in the fruits of higher productivity. 
Only up to a critical point, however, beyond 
which the privileged-consumer society 
reacts by resorting to powerful State 
mechanisms, in an effort to defend itself 
and go on developing its dynamics, which 
can only be kept up by virtue of the sys-
tem's great distribution disparities. Social 
inequality is inherent in the consumer 
society. But the time has not yet come to 
broach so important a topic. 
To return now to our line of argument, 
we were seeking to explain why the lower 
strata are still so largely employed at very 
low levels of productivity. This situation 
persists because the rate of capital ac-
cumulation is not high enough for it to fulfil, 
to the greatest extent possible, its role of 
absorbing the labour force drawn from 
the lower strata in technological layers of 
increasing productivity. And the rate is 
not high enough because, as the surplus 
grows, the part wich should be earmarked 
for accumulation is spent on consumption 
by the upper strata. The role of labour 
absorption can never be properly discharged 
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unless the rate of accumulation is raised as 
much as necessary by the allocation of an 
increasing proportion of the surplus to that 
end. 
This is the serious consequence that 
attends the waste of the accumulation 
potential of the surplus occurring in the 
privileged-consumer society, in addition 
to the siphoning-off of income by the centres, 
which are linked to that society by such close 
ties. 
But there is something more. The prob-
lem of absorption bears not only on the 
labour force that is stagnating in the lower 
strata but also on the growth of the labour 
force throughout the social structure. 
This growth has been exceptionally 
rapid in recent decades, which implies 
that the rate of capital accumulation ought 
also to have risen to prevent aggravation 
of the absorption problem. But there is 
nothing in the system that will lead spon-
taneously to such an adjustment. Thus, 
the higher rate of population growth, as 
long as the rate of accumulation does not 
rise, means that manpower is left redundant, 
with the consequent accentuation of the 
tendency to exclude the lower strata from 
the development process. 
The increase in the rate of productivity 
has a similar effect. It results in less absorp-
tion of labour per unit of capital, or, in other 
words, as the rate of productivity rises the 
rate of absorption proportionally decreases. 
And if the rate of accumulation does not 
increase, the volume of redundant labour 
which accompanies the higher rate of 
population growth becomes larger still. 
Once again we are up against the waste 
of potential. If the increase in the rate of 
productivity were used to raise the rate of 
accumulation of reproductive capital, the 
absorption of labour could not only make 
up its leeway but could be carried farther. 
However, as this does not happen, not only 
do the members of the lower strata employed 
in low-productivity layers of technology 
remain where they are, but they are joined 
by the manpower which has become redun-
dant because capital accumulation is in-
sufficient. It is in these strata, be it noted, 
that redundancy acquires the greatest pro-
portions, both owing to changes in demand, 
as will be seen later, and because there the 
highest population growth rates are found. 
I hope that these explanations will have 
shed some light on the nature of peripheral 
capitalism. The privileged-consumer society 
is the offspring of propagation and imi-
tation of the patterns of the centres in a 
very different social structure. The mark-
ed heterogeneity of this structure, com-
bined with the play of power relations, 
allows appropriation of the fruits of the 
technical progress brought from the centres 
to reach the height of inequality. And in 
the course of development this inequality 
makes it possible to imitate the more and 
more advanced consumption patterns of 
the centres and at the same time to propa-
gate increasingly high productivity and 
efficient techniques, which necessitate a 
larger proportion of non-reproductive (or 
consumptive) capital. All of which entails 
the inmense social cost of exclusion and 
redundancy. 
The socio-economic structure also 
affects the rate of population growth, since 
the propagation of the scientific and tech-
nological discoveries made in the centres, 
which protect and prolong human life, is 
of very unequal incidence. Where the 
proportion of lower strata with minimal 
productivity and tiny incomes is very large, 
the decrease in the mortality rate is not 
accompanied by anything like as intensive 
a reduction in die number of births as in the 
middle and upper strata. It is common 
knowledge that among the poor the psycho-
social changes which in the course of de-
velopment bring down the birth rate in the 
other strata do not appear to take place. 
All this accounts for the limited ambit 
of the consumer society. Within those bounds 
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it may attain great prosperity and a high 
degree of economic efficiency which calls 
forth wondering admiration both at home 
and abroad, notwithstanding the persistence 
of the sub-consumer society at the bottom 
of the system. 
2. The surplus and the social efficiency 
of the system 
There are some who believe that by virtue 
of these achievements the system could 
also acquire social efficiency; but they do not 
pause to reflect that its dynamic exaltation 
is based precisely upon its lack of social 
efficiency. The point is not that the system 
is failing to work properly, but simply that 
it is like that; it is a socially vicious system. 
And it is still more so when suppres-
sion of the trade-union and political power 
of the disadvantaged strata permits the 
squeezing of income improvements pre-
viously secured by virtue of their increased 
sharing capacity. The upper strata are 
thus enabled to expand their consumption 
yet more and at the same time to raise the 
rate of capital accumulation. 
The social efficiency of development 
depends essentially upon the rate at 
which the higher-productivity layers of 
technology absorb labour from the lower 
layers, as was explained above. If this 
process were carried out satisfactorily, 
those lower layers would gradually disap-
pear, and the layers immediately above 
them would successively take their place. 
And thus, in the course of time, as the 
formerly very high proportion of the 
labour force employed at lower-pro-
ductivity levels decreased, the process of 
regressive competition which prevents 
earnings from increasing correlatively 
with the increase in productivity would be 
progressively set right. 
How far could this process go? It is 
worth elucidating this aspect of the 
question to obtain a better understanding 
of the nature of peripheral capitalism. If 
the surplus were used entirely for accumu-
lation, an austerity-type capitalism would 
result, in which the owners of the means 
of production, rising above the temp-
tations of the centres, would use for con-
sumption purposes only the payment they 
received for their entrepreneurial functions. 
The labour force would thus obtain a 
steadily increasing share in the fruits of 
higher productivity, thanks to the grow-
ing competition among enterprises to 
recruit the manpower required for their 
expansion, and also to the progressive 
weakening of regressive competition. Ac-
cording to the neo-clasical method of 
reasoning, through this process the privi-
leged-consumer society would gradually 
disappear, giving way to equitable con-
sumption. 
Some thought should be given, however, 
to the fact that the surplus is, too, a primary 
source of accumulation. And if it were 
reduced in this way, the accumulation 
effort would be increasingly weakened, 
unless the labour force assumed responsi-
bility for accumulating capital. But there 
is nothing in the spontaneous operation 
of the system that might be conducive 
to substitution of this new form of accumu-
lation for accumulation by the owners of 
capital. 
In reality, the system does not function 
on these lines. No such austerity is to 
be found in peripheral capitalism, increas-
ingly exposed as it is to imitation of the 
consumption patterns of the centres. 
The labour force, disadvantaged by the 
operation of market laws, has no way of 
snaring in the fruits of higher productivity 
but by the exercise of its trade-union and 
political power; and when it strives to 
go beyond the limit referred to before, 
the owners of the means of production do 
not resign themselves to the euthanasia 
of the privileged-consumer society. They 
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have at their disposal powerful means of 
reacting. But the moment has not yet 
come to deal with this subject. 
It is plain to reason that for the 
dynamics of any system whatever capital 
accumulation is an indispensable requi-
site. Accumulation is a role that is perform-
ed by the surplus in peripheral capitalism; 
but the surplus also plays a second role, to 
the detriment of the first, namely, that of 
encouraging the consumer society, besides 
transferring to the centres part of the 
fruits of higher productivity. 
The image of an austerity-type capi-
talism, in which the surplus is used to the 
utmost extent possible for accumulation, 
is manifestly remote from reality where 
the periphery is concerned. The owners 
of capital are subject to two opposite tend-
encies: one pushes them in the direction of 
increasing their capital accumulation in 
order to extend their economic power and 
expand their activities; the other promotes 
obsessive imitation of the consumption pat-
terns of the centres. The first tendency may 
possibly prevail in an initial phase of devel-
opment, but not afterwards, when the sur-
plus acquires dimensions which allow con-
sumption to be increased more intensively 
than capital accumulation. The rate of 
accumulation must be sufficiently high, 
however, to give momentum to the dynamics 
of the system. 
3. Diversification and changes in 
employment 
Let us now revert to the absorption process. 
We have described how the labour force 
moves up from the lower layers of techno-
logy to those of increasing productivity; 
but nothing has been said of the changes 
which simultaneously take place in em-
ployment, and which, in their turn, in-
fluence power relations, as will be seen in 
due course. We will now deal with this aspect 
of the question. 
These changes in employment depend 
upon the variations which occur in demand 
for goods and services as per capita income 
increases and distribution disparities be-
come more marked. 
As demand expands, the goods and ser-
vices towards which it is directed are in-
cessantly diversified; the propagation of 
technique raises productivity, and this en-
courages imitative capitalism to adopt new 
patterns of diversification, which also de-
rive from constant innovations in the 
centres. 
This diversification takes place both 
in production of goods and services to 
meet market demand, and in State services, 
which are supplied as a result of political 
and administrative decisions. 
In both cases power relations make 
their presence felt: in the sphere of the 
market, because it is upon them that in-
come distribution mainly depends; and in 
the sphere of the State, because they con-
siderably influence not only the size and 
composition of State services, but also the 
incidence of their cost, as well as the spu-
rious absorption of labour, that is, absorp-
tion which does not respond to consider-
ations of economic efficiency. In contrast, 
these considerations are predominant in 
the market sphere. 
To go back now to diversification: as 
regards goods, it is a platitude that de-
mand for primary commodities, especially 
foodstuffs, generally grows at a relatively 
slow pace, once the initial stage of devel-
opment is over. For well-known reasons, 
diversification is very limited in the case 
of these goods, except as regards methods 
of processing. 
In contrast, however, diversification 
would appear to be limitless in respect of 
demand for industrial goods. Here tech-
nique and demand influence each other 
as the process evolves in the centres; tech-
nical innovations, given impetus by 
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scientific progress, stimulate the diversi-
fication of demand, and diversification in 
its turn acts as a spur to technical inno-
vations. 
As the consumption patterns of the 
centres are propagated and diffused 
throughout the periphery, the diversifi-
cation of demand presents a steadily 
increasing contrast between demand for 
primary goods, with a relatively low income-
elasticity, and demand for manufactured 
goods, whose income-elasticity is rela-
tively high. Hence the characteristic shift 
of the labour force from primary pro-
duction to industry, and likewise to those 
services where similar diversification is 
taking place as technique advances, in 
personal and State services alike. 
These changes in demand are matched 
by changes in the employment of the la-
bour force. Obviously, employment tends 
to increase faster in activities where de-
mand for goods and services grows more 
rapidly, to the detriment of employment 
in activities where the growth of demand 
is relatively slow. Thus in the dynamics 
of employment great shifts of manpower 
occur from what might be termed labour-
expellent activities to those that are labour-
absorbent. Such transfers also take place 
on account of the natural growth of the 
labour force. 
4. Labour redundancy 
In these movements a very important role 
is played by the growth rate of productivity. 
It should be recalled that the more this rate 
increases, the higher must the rate of 
accumulation rise in relation to the total 
product. What happens, however, as has 
already been explained, is that a more or 
less substantial proportion of accumu-
lation potential is wasted in imitation of 
the consumption of the centres, as well as 
in the siphoning-off of income effected 
from abroad. 
All this of course reduces the capacity 
of the labour-absorbent activities to employ 
not only the natural increment of their own 
labour force, but also the manpower 
displaced from the labour-ex pel lent ac-
tivities. And when in addition productivity 
increases in the latter, the adverse effects 
on employment in such occupations pro-
duced by the diversification of demand are 
augmented by those accompanying this 
higher productivity. 
This is one of the gravest manifestations 
of the insufficiency of capital accumu-
lation. Agriculture affords the most strik-
ing case in point. When higher-pro-
ductivity layers of technology are super-
imposed and the rate of accumulation is 
not what it ought to be, part of the labour 
force is left redundant, and either remains 
unemployed or underemployed in the rural 
areas, or migrates to the towns to look for 
work. But since capital accumulation is 
insufficient in the labour-absorbent ac-
tivities, the people thus displaced are not 
employed in higher-productivity layers 
of technology. At best, their relatively 
meagre income promotes the regressive 
absorption of labour, mainly in a prolifer-
ation of personal services requiring little 
or no special skill. Hence it can be seen that 
the existence of absorption is not enough 
to eliminate the problem of the lower strata 
stagnating in the sub-consumer society; it 
is also necessary that the absorption be 
effected at rising levels of productivity. 
A situation similar to that of agri-
culture, although not exactly the same, is 
to be found in the intermediate and lower 
layers of technology in production of 
other goods — principally in artisan-type 
activities or low-productivity industries. In 
such cases demand usually shifts towards 
more advanced goods, to the detriment of 
employment in the activities in question, 
and this aggravates the redundancy prob-
lem if there is not sufficient absorption 
capacity. 
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In face of these facts, the neo-classical 
ideologists usually say that if there is 
redundancy in the system it is because 
wages are too high for the labour force 
to be absorbed. This extraordinary thesis, 
however, does not do justice to strict neo-
classical reasoning, since according to 
this argument, if wages fell prices would 
have to follow suit, as will be shown in the 
relevant chapter. Only, unfortunately, in 
peripheral capitalism what really happens 
instead is that the surplus increases for the 
greater comfort and recreation of those 
who enjoy a place in the privileged-con-
sumer society. 
Obviously, then, the insufficient ab-
sorption capacity of the system is reflect-
ed in the deterioration of incomes in the 
lower strata of the social structure in relation 
to those in the upper strata, in so far as the 
latter share among themselves, in one 
way or another, the fruits of higher pro-
ductivity. 
A similar deterioration also takes 
place in the relative prices of certain 
primary products, in particular agricul-
tural commodities, above all when available 
land, and, of course, labour, are so plentiful 
that production tends to outgrow demand, 
especially if productivity rises as a result 
of technical progress. When land is in 
short supply or demand is very brisk, the 
surplus created by the increase in pro-
ductivity crystallizes, so to speak, in land 
rent. This point will be discussed again 
later. 
5. Reproductive and non-reproductive 
(or consumptive) capital 
Attention was drawn above to the influence 
of diversification on the exclusiveness of 
the system. The unequal distribution of 
income strengthens this influence and helps 
to bring about other structural phenom-
ena with which we will now deal. We have 
several times referred to the imitation of 
the consumption patterns of the centres 
at the expense of capital accumulation 
and the absorption capacity of the system; 
but what is involved is not only consump-
tion in itself but also the capital used to 
produce advanced goods and services, 
when there are others less advanced that 
could satisfy the consumer requirements 
concerned, although not in exactly the 
same way. We are referring to what we 
have termed consumptive capital, to dis-
tinguish it from reproductive capital. 
Demand for these more advanced goods 
issuing from new layers of technology 
tends to eliminate the demand for goods 
from lower-technology layers which need 
less capital and often absorb more labour; 
and this elimination process is sometimes 
intensified by competitive prices. Of 
course, the replacement of one layer of 
technology by another is a characteristic 
of development, and is almost always 
desirable from the standpoint of individual 
satisfaction. But it is a premature substi-
tution, satisfying those who enjoy, aibeit 
in differing degrees, privileges in respect 
of distribution; and this goes on despite the 
fact that reproductive capital accumu-
lation is insufficient to fulfil its proper 
role in the labour-absorbent activities. 
The distinction referred to above is by 
no means a trifling matter. A little thought 
will show that in the evolution of the tech-
nique of the centres two trends exist: one 
directed towards raising productivity per 
worker, with which we have been concerned 
up to now; and the other, towards achiev-
ing more and more advanced and diversi-
fied types of goods and services with 
increasing capital inputs. In other words, 
there, are techniques that multiply capital 
and employment and techniques that con-
sume capital, at the expense of subsequent 
accumulation and of employment. It 
should be noted, however, that with the 
progress of technology the two kinds of 
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technique are usually combined, although 
in different proportions. 
As has been remarked elsewhere, 
objections are often raised to the tech-
nology of the centres on the grounds that it 
tends to reduce employment because of 
the greater density of capital per worker. 
It is felt to be a technology inappropriate 
for the periphery. But no account is 
taken of the fact that it is precisely in the 
saving of labour that the inestimable 
virtue of these techniques resides, if the 
choice between alternatives, where they 
exist, is wisely made. 
But it is only half a virtue, so to speak; 
for to make it complete, the fruits of higher 
productivity would have to be used, to the 
greatest extent possible, for the accumu-
lation of reproductive capital in order to 
increase employment and income. 
Let us now take a look at the repro-
ductive capacity of capital. We may begin 
by assuming a specific capital increment, 
which is used to step up production with 
less employment of labour than in the case 
of the capital previously accumulated. 
Let it be further assumed that the fruits of 
this higher productivity are devoted to 
obtaining a new increment in reproductive 
capital, using the labour saved before. 
Thus the effect on employment would be 
compensatory. But from the dynamic 
standpoint there is something more im-
portant, namely, that the increase in 
reproductive capital will give rise to an 
additional increase in enployment; and if 
the process continues on the same lines, 
not only compensatory but also additional 
employment will be generated. In other 
words, as the fruits of rising productivity 
are continuously allocated to increasing 
reproductive capital, employment will ex-
pand enough to absorb more labour than 
is saved through the higher productivity 
achieved. 
Very different is the case of consump-
tive or non-reproductive capital. Let us 
assume an initial increase in productivity 
whose fruits, instead of being earmarked 
for reproductive capital as in the preced-
ing instance, are allocated to consumptive 
capital, that is, to means of production 
designed to put out technically advanced 
goods that will meet the requirements of 
demand better than before. The production 
of these consumer goods would also gen-
erate compensatory employment, but succes-
sive increases in productivity would not 
occur, nor would additional capital and 
employment be created as in the case of 
reproductive capital. There would be no 
progressive accumulation. 
This seems the right moment for a word 
of warning which is not unimportant. It 
was assumed, in order to simplify our 
argument, that the fruits of higher pro-
ductivity were devoted in their entirety 
to the production of reproductive capital 
goods. But this does not really happen, 
since only a part of them is invested in this 
way. 
Thus the same compensatory effect 
on employment is not produced. But this 
is equally true for both reproductive and 
consumptive accumulation, and does not 
invalidate our previous line of reasoning. 
The only thing is that total compensation 
in respect of employment will take longer 
to achieve, and all the longer still, the 
smaller the proportion of the fruits of pro-
ductivity earmarked for accumulation. 
Let us go a little more deeply into the 
significance of these phenomena. In 
the technological progress of the centres 
there is a measure of correspondence 
between the two kinds of technique. In 
reality, the growing accumulation of repro-
ductive capital, with continual increases in 
productivity, makes possible the progres-
sive advance of diversification and of con-
sumptive capital techniques. Obviously, 
it would be irrational to expand production 
of the same goods beyond a certain point. 
The diversification of goods incorporat-
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ing more and more advanced techniques 
is an indispensable requirement of the 
dynamics of capitalism; and if this entails 
increasing the proportion of consumptive 
capital in the whole, the reason is that 
productivity has risen sufficiently to make 
that possible, due account being taken of 
distribution disparities. 
A clear case in point is that of the diver-
sification of durable consumer goods, 
where a number of gradations by efficiency 
are found, which call for increasing 
amounts of capital and more and more 
highly-skilled labour. The efficiency of 
a good consists not only in its intrinsic 
capacity to satisfy needs, but also in its 
ability to respond to other considerations. 
And we cannot in fairness ignore the criti-
cisms levelled in the centres themselves 
against the ceaseless arousal of new 
requirements as a result of the prodigious 
development of the mass communication 
media, which are becoming more and more 
adept at manipulating the sovereignty of 
the consumer. In demand for these advanc-
ed goods and in their proliferation there 
are, too, elements of conspicuous consump-
tion and social climbing. But even apart 
from all this, the propensity to prefer 
what is technically more advanced is very 
understandable. 
It is a preference that largely depends 
upon personal income. The more inequi-
table income distribution is, the stronger 
will be that preference on the part of the 
more fortunate. And it is precisely herein 
that the serious incongruity of peripheral 
capitalism lies, since in order to produce 
increasingly advanced goods more capital 
per unit of output is required, and this is 
prejudicial to reproductive capital ac-
cumulation. 
A less inequitable income distribution 
would obviously be favourable to those 
patterns of consumption which call for 
less consumptive capital. 
Whichever way one looks at it, the diver-
sification described, costly in social terms, 
is effected at the expense of the repro-
ductive capital which needs to be accumu-
lated as intensively as possible, in order 
to absorb, at higher levels of productivity 
and income, the labour force employed in 
lower-productivity layers of technology. 
It should be pointed out that these 
problems occur not only in the upper in-
come strata, but also, to an increasing 
extent, at the higher levels of the middle 
strata. And to these the limited ambit of 
the privileged-consumer society is confin-
ed. 
From another standpoint, diversifi-
cation helps to accentuate the trend towards 
external disequilibrium. For while it is 
true that the position is eased by import 
substitution in respect of such goods, 
especially in the initial phases of the pro-
cess, it is equally undeniable that the inter-
mediate and capital goods required for 
domestic production have to be imported, 
and this tends to counteract the relief 
obtained, apart from the limits set by 
technology and fragmented markets. 
Furthermore, as diversification proceeds 
in the centres, part of the increment in 
peripheral demand which cannot be 
satisfied by import substitution is deflect-
ed centrewards. 
Reverting to the line of reasoning I 
was following before these digressions, I 
would say that the consumer society dis-
plays other kinds of waste of accumulation 
potential which are due not so much to the 
advance of technique as largely to tra-
ditional considerations of social status. 
The most striking example is afforded by 
housing. Beyond a certain point, which 
could be determined only empirically, far 
too much consumptive capital is spent on 
housing, and this not only among the upper 
strata, but among part of the middle 
strata as well. Here the effect of income 
distribution privileges is manifest. Thus 
reproductive capital accumulation poten-
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tial is wasted, and this, as happens in other 
cases of imitative consumption, weakens 
the labour-absorbing capacity of the system. 
This is one of the principal factors of frus-
tration in the dynamics of peripheral 
capitalism. 
Again, a high proportion of non-es-
sential consumptive capital is common in 
State investment, both in infrastructure 
and in some types of public monuments. 
Certainly neither the sphere of the State 
nor that of the market is characterized by 
austerity in peripheral capitalism. 
The waste of capital is not confined 
to production of goods alone. It is also 
observable in the field of highly-skilled 
personal services which are performed in 
the centres on increasingly advanced lines. 
Where medical services are concerned, for 
example, the training period for profes-
sionals involves considerable capital 
requirements, both because of the increas-
ing efficiency demanded of such services 
by virtue of the progress of science and 
technique, and also as a means of limiting 
access to the profession with a view to 
enhanced prestige and bigger fees. Well-
authorized critics have pointed out that 
capital investment for training purposes 
could be reduced if paramedical services 
were developed and certain procedures 
were simplified. But here too the distri-
bution privileges of the upper and part of 
the middle strata make imitation of the 
centres possible, while the lower strata 
often lack the most elementary services. 
There are various professional services 
of which the same might be said. 
The subject of education has also been 
much discussed. Eagerness to reproduce 
the institutions of the centres (often 
spurred on by the opportunities of skilled 
employment thus afforded) leads to the 
allocation of a disproportionate amount 
of capital to higher and secondary edu-
cation, with the consequent neglect of the 
lower strata. And even when these have 
access to primary education, its results 
are often very unsatisfactory because 
incomes are so tiny. 
Thus the socio-economic structure 
exerts influence in two major ways. On the 
one hand, institutions for the training of 
personnel and provision of services are 
largely responsive to structural power 
disparities, and, on the other, these dis-
parities substantially affect the capacity 
to use the services provided. 
Let us now pause to examine the most 
important conclusions to be drawn from 
all this, as regards both goods and services. 
No one could deny the immense contri-
bution that technique has made to human 
welfare, especially if present ways of life 
are compared with those of only a few 
generations back. But what can be denied 
is the desirability, from the standpoint of 
development, of imitating patterns of con-
sumption which the centres have achieved 
thanks to their large-scale capital accumu-
lation and to an average income whose 
level is several times higher than those at-
tained in the periphery. 
Nothing in the operation of the system 
is calculated to lead spontaneously to the 
solution of this problem. On the contrary, 
distribution disparities make for its ag-
gravation, since in so far as they encourage 
diversification, the proportion of con-
sumptive capital tends to rise at the expense 
of reproductive capital, to the detriment 
of the social efficiency of the system. 
The social cost of all this is enormous, 
since the expansion of the consumptive 
capital required makes increasing inroads 
on the reproductive capital necessitated 
by the magnitude of the labour absorption 
problem. The whole process contributes 
to the exclusiveness of peripheral cap-
italism. Since advanced consumptive-capi-
tal techniques are spreading more and 
more, reproductive technique cannot pen-
etrate in depth into the lower strata of the 
social structure. Hence too the conflictive 
element in peripheral capitalism, for as 
time goes by, the fruits of higher pro-
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ductivity are no longer enough to satisfy 
the increasing pressure of consumption 
on the interplay of power relations. 
In all this can be seen the interrelation-
ship of these aspects of the socio-economic 
structure. The more and more advanced 
patterns of consumption of goods and 
services prevailing in the centres are 
1. The sharing capacity of the middle 
strata 
As will be recalled, under the rule of market 
laws the fruits of higher productivity are 
more and more unequally distributed. The 
following are the major aspects of this 
inequality: 
—The income of the upper strata tends 
to rise faster than productivity, owing, on 
the one hand, to the appropriation of the 
surplus by the owners of the means of pro-
duction, and, on the other hand, to the 
capacity of part of the labour force to share, 
thanks to its high levels of skill, in the 
fruits of increased productivity. It is 
essentially in these strata that the consumer 
society evolves; 
—The income of the middle strata 
grows more slowly than productivity be-
cause of regressive competition, although 
the effect of the letter lessens as the scale 
of skills is ascended; 
—The income of the lower strata, 
which have little or no share in the fruits of 
development, is minimal. 
However, the sway of market laws over 
income distribution is not indefinitely 
maintained; rather is it a characteristic of 
the initial phases of development. As these 
phases are left behind and technique is 
propagated through industrialization and 
the development of other activities, the 
propagated throughout the periphery by 
virtue of the enormous distribution dis-
parities resulting largely from the power 
relations that emanate from the social 
structure. And in their turn these phenom-
ena react upon the social structure, with 
the consequences just described. 
middle strata gradually expand, both by 
virtue of their own natural growth and 
because they absorb labour from the lower 
strata. This process, the urban concen-
tration of the labour force concerned, its 
increasing cohesion, the progress of 
education and the influence of the mass 
communication media, gradually pave 
the way for the march of democracy, 
although not without great difficulties. 
And as this happens the trade-union and 
political power of the middle strata begins 
to grow, albeit with very different degrees 
of intensity in different social groups. 
This power, which gathers strength 
as development proceeds, counterpoises 
market laws within the sphere of the market 
and is also used to bring certain State 
mechanisms into action in order to offset 
or overcome the effects of those laws both 
on earnings and on employment. 
Trade-union power is used chiefly in 
the sphere of the market to limit or 
eliminate regressive competition, push 
up salaries and wages and defend the im-
provement already obtained; and politi-
cal power in the sphere of the State, to attain 
the following objectives: 
—to procure and increase social 
consumption; 
IV 
Structural changes in power and income distribution 
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—to expand employment beyond the 
bounds set by economic efficiency in the 
market sphere, when State services grow 
to excess by virtue of their own dynamics; 
—to secure spurious employment of 
labour, especially the labour force in the 
middle strata that is affected by the 
weakening of the labour-absorbent role of 
capital accumulation. 
None of this applies to the labour force 
in the lower strata, inasmuch as it lacks 
political and trade-union power. 
With the development of these various 
ways in which the disadvantaged labour 
force obtains a share in the fruits of higher 
productivity, the growth rate of its overall 
income rises, and, as the trade-union and 
political power of the strata in question 
increases, catches up with the growth 
rate of productivity. But this is the limit 
which cannot be overstepped without 
seriously jeopardizing the dynamics of 
the system; for if trade-union and political 
power tries to make the growth rate of 
income outstrip that of productivity, it 
will have to do so at the expense of the 
surplus, and this will have an unfavourable 
effect, not only on capital accumulation, 
but on the very privileges of the consumer 
society. This problem will be dealt with in 
another chapter in the context of the crisis 
of the system. The present reference to it 
is intended to give some idea of its dynamics 
in face of the structural changes ac-
companying the propagation of technique. 
2. Different kinds of power in relation 
to income strata 
In the following pages we will examine 
the significance of the different kinds of 
power that intervene in income distri-
bution and redistribution. But stress 
should first be laid on the essentially 
dynamic nature of the distribution process, 
since structural changes take place inces-
santly, and so do changes in the power 
relations emanating therefrom. We have 
just seen that as a result of these structural 
changes, alongside the growth of the 
economic power of the upper strata and of 
their capacity to appropriate surpluses 
and increase the amount of the global 
surplus, the trade-union and political 
power of the middle strata also develops. 
When this happens it would appear that 
the political power of the upper strata 
weakens, while the concentration of capital 
is maintained, and with it the ability of the 
owners of the means of production to enlarge 
the global surplus. Nevertheless, once 
the limit referred to is reached, political 
power, backed by the economic power which 
has continued to grow, finally asserts itself, 
and weathers the crisis of the system by 
resorting to the use of force. 
Analysis of the different kinds of 
power and power relations may usefully 
be preceded by a word as to the correspon-
dence between them and the income strata 
over which they exercise paramount in-
fluence. 
Hitherto we have been talking about 
upper, middle and lower strata, but without 
defining the significance of these terms. 
For, as always happens when a quantitative 
scale is in question, it is impossible to 
establish a clear-cut dividing-line. The 
borderlines are manifestly indeterminate, 
but this in no way invalidates our reasoning. 
Furthermore, the point is one that will prove 
important in the praxis of change. 
It should be recalled in passing that 
we have likewise discussed, and likewise in 
brief outline, the privileged-consumer 
society which is based on the upper strata, 
and the sub-consumer society of the lower 
strata. And there is no room for doubt as 
to what these extremes imply. But between 
the two extremes lies a whole range of 
situations. Where does the sub-consumer 
society end and the diversification of con-
sumption in the middle strata begin? 
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The economic power bestowed by owner-
ship of means of production is concentrat-
ed in the upper strata and, albeit with less 
dynamic significance, in the middle strata 
too. The possession of means of pro-
duction diminishes with the descent from 
one stratum to another until in the lower 
strata it becomes relatively negligible. 
Social power makes its appearance in 
a small proportion of the labour force 
which is incorporated partly in the upper 
strata, and, above all, in the middle strata 
and their higher income steps. It finds 
expression both through the skills whose 
technical complexity increases with the 
ascent of the scale of capacities, and 
through conventional skills. This is the 
labour force which has benefited in the 
course of development, although in degrees 
which differ greatly among its members. 
In any event, the said labour force, 
precisely because it is in a favourable 
position in the absorption process, experi-
ences a spontaneous improvement in its 
income as productivity rises. For that it 
has no need of trade-union power. But 
lower down the scale regressive competition 
begins to operate and trade-union power 
becomes a necessity in order to secure a 
better share in the fruits of higher produc-
tivity, especially where skills are rudimen-
tary or simply non-existent. 
As will be remembered, to the middle 
strata corresponds the labour force that 
has been absorbed in technological layers 
of rising productivity and is acquiring 
redistributive power. The workers that 
are not absorbed remain in the lower strata 
and have no such power; and those that do 
belatedly secure a very partial and incipi-
ent form of it move up into the middle strata. 
Thus the play of power relations in 
respect of income distribution is reflected 
both in the sphere of the market and in that 
of the State. In the former, the possessors 
of economic power and social power accept 
the rule of market laws, while trade-union 
power is used to offset the action of those 
laws. Similarly, in the sphere of the State, 
the relations between income distribution 
and these various kinds of power depend 
upon the way in which the latter are project-
ed in politics. From the standpoint of 
participation in the fruits of higher pro-
ductivity, the State is really an expression 
of those power relations into which the 
electoral weight carried by the labour force 
is increasingly incorporated, in so far as 
democratization goes ahead without 
hindrance in the middle and also the lower 
strata. These are relations that alter in 
the course of structural changes, and are 
eminently dynamic, not static. 
The contention that power relations 
are the main determinants of income dis-
tribution by no means implies a denial of 
the influence wielded by the capacity and 
dynamism of individual figures who rise 
above the strata from which they have emerg-
ed, as will be seen in due course. 
Let us now go on to analyse the different 
kinds of power. The only aspect of the 
matter with which we are concerned, be 
it noted, is that bearing on distribution phe-
nomena. The socio-economic structure, of 
course, is much more complex; but to deal 
with it would be impossible without going 
beyond the strict confines of development. 
3. Economic power 
Economic power is mainly the prerogative 
of the owners of the means of production, 
who are increasingly concentrated in the 
upper strata. They are closely linked to 
those who handle the banking and financial 
machinery of the system and who frequently 
combine ownership of means of production 
with their own specific role. 
Since the role of monetary expansion 
in the formation of the working capital of 
enterprises has already been explained, it 
seems needless to mention the importance 
of those who carry responsibility in the 
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banking world, especially when, in addition 
to the financing of working capital, recourse 
is also had to bank credit for the purposes 
of fixed investment or purchases of exist-
ing assets. And the limit is not far off beyond 
which these operations acquire inflationary 
characteristics, as fairly often happens in 
peripheral capitalism under the influence 
of dominant interests. These complemen-
tary activities, while they do not generate 
surpluses through a rise in productivity, 
make it possible to appropriate and retain 
them, and even to increase them on an 
inflationary basis, at the expense of the 
rest of the community. 
Special consideration has already been 
given elsewhere to land tenure, which has 
not the same dynamic significance as capi-
tal accumulation. Urban land is not a 
source of surpluses; rather is the surplus 
generated in enterprises deflected towards 
it. But its owners share economic power 
with the owners of capital and with those 
who handle banking and financial machi-
nery, so that they project their interests 
into the political field. 
Allusion has several times been made 
to the concentration of capital, and the 
time now seems to have come to explain it. 
It has two aspects: on the one hand, concen-
tration of the owners of the means of pro-
duction, in relation to the rest of the com-
munity ; and, on ¿he other hand, in-
equality in the concentration process, since 
it takes place mainly in the upper strata. 
The basic explanation of the first aspect 
lies in the fact that a high proportion of the 
capital of enterprises is accumulated 
through investment of a part of the surplus 
generated in the enterprises themselves, 
and also a part of the income of their lead-
ing executives, in which there is usually a 
substantial element of surplus. This does 
not mean that the other members of the 
labour force do not accumulate capital; 
they do, especially the middle strata, in 
the upper ranks of the labour force. A 
considerable proportion of this accumu-
lation, however, takes the form of con-
sumptive capital which does not generate 
a surplus, the principal case in point being 
housing. 
Moreover, it is readily understandable 
that, save in exceptional cases, enterprises 
have little interest in spreading accumu-
lation among their staff, since that might 
imply, with the passage of time, the intention 
to share with the executive personal the 
decision-making power of the enterprises 
themselves. 
Let us now look at the second aspect of 
the question, which we regard as highly 
significant. Why is concentration increas-
ingly intensified in the upper strata of the 
owners of the means of production? In 
point of fact, the inequality that is 
manifested in these strata engenders a 
greater inequality. Those who possess 
most of the means of production are in a 
better position to accumulate capital; 
their situation is advantageous for introduc-
ing new layers of technology, and the more 
intensive is concentration, the more 
privileged they are in this respect. Hence 
a considerable amount of the fruits of 
higher productivity in those new tech-
nological layers, and, consequently, of the 
accumulation potential which this rep-
resents, ends up in their hands. And 
although they do not accumulate as much as 
they could, at all events they accumulate 
more than the other owners of means of 
production lower down the scale of tenure. 
Thus the propagation of technique and 
the socio-economic structure tend to favour 
the strong rather than the weak. 
The lower the position of the owners of 
means of production in the scale of tenure, 
the less is their capacity to introduce the 
techniques of the centres. And thus as the 
capital at their disposal is relatively 
scanty, so too is their participation in the 
surplus, since that smaller capital makes 
it difficult to adopt higher layers of tech-
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nology of increasing productivity. Fur-
thermore, the lower down they are in the 
scale, as was have already pointed out, the 
more difficult it becomes to obtain access 
to bank credit and financing, as well as to 
the sources of technology. 
All this explains why, as a general rule, 
the lower the position of the entrepreneur 
in the scale of ownership, the lower will 
productivity be. 
Dynamic entrepreneurs, however, sur-
mount these difficulties; and when they do 
so, and make technical progress, the object 
in view is frequently not to produce the same 
goods, but to participate in the process of 
diversification in line with demand and 
with the changes in it brought about by 
distribution privileges. 
From the trend towards concentration 
far-reaching consequences stem, and one 
of these relates to the management of en-
terprises. In small and medium-sized en-
terprises, management is closely linked 
to the ownership of the means of production, 
and since as a rule intermediate and lower 
layers of technology are involved, the sur-
plus too is small or medium-sized. It might 
therefore be said that the lower the position 
of entrepreneurs in the scale of ownership, 
the bigger is the proportion of their income 
that derives from their personal work. 
In contrast, the higher up we look in the 
scale of ownership and also in the scale of 
productivity of the technological layers, 
the more the surplus increases, and thus a 
decrease takes place in the proportion of 
income corresponding to the remuneration 
of entrepreneurs. This effect is ac-
companied by another which is also of 
outstanding significance; for with the in-
troduction of new layers of technology and 
the increase in concentration, greater 
importance attaches to the function of the 
executive and technical personnel who 
collaborate with and are appointed by the 
owners. Thus the periphery is developing, 
although to a much less marked extent, the 
same tendency as exists in the centres to 
dissociate management from ownership 
of the means of production. The work of 
management is increasingly shouldered by 
the executive and technical staff, but the 
owners continue to appropriate the surplus. 
Their role is therefore reduced to their 
election and to the performance of certain 
functions which, although they do not neces-
sarily redound to the greater efficiency of 
large enterprises, strengthen their power. 
Important shareholders, or their represen-
tatives, serve on various boards of directors, 
especially in the case of groups of companies 
whose formation is facilitated by the con-
centration of capital and easy access to 
financing from other sources; and also when 
the aim is to co-ordinate the development 
of several enterprises, often with restric-
tions on competitor!. 
It is really a matter of an internal con-
stellation of interests whose influence on 
the political parties and State authorities 
is thus considerable, since, inter alia, it 
facilitates obtaining modifications of cus-
toms duties, subsidies or other privileges 
which help to swell the surplus. 
In this constellation of interests the 
transnational corporations become artic-
ulated. They are increasingly active agents 
of the introduction of new layers of tech-
nology and therefore of the creation of 
surpluses. They generally make a marked 
contribution to the expansion of production, 
but after a certain time they also turn into 
active agents of the siphoning-off of income 
abroad. 
4. Social power 
In peripheral capitalism two components 
go to the making of social power: training 
opportunities on the one hand; and the pos-
sibility of using them on the other. Both 
components are considerably influenced by 
the social structure. 
Some CEPAL studies have helped to 
highlight the fact that opportunities for 
education and training depend largely 
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upon the political power of the upper and 
middle strata, although in very different 
degrees, whence great disparities derive. 
Thus, to cite extreme cases, there is generally 
a notable contrast between the resources 
earmarked by the State for the education of 
the upper and middle strata and those 
allocated to that of the lower strata, in some 
countries that have not yet succeeded even 
in eradicating illiteracy. 
Obviously, too, access to the opportuni-
ties in question declines with the descent in 
the income scale. For instance, in cases 
where primary education has been extended 
to the lower strata, their family incomes are 
too tiny for them to take due advantage of 
it. And this is of course more marked in 
respect of secondary education; not to speak 
of university education, where the partici-
pation of the lower strata is minimal, to 
refer once again to extreme cases. 
We are simplifying a serious problem 
in which other elements of a different kind 
are usually present. But enough has been 
said to draw attention to the privilege implicit 
in social power, which is of so much impor-
tance in the distribution of the income of 
the labour force. 
The higher and more complex are the 
skills required, the greater is the influence 
of structural privilege on training in such 
skills, irrespective, of course, of individual 
differences, with which we will deal else-
where. Moreover, competition between en-
trepreneurs to recruit possessors of such 
qualifications in the market induces them 
to give these skilled personnel a larger 
share in the global surplus than they would 
obtain if the latter did not tend to increase 
continuously in the course of development, 
in contradiction to the assumptions of neo-
classical theory. Market forces help those 
who have acquired skills to climb the ladder, 
but they do not help in acquiring them. 
Such is the influence of the socio-economic 
structure. 
This observation relates, of course, to 
the skills that become more and more 
indispensable with the propagation of tech-
nique in the various manifestations of 
development. But the influence of social 
power affects not only them but also what 
we have called conventional skills. These 
are mainly the qualifications required for 
general State services, and for a whole 
extensive range of professional activities 
which are chosen not only for reasons of 
income, but in the light of traditional con-
siderations of social status. Accordingly, 
in peripheral development there is a mark-
ed tendency to overdo training in these 
conventional skills, which in itself rep-
resents an additional factor of waste of 
capital. 
This frustration of social power leads 
to the use of political power to secure the 
spurious absorption of redundant man-
power with conventional qualifications in 
general State services and in public 
enterprises. To this last point we will 
revert later. 
5. Trade-union power 
It will be recalled that with the penetration 
of technique and the accompanying struc-
tural changes, the middle strata grow pro-
gressively larger. Only a fraction of them, 
however, has enough social power to acquire 
the skills which the new technique demands. 
The majority do not command these skills, 
or possess them only in an inferior and 
rudimentary degree, because they have 
insufficient social power or none at all. 
Consequently, their chance to share in the 
fruits of higher productivity through the 
spontaneous action of market forces grows 
less and less the lower down the scale of 
skills we look, and the supply of labour 
increases, exposed to the regressive com-
petition which has already been explained 
elsewhere. 
This is one of the most serious distri-
bution problems, since under the rule of 
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market laws this mass of workers has relativ-
ely little redistributive power, and only in 
the course of time might gain a measure of 
strength as structural disparities were 
gradually reduced. 
Clearly, then, distribution disparities 
are inherent in the development of the 
system. Accordingly, other kinds of power 
assert themselves, which come to the fore 
with the advance of democracy, as the mid-
dle strata are enlarged by industrialization 
and the expansion of other labour-absorb-
ing activities. 
If the capacity to share in the fruits of 
higher productivity were inherent in the 
play of market forces, as is assumed by 
conventional theories, trade-union power 
would have no reason to develop. But as 
this is not the case, the propagation of tech-
nique and the consequent changes in the 
social structure lead to the emergence of this 
kind of power together with political power, 
with the aim of counteracting the effects on 
distribution produced by the economic 
power of the owners of the means of pro-
duction concentrated in the upper strata 
and by the social power of the advantaged 
labour force. 
In reality, all this goes to make up one 
single system: the system of power relations. 
To denounce the trade-union power of the 
masses as anathema because it implies 
violation of economic laws is a serious non 
sequitur, since the economic and social 
power which it is opposing is not the result 
of those economic laws but of the socio-
economic structure. 
If, with the passage of time, this confron-
tation of powers culminates in conflictive 
situations and in a crisis of the system, 
this is due to the system itself, inasmuch, 
as has already been observed, the evolution 
of power relations is determined by no 
regulatory principle based on consider-
ations of equity. 
This lack of an equitable regulatory 
principle is apparent not only in power 
relations in general but in trade-union 
power itself, which is far from being homo-
geneous. It usually carries more weight 
at the strategic points of the system and 
in those big enterprises where the surplus 
is high. In such cases, regressive competi-
tion has been largely eliminated, whereas 
this is not so in other activities in which 
a large proportion of unskilled or only 
slightly skilled labour is required, and 
in which regressive competition is strong, 
precisely because such manpower is so 
plentiful. In cases like this the State is 
invoked to support trade-union claims. 
6. The State and the composition of 
political power 
The State, being the political organ of the 
system, and therefore subject to changes 
in the composition of political power, is 
of considerable importance in the distribu-
tion of the fruits of higher productivity 
through the services it provides, the 
corresponding employment and the levying 
of tax revenue to cover the cost of such 
services. From the standpoint of distribu-
tion, the State is an expression of the 
existing power relations. 
It has already been noted that the 
incidence of power relations is also heavy 
in the sphere of the market, where the 
relations deriving from the social structure 
and its changes influence distribution, and 
this in turn affects the diversification of 
demand and employment, which, again in 
its turn, operates upon the aforesaid 
changes. The situation would therefore 
seem to be similar, but there are very 
significant differences. 
Whereas in the market sphere demand 
for goods and services is given expression 
through the expenditure of personal income, 
whatsoever pattern income distribution 
may have followed, in the sphere of the 
State the linkage between income and 
services is different. Save in exceptional 
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cases, the services provided by the State 
are financed with tax revenue which is 
drawn not necessarily from the income of 
those benefiting by the services but from 
that of other social groups. Thus, some 
groups may enjoy a sizable share of services 
for which other groups have paid. 
Both cases reflect the composition of 
political power and the modifications it 
undergoes as the result of structural 
changes. In the course of these the domi-
nant power of the upper strata finds itself 
opposed by that of the middle strata, as 
the democratization process advances, 
and finally by that of the lower strata, 
which the process in question is slow to 
reach. Thus a distinction might be drawn 
between different combinations of power, 
or if it is preferred, different phases, 
although one must beware of the risk of 
lapsing into an over-schematic presentation 
of the democratization process. 
The first phase is that of outward-
directed development, prior to industrializ-
ation. Political power is then essentially 
in the hands of the upper strata —landow-
ners, financiers and big businessmen— 
and is shared by those who enjoy social 
power in the conventional forms prevailing 
at the time. External demand appreciably 
influences the generation of the primary 
production surplus, and the part left by 
foreign enterprises in the host country is 
distributed at the dictates of the market 
forces, whose interplay is undisturbed by 
the intermediate strata consisting mainly 
of the traditional middle class. The lower 
strata represent a very high proportion 
of the labour force which is widely scattered 
and has no power at all in the rural areas. 
In a second phase, industrialization 
and, in general, the propagation of tech-
nique outside export activities are inci-
pient; and to the primary production sur-
plus is gradually added that generated 
by the new activities. Thus new elements 
are incorporated into the upper strata, 
whose political power remains considerable 
in face of the weakness of the middle strata, 
which are beginning to expand as a result 
of the penetration of technique. Distri-
bution is still governed entirely by market 
laws, owing to that same weakness and to 
the use of the State's potential instruments 
of repression, always ready for application 
in case of any troublesome redistributive 
effort. 
In a third phase, the enlargement of 
the middle strata and the urban concentra 
tion which industrialization and, in general, 
the propagation of technique involve 
—through their direct and indirect ef-
fects— pave the way for the democratiza-
tion movement. The upper strata, however, 
manage to mitigate, if not to nip in the 
bud, the incipient trade-union and political 
power that democratization is bringing to 
the disadvantaged strata. To that end 
they resort to different procedures: the 
manipulation and mobilization of masses 
or clienteles under direction from the top 
of the system; the co-opting of political 
and trade-union leaders, and their incor-
poration in the system with some par-
ticipation in its advantages. In any case, 
democratization is largely formal, rather 
than substantive, and accordingly trade-
union and political power develops within 
narrow limits. 
The fourth phase represents the natural 
corollary of the third. It is characterized 
by the emergence, in the middle strata, 
of a clear awareness of their interests, 
thanks to their progressive expansion, 
to education and to the growing influence 
of the mass communication media. And 
through the exercise of trade-union and 
political power their former relationship 
of subordination to the power of the upper 
strata begins to melt away, so that their 
leaders acquire a capacity for bargaining 
and compromise, both as regards income 
redistribution and employment, and in 
respect of aspirations outside the economic 
field. 
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In the fourth phase the trade-union 
and political movement gains greater 
momentum. New leaders emerge whose 
activities are more and more directed 
towards exacerbating the distribution 
struggle, rather than easing its pressure. 
And the claims for redistribution which 
subsequently begin to be voiced by the 
lower strata as well drive the system to a 
critical limit beyond which its stability 
is seriously jeopardized. 
Incidentally, in all this too a part is 
played by propagation and irradiation 
from the centres, whose democratic ideas 
and institutions acquire telling significance 
in the periphery in the course of the 
aforesaid structural changes. Thanks to 
this, the trade-union and political power 
of the middle strata gives increasing im-
petus to the tendency to extend the advan-
tages of development beyond the restricted 
ambit of the privileged-consumer society. 
In the successive phases just de-
cribed, changes take place both in the 
composition of State services and in the 
manner of covering their cost. 
In the first phase, in addition to 
providing the general services that to a 
greater or lesser extent are of interest to 
the whole community, the State, in chan-
nelling public expenditure, responds 
primarily to the requirements of the upper 
strata, as it does in its investment in 
infrastructure. 
But as the subsequent phases succeed 
one another, the political power of the 
middle strata obtains services to satisfy 
its own social consumption, which are 
superadded to other State expenditure 
or investment. 
These social services, as well as the 
other State services, also reflect another 
kind of pressure exerted by the middle 
strata, which relates more to employment 
and earnings. 
At all events, in this latter case as in 
the former, the middle strata are trying 
to remedy in the sphere of the State the 
adverse effects of market laws. 
Employment is obtainable in two ways. 
The first is linked to the growth of services 
to an extent incompatible with the con-
siderations of economic efficiency that 
prevail in the market. Services are over-
amplified in relation to the strict require-
ments of demand; they are really the 
product of their own dynamics, of 
aspirations to bureaucratic hypertrophy 
and to higher incomes. Nor, of course, 
do these services abstain from the prema-
ture propagation of diversification and 
consumptive capital techniques, such as 
takes place in the market sphere. 
Clearly this means that more employ-
ment is created, not only for those who 
command the skills demanded by technique, 
but also for those who have acquired 
conventional qualifications. 
This over-expansion of services is 
not incompatible with good management: 
but it often becomes so, owing to the 
spurious absorption of labour. In so far 
as the system, because of the insufficiency 
of capital accumulation, fails to fulfil its 
labour-absorbing role, the redundant or 
unemployed labour force, particularly 
in the middle strata, uses its political 
power to secure its spurious absorption 
in State services. The lower strata, as a 
general rule, have much less power to do so. 
Public enterprises constitute a special 
case which is far too important to be left 
out of the present analysis. Apart from 
the ideological motives which in some 
cases promote their establishment, they 
have frequently become necessary as an 
alternative to a transnational corporation 
or as a means of counteracting the econ-
omic and political power of the upper strata. 
But at the same time, it is undeniable that 
even when this has not initially been a 
paramount objective, they have often 
represented the political road to participa-
tion in the surplus which is generated in 
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the enterprise, and which is used partly 
to raise earnings and facilitate the access 
of the senior staff to the consumer society. 
But often, too, their own surplus is dissi-
pated, in spurious absorption of labour, 
when this does not take place at the expense 
of the surplus pertaining to the rest of the 
economy. 
These remarks, of course, are not 
meant to justify economic inefficiency 
on the part of public enterprises, but to 
enable their case to be viewed in a broad 
perspective, as one of the manifestations 
of a process of redistribution. There are 
some, it should be added, who regard the 
public enterprise as an instrument for 
changing the system; but while positive 
contributions have admittedly been made, 
it cannot entirely elude the play of power 
relations. 
Apart from what has just been said of 
public enterprises, all these different 
ways of sharing in the fruits of higher 
productivity of which, as stated above, 
the middle strata in particular avail 
themselves by virtue of the political 
pressure they can exert, naturally have 
important effects on the growth of the 
surplus; for, in the last analysis, the 
tax revenue which defrays the cost of 
State services and investment represents 
a burden on it. We are not alluding only 
to those investments in infrastructure 
which help to increase the surplus, or 
to those which are genuinely necessary 
for the performance of the State's functions, 
but also to the conspicuous investment 
which responds to other ail-too-well-known 
motivations. 
We have just seen how political power, 
which was originally confined to the upper 
strata, is gradually shared, by the middle 
strata in particular, and may ultimately 
be extended to the lower strata. To whatever 
extent this happens, however, the political 
power of the upper strata will remain 
considerable. For, as already pointed 
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out, while the political process is thus 
spreading its effects, the concentration 
of economic power is intensified. Even if 
the impact of the said process slows down 
the growth rate of the global surplus, this 
latter continues to expand, and thanks to 
this the upper strata increasingly enjoy 
the advantages of the consumer society. 
They will have to make concessions to the 
pressure for redistribution from below, 
but their political power is more than suf-
ficient to defend the institutional bases 
on which their growing economic power is 
built up. 
7. Political power and the mass 
communication media 
The ramifications of the political power 
of the upper strata are a matter of com-
mon knowledge. They include financial 
contributions to the political parties and 
to their dynamic figures; introduction 
of politically influential personages into 
the boards of directors of enterprises, or 
employment of their professional services, 
both privately and in affairs of State; and 
other forms of participation through 
political channels. 
In addition, account must be taken of 
the close relations of the mass communi-
cation media with the privileged-consumer 
society. These merit separate consideration, 
especially in the case of the press. 
The evolution of publishing techniques 
'—an integral part of production technol-
ogy— necessitates an increasingly large 
amount of capital, and this does much 
to intensify the concentration of capital, 
as is the case with other enterprises. 
There is really a symbiosis between the 
big newspaper enterprises and journalism 
proper. But the latter tends to be sub-
ordinated to the former. The days are 
long gone by in which journalism required 
a relatively small amount of capital ac-
cessible to those who wanted to disseminate 
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ideas and influence public opinion. That 
state of affairs was intimately bound up 
with the original concept of the freedom 
of the press in political liberalism; but 
the hard facts have undergone a fundamental 
change. 
It is becoming increasingly evident 
that newspaper enterprises are closely 
linked to the evolution of the privileged-
consumer society, and are largely depen-
dent upon commercial advertising. The 
journalistic function is strictly obliged 
to meet publicity's demands. And however 
broad its field of criticism, there would 
be no room for an attack in depth on the 
consumer society, or on the systematic 
manipulation of what the neo-classical 
economists call the sovereignty of the 
consumer. Much less could it impugn 
the very foundations on which the system 
is based. What is more, the success of 
advertising depends upon the circulation 
of the newspaper; to boost circulation is 
an inviolable watchword. And although 
there are noteworthy cases of circumspection 
and a sense of social responsibility, there 
are others, by no means uncommon, in 
which for the sake of a wide circulation 
commercial considerations alone prevail. 
One important factor of circulation 
is criticism of governments rather than 
of the system: an expression of the freedom 
of the press; a mighty conquest of liberty. 
But it is the liberty of the owners of the 
means of production of the enterprise. 
This again bears witness to the inter-
dependence between the penetration of 
technique and the social structure and its 
changes. Because of the demands of tech-
nique, a big newspaper enterprise shares 
power with the other large enterprises 
whose economic power is substantial. 
The former is, up to a point, a member of 
the system of the privileged-consumer 
society, however wide and varied the range 
of its political opinions. It is so inasmuch 
as the requirements of circulation lead it 
to trumpet abroad the superlative merits 
of that society. And by doing this it joins 
with the factors that animate the distribution 
struggle, apart from those which in some 
instances stem from its own bias. 
This bias is considerably influenced 
by the structural changes that take place 
and the resulting changes in power 
relations. Thus, as the political power 
of the middle strata expands, the press 
responds increasingly to their interests 
and aspirations. New organs of the press 
are added to those which maintain their 
firm ties with the upper strata. 
A certain ambivalence then makes 
itself apparent, particulary when democratiz-
ation starts to forge ahead. Its advance 
is encouraged by the press, which at the 
same time continues to offer its stimulus 
to the consumer society. This, as we know, 
tends to develop within a limited ambit, 
whereas the march of democracy, urged 
on by the press, carries downward the 
advantages it brings. This ambivalence 
helps to accentuate one of the deepest-
seated contradictions of the system, namely, 
the increasing disparity between the 
course of economic development and the 
political process, an aspect to which we 
have already made repeated reference. 
In alluding to ideologies I am not 
necessarily thinking of those which are 
definitely opposed to the system, although 
obviously there is little room for them 
in these newspaper enterprises. Nor do I 
refer, of course, to those cases in which 
enterprises are established for the propa-
gation of such ideologies rather than 
for the sake of an economic interest which 
could not, of course, be sustained by an 
inherently limited commercial publicity. 
They have other sources on which to draw 
for funds. In any event, freedom of expres-
sion is the primary concern of those who 
share the ideologies of these organs of 
the press. 
On every side, the individual freedom 
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of expression proclaimed as one of the 
basic principles of political liberalism is 
seen to be hampered in practice, even 
when the democratization movement is 
in full swing. It is not easily accessible, 
as are, in contrast, public services, which 
are open to all those who are able and 
wishful to use them. 
It is a commonplace that radio and 
television are acquiring such increasing 
importance as to jeopardize, in some cases, 
the prosperity of newspaper enterprises. 
Like these, they too need a great deal 
of capital and are usually similarly 
dominated by the interests of commercial 
advertising. There is, however, a by no 
means negligible difference when access 
to these media is accorded to any who 
which to make use of them. Even though 
this access is paid for, it still represents a 
positive approach to solving the problem 
of freedom of expression; for it perhaps 
signifies the beginning of a separation 
between the enterprise as such and the 
genuine medium of diffusion of ideas 
and ideologies. 
To these observations on the freedom 
of the press I should like to add one 
concluding remark. As will be pointed 
out later, mobility does exist in peripheral 
capitalism, but those who 'get somewhere' 
join the privileged members of the system 
and in one way or another obstruct the 
arrival of others. There is a similarity 
between this process and what happens in 
the case of freedom of the press. 
This freedom is still deeply meaningful, 
and its significance is never better unders-
tood than when it is restricted or suppressed 
by the State's power of repression, or 
when the State takes over the press. 
Where democratic liberalism prevails, 
anyone who wants to establish a newspaper 
or periodical can do so. The drive of 
dynamic personalities has made itself 
felt here as in other human activities. But 
although this implies a strong element of 
freedom of the press, it is far from 
constituting a satisfactory response to that 
original concept of which we spoke before. 
Such dynamic personalities, endowed 
with great entrepreneurial capacity, 
surmount in one way or another the 
formidable obstacles represented by 
capital requirements. And those who are 
successful acquire great power, power 
which is given by the freedom of the press, 
freedom to serve their own ends. But this 
by no means signifies free access for 
others, or equality of opportunity for 
all those who have ideas to express or 
ideologies to defend. 
Nor is this all. The capacity to form 
a great newspaper enterprise, the capacity 
to guide its economic management, does 
not necessarily coincide with journalistic 
ability proper. And in the last analysis, 
entrepreneurial interests, so closely linked 
as they are to the consumer society, tend 
to take precedence of the role that political 
liberalism used to assign to the journalistic 
function. And sometimes a great contradic-
tion arises between the enterprise as such 
and the convictions that may be urged, 
a contradiction which could hardly be 
understood without thinking in terms of 
the limited ambit of development privileges. 
8. Individual differences and social 
/nobility 
We have explained the considerable 
influence of power relations on the distribu-
tion of the fruits of higher productivity. 
But this does not mean denying the 
existence of individual differences; in 
that case, to escape from neo-classical 
theories we should have tumbled into the 
opposite extreme. A very important form 
of social mobility does indeed occur, 
enabling certain individuals to triumph 
over the power relations resulting from 
the social structure, whatever their original 
place in the system. Thanks to their 
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capacity and dynamism, their ability to 
turn their experience to good account, 
they outstrip their fellows and increase 
their income, climbing to higher —some-
times much higher— strata than others 
who set out from the same starting-point. 
But when this happens they end by 
joining in the privileges of the system, 
and contribute to the exclusive and 
conflictive effects by which it is characterized, 
despite their positive contribution to 
development. 
These differences primarily affect 
the surplus itself. If we have underlined 
its structural character, we must not forget 
its dynamic significance, since the growth 
of the surplus is determined by the increase 
in productivity which is due to the super-
imposition of new layers of technology 
and the improvement of techniques in 
the layers immediately below. And it is 
here precisely that the above-mentioned 
differences in capacity, drive and experi-
ence make themselves felt. Those who are 
outstanding in these qualities in the 
entrepreneurial sphere forge ahead and 
move upward more rapidly than others; 
they are the dynamic elements of the 
system, and their contribution is usually 
of great importance within the limited 
ambit of development. 
Conventional theory is to some extent 
right in considering distributive advantages 
justifiable for the entrepreneurs who have 
contributed most to the improvement of 
productivity under a system of free com-
petition; but privilege does not consist in 
profits themselves, but in the fact that how-
ever unrestricted competition may have 
been, a part of the fruits of higher pro-
ductivity, which are considerable in 
peripheral capitalism, is retained on top 
of what was retained before, that is, it goes 
to increase the global surplus. The surplus 
is in the last analysis a structural privilege. 
Rightly considered, it is in the persis-
tence of this privilege that the fundamental 
defect of imitative capitalism lies, for on 
it the consumer society rests at the expense 
of accumulation. I do not deny that social 
mobility allows the more dynamic 
individuals to increase their holdings of 
the means of production, but as a general 
rule, those who make good in this way, 
with the undoubted merit of overcoming 
opposition, end by joining the consumer 
society, as was noted above. And if they 
do not, those who have inherited the means 
of production in question generally do, 
even if they have not the same dynamic 
qualities. 
In short, by wasting accumulation 
potential in this way they are hampering 
the social mobility of others, who, if they 
had the means to do so, might prove more 
efficient. More intensive use of this 
potential in introducing changes in the 
system would give greater opportunities 
of mobility to a larger number of individuals 
who might distinguish themselves by their 
capacity and dynamism. To pursue this 
subject further, however, would be to tres-
pass too far on the ground that will be 
covered in a subsequent study on the 
Theory of Change. 
We have already said elsewhere that 
social power enables its possessors to 
acquire the skills necessitated by the 
propagation of techniques. Here too 
there is an element of social privilege; 
but there are also individual figures with 
dynamic qualities who rise from below 
—sometimes from the very bottom— and 
by their tenacious efforts succeed in learn-
ing those skills and improving them 
through experience. Then again there 
are those who have social power and show 
great dynamic abilities which enable 
them to distinguish themselves and outs-
trip others risen from the same strata. 
But when they reach higher levels much 
the same thing happens to them as to 
those who shine in the entrepreneurial 
field, for as they climb they improve their 
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capacity to participate in the fruits of 
technical progress and gradually secure 
a share in the privileges of the system, 
including greater social power. 
At all events, those individuals who, 
by virtue of their dynamic ability or of 
their social power, or thanks to a combina-
tion of both, possess the skills called for 
by the propagation of technique, find 
themselves in a more favourable position 
than others to share in the surplus to 
whose enlargement they contribute to a 
greater or lesser extent. The bigger the 
surplus, the more willing are enterprises 
to raise wages and salaries when supply 
lags behind demand for this skilled labour 
force. Exactly the opposite happens at 
the other extreme of the social structure. 
A fundamental distinction must there-
fore be drawn between structural income 
distribution and individual differences 
in income. The structural distribution 
results from the play of power relations 
which are constantly altering with the 
changes in the social structure, and in 
their turn influence those changes. 
Individual differences correspond to 
varying degrees of ability and dynamism. 
1. The centripetal dynamics of capitalism 
There could hardly be anything less 
realistic than that inveterate belief in the 
indefinite expansion of capitalism according 
to which it was merely a matter of time 
until this expansionist movement would 
spread progressively all over the world. 
Here I should like to slip in a pertinent 
comment. Since the weak capacity of the 
labour force to participate in the productivity 
increment constitutes the structural origin 
of the surplus, those who are at the opposite 
extreme and in a better position to obtain 
their share thus benefit by the structural 
disparity, a situation which is reflected in 
the deterioration of income relations be-
tween the two groups. 
This deterioration affects not only 
the lower strata but also that proportion 
of the middle strata whose ability to obtain 
higher pay lessens when the labour-
absorbing role of the system loses strength, 
whereas the sharing capacity of the above-
mentioned relatively small fraction of the 
labour force grows greater as the rate of 
productivity rises. 
In other words, the improvement of the 
earnings of the labour force that possesses 
the skill s increasingly demanded by 
technique largely depends upon the 
incapacity of the disadvantaged labour 
force to push up its wages correlatively 
with the increase in productivity. Such is 
the nature of the deterioration in income 
relations which is liable to occur in the 
spontaneous play of market forces. 
Let time do its work. The centre-periphery 
set-up did not fit into such a concept at all. 
The dynamics of capitalism is quite 
a different thing. Capitalism, however 
thriving, has always tended to keep 
development to the centres themselves; 
and when it penetrated into the periphery 
in the days of outward-directed development 
V 
Structural disparities in centre-periphery relations 
and the hegemony of the centres 
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it did so in order to obtain supplies of 
primary commodities. The centres placed 
investment there with that end in view, 
generating what were sometimes very large 
surpluses. But these surpluses, in so far 
as they were not needed for the continued 
expansion of production for export, were 
siphoned off by the centres in response to 
incessant innovations. And the part 
which in the play of power relations the 
centres left for the periphery was also 
largely channelled back towards the centres 
themselves through imports purchased 
with the aim of imitating their patterns 
of consumption. 
This explains why during the period 
of outward-directed growth capitalism was 
not favourable to integrated development 
of the periphery, over and above primary 
production; the peripheral countries were 
excluded from the spontaneous industrializ-
ation process. Not with malice aforethought, 
but by the very dynamics of the system 
—an essentially centripetal dynamics. 
Thus an increasing structural disparity 
between centres and periphery supervened, 
and the economic and technological 
superiority of the former steadily increased. 
Accordingly, when adverse international 
events compelled the periphery to embark 
upon a deliberate industrialization process, 
it came up against wide disparities between 
its own productivity and that of the centres, 
and had to resort to protection in order 
to undertake import substitution. During 
the initial phases it relied entirely on its 
own efforts; but in the course of time 
substitution has attracted the transnational 
corporations. They invest to exploit 
their innovations, especially those that 
may be termed 'second-line', i.e., not 
the very latest. But they do not invest 
indefinitely, since the time comes when 
the surplus they generate is likewise 
transferred to the centres: a kind of 
siphoning-off which combines with the 
tendency of peripheral demand to shift 
towards the centres in quest of increasingly 
diversified goods, in so far as these cannot 
be obtained through import substitution. 
The centripetal dynamics of capitalism 
reasserts itself after a spell of fleeting 
illusions. 
On of these illusions has consisted in 
cherishing the hope that the transnationals 
would play a decisive role in the expansion 
of exports of manufactures to the centres, 
thus incorporating the periphery into the 
voluminous flow of trade in industrial 
products which has developed in these 
latter. But hitherto this has occurred only 
on a very small scale, because of the very 
dynamics of the system and its innovations. 
The truth is that the portentous ap-
pearance of the transnationals on the 
scene contributes notably to the inter-
nationalization of patterns of consumption, 
but not so much to the internationalization 
of production, which is stimulated in the 
centres by technological progress. The 
transnationals forge increasingly close 
links with the consumer society of the 
periphery and do a very great deal to 
exalt it. But they do not counteract its 
exclusive tendency, because in the last 
analysis this is due, of course, to the 
waste of capital accumulation potential 
in imitation of the consumption of. the 
centres, and to their centripetal dynamics. 
Such is the myth of the indefinite 
expansion of capitalism, which has been 
fading out with the passage of time, as has 
that other illusion of peripheral develop-
ment in the image and likeness of the 
centres. 
The centripetal dynamics of capitalism 
exerts a profound influence on the develop-
ment of the periphery, as has already been 
explained, and on its relations with the 
centres, with which we will now go on to 
deal. 
Since the capitalism of the centres 
does not promote the integrated develop-
ment of the periphery, this takes place 
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with a lengthy time-lag: a time-lag which 
entails a number of very important con-
sequences that have come to light in our 
centre-periphery system, namely, the 
great structural disparities, the fragmen-
tation of the periphery, its external 
vulnerability, the deterioration of the 
terms of trade and the concentration in 
the centres of economic and technological 
power. All this goes to prevent reproduction 
of the capitalism of the centres. 
These various points, which are, of 
course, closely interrelated, will now be 
considered in turn. 
2. The great structural disparities 
The time-lag in the development of the 
periphery should be examined in the 
light of the past. Initially the periphery 
played a passive role in what we have called 
the days of outward-directed growth. At 
that time it really constituted a sort of 
appendix to the centres, whose function 
was to supply them with the primary com-
modities they needed, at a low cost. 
Moreover, the propagation of the technique 
of the centres was chiefly confined to serving 
this purpose. And peripheral development 
depended upon the degree of intensity 
with which this passive function was fulfilled, 
and which in some cases was very marked 
and created favourable conditions for 
subsequent industrialization. But this 
latter process was not the consequence 
of the spontaneous development of 
capitalism. 
Owing to the very dynamics of the 
system, from the outset of the industrial 
revolution the fruits of the higher produc-
tivity achieved through technical progress 
were not spread throughout the world, 
but were retained in the centres themselves. 
There, accordingly, demand steadily 
increased, and there too, profiting by 
this process, innovations and industrial 
diversification developed. Demand and 
innovations were spurs to one another. 
Despite a few budding industrialization 
efforts in some of the peripheral countries 
during the phase of outward-directed growth, 
the periphery performed the specific role 
incumbent upon it in the outdated schema 
of the international division of labour, 
and was broken up into a number of 
compartments converging separately 
upon the centres, with very little reciprocal 
trade. 
The significance of all this should give 
food for thought. While in the centres 
industrialization progressively changed 
the social structure and disseminated the 
fruits of technical progress downwards, the 
social structure of the periphery lagged 
farther and farther behind. It is true that 
the upper strata shared with the centres, 
although in differing degrees, the fruits 
of technical progress chiefly in respect 
of primary production, but the masses 
benefited only slightly or not at all. 
This articulation between centres and 
periphery during the phase of outward-
directed development split apart in the 
great crises of the centres (the First World 
War, the Great Depression and the Second 
World War). Until then, demand in the 
periphery, especially that of its upper 
strata, had been satisfied with imported 
goods. The crises in question made it 
exceedingly difficult for this to go on. 
Industrialization thus became a necessity: 
undertaken at first in order to produce 
at home what could not be imported, and 
later, carried along by its own momentum; 
and the advent of this process threw into 
sharp relief the technical and economic 
inferiority of the periphery from the 
standpoint of competing with the centres. 
3. Peripheral industrialization and the 
transnational corporations 
Industrialization was based primarily on 
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import substitution. Furthermore, it was 
asymmetrical. And in the light of experi-
ence it is clear that a symmetrical process 
would have been preferable, combining 
protectionist duties with various kinds of 
incentives to exports. But in face of the 
crises in the centres, the idea of a great 
export drive would have been a pipe dream. 
In those early days of industrialization, 
active import substitution proved enough 
to counteract the inherent proneness of 
peripheral development to an external 
bottleneck. It should be recalled that this 
tendency is due to the structural disparities 
which the time-lag in development brings 
about in centre-periphery relations. 
Owing to these disparities, demand 
for industrial goods produced by the centres, 
under the continual stimulus of diversifi-
cation, expands rapidly in the periphery; 
whereas in the centres —save in excep-
tional cases— demand for primary com-
modities from the periphery grows rela-
tively slowly, in addition to which some of 
these commodities are superseded by syn-
thetic substitutes as a result of technical 
innovations. 
To begin with, the centres were opposed 
to industrialization of the periphery, but 
later they found it fertile ground for the ex-
pansion of the transnational corporations. 
Attracted by protection, the transnational 
have played an increasingly important part 
in the import substitution process, either 
for the direct satisfaction of the consumer 
society's requirements, or in order to 
facilitate other imports, especially those 
incorporating the constant innovations 
of the centres. 
However, it is common knowledge that 
import substitution has its limits and 
becomes more difficult and complex when 
these are overstepped. Export promotion 
then becomes an indispensable requisite 
in order to offset the tendency towards an 
external bottleneck. 
A good many people believed that the 
penetration of the transnational corporations 
into the periphery would make a notable 
contribution to the export of manufactures 
to the centres. The transnational would 
be powerful instruments which, thanks to 
the internationalization of production, 
would enable us to participate in the 
copious flow of industrial trade together 
with the centres. But in practice things 
have not worked out like that. The trans-
nationals have vigorously promoted the 
internationalization of consumption in 
the periphery, rather than the interna-
tionalization of production, inasmuch as 
they have not helped to establish new 
ways of taking part in the international 
division of labour. The periphery therefore 
remains largely excluded from the trade 
flows of the centres, as formerly from the 
industrialization process. This is the 
consequence of the structural disparity 
in centre-periphery relations. 
What is more, until a few years ago 
the transnational corporations betrayed 
reluctance to export manufactures. Since 
then, however, they have reacted to the 
incentive of subsidies with impressive 
results; but relatively very little of this 
trade has reached the centres. 
It may well be asked why, in this export 
effort, the transnational have placed em-
phasis on exports to other peripheral 
countries rather than to the centres. As 
has already been pointed out, the dynamics 
of the centres is closely linked to the inno-
vations that make for diversification; and 
it would therefore seem that the trans-
nationals are not interested in undertak-
ing them in the periphery, at any rate for 
the present. On the other hand, it does 
suit them to exploit there those newest 
products of yesterday's industry, or 'se-
cond-line' goods, which in the centres are 
being ousted by the still newer and more 
and more technically advanced products 
in which today's and tomorrow's inno-
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vations take shape. They exploit in the per-
ipheral countries innovations which in the 
centres are no longer such. The lot of 
the periphery is always to lag behind. 
But why should not the transnational 
corporations use the periphery as a base 
from which to launch at least a part of the 
vanguard innovations? I am inclined to 
think that the lower-wages argument 
carries little weight, except in special 
instances, for in the case of those advanced 
goods the essential thing, apart from the 
expanding market of the centres themselves, 
is the scientific and technological infras-
tructure and the training of human resources 
to meet increasingly exigent requirements 
at all technical levels. These factors 
represent obstacles which, in combination 
with the narrow social base and the frag-
mentation of the peripheral economies, 
are hardly surmountable by means of 
export subsidies, however liberal these 
may be. 
Again, the centres put up opposition 
in several ways to the admittance of those 
manufactures in which the periphery, by 
its own efforts, has achieved or could 
acquire competitive capacity. These are
 h 
generally less advanced and less technically 
complex goods, for which the centres' 
demand tends to grow much more slowly 
than for the frontline products. 
The transnalionáis, of course, are not 
interested in producing such goods, which 
do come within the reach of the domestic 
enterprises of the periphery. But they are 
not yet covered by the liberalization policy 
which has done so much for the expansion 
of trade in advanced goods in the centres. 
What is more, to the existing restrictions 
other new ones are often added which 
hamper peripheral exports to a still 
greater extent. 
It is therefore understandable that 
enterprises producing the same sort of 
goods in the centres —goods for which 
demand grows relatively slowly— resort 
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to their political power and to that of the 
trade unions to keep imports out. If this 
has happened in boom periods when some 
centres have had to bring in foreign 
workers in order to expand production, all 
the stronger will be their opposition in 
less favourable circumstances such as 
those prevailing at present. 
Notwithstanding all this, the trans-
national corporations, persistently en-
couraged by the centres, have been 
penetrating more and more deeply into 
the periphery, to the manifest detriment 
of the autonomy of peripheral development 
and of its national significance. There are 
some who opine that this must be accepted, 
as a means of removing the external 
obstacles to Latin American development. 
That objective has not been attained, as 
already shown; but dependence has 
increased. 
We said at the beginning of this chapter 
that the myth of the spontaneous propaga-
tion of the capitalist dynamics of the centres 
in peripheral development has been explod-
ed, like that of the social efficiency of 
peripheral development. Both were myths 
that arose out of an inveterate belief in 
the role of economic incentives and of 
market laws. That such a role exists, and 
is generally positive, there can be no 
doubt. But the incentives operate within 
certain structures and power relations 
which, as propagation and irradiation from 
the centres into the periphery take effect, 
involve deepseated contradictions, both 
in centre-periphery relations and in internal 
development. 
Perhaps a few years ago it was imposs-
ible to imagine such contradictions in 
centre-periphery relations; but not to re-
cognize them now would be veritably in-
excusable. Yet this is what is happening. 
The centres remain entrenched in a pos-
ition that is completely negative as regards 
the requirements of a new international 
economic order —a body of ideas that in 
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reality are not new, since they have 
been fruitlessly canvassed for more than 
two decades. And the periphery, as a 
general rule, persists in expecting of such 
a new order what can only be achieved after 
a radical and tenacious effort to bring 
about change. The new order must not be 
a means of continuing to boost the privileg-
ed-consumer society. 
4. The fragmentation of the periphery 
If a dynamic approach to these problems 
is adopted, it would seem unlikely, even 
were it possible to secure the application 
of a liberalization policy in the centres, 
that this would constitute the final solution 
of the peripheral bottleneck problem. This 
problem will acquire formidable dimensions 
as the peripheral industrialization process 
advances and is rapidly extended to 
countries where it is still incipient. Nor 
is it easily conceivable that the centres, in 
face of the periphery's potential imbalance, 
will increase their coefficient of imports 
from the periphery much beyond certain 
limits. 
At all events, the periphery has not 
yet made a vigorous and sustained effort 
to exploit the considerable potentialities 
of reciprocal trade. It has not been capable 
of breaking down the outdated trade system 
under which each peripheral country 
converged separately upon the centres. 
It is true that the latter, and in particular 
the chief dynamic centre of capitalism, 
did not take a sympathetic view of certain 
efforts on the part of peripheral countries 
in the early days; but later they supported 
these attempts, when they realized that 
by doing so they could open up a promising 
field for the expansion of the transnationals. 
They have urged, however, that this 
expansion should take place entirely 
without intervention on the part of the 
governments, without any effort at rational 
distribution of the production of capital 
goods and intermediate goods, an end 
which would not be attained as a mere 
result of tariff reductions. 
All the same, thanks to such tariff 
reductions and to export subsidies, the 
transnationals have discharged a very 
important role in the peripheral countries' 
reciprocal export trade in manufactures. 
But the governments have devoted 
little care to ensuring reciprocity. The 
more industrially advanced countries of 
Latin America are exporting larger and 
larger quantities to less developed countries, 
although without concerting measures that 
would enable the latter to develop their 
own industrial exports. Consequently, the 
less developed countries have transferred 
some of their import trade from the centres 
to the more advanced peripheral countries, 
thereby relieving the latters' trade deficit. 
However, this would not seem the most 
rational way of resolving the bottleneck 
problem from the standpoint of the 
periphery as a whole. 
5. The vulnerability of the periphery 
The development of capitalism proceeds 
in cyclical form. And the cycle is reflected 
in the periphery more intensively than in 
the centres, owing to the dominant role 
still played by primary exports, the prices 
of which fluctuate more sharply than 
those of final goods. 
As a result of the cyclical fluctuations, 
in boom periods the peripheral countries 
are inclined to lose sight of the latent 
trend towards external bottlenecks; whereas 
in the downswings this trend reasserts itself 
in a form that is generally more difficult 
to counteract by the countries' own auto-
nomous decision. 
Such things are the consequence of 
the structural lag that we have already 
attempted to explain. If the periphery 
had played the same active part in 
industrial trade as do the centres, the 
proportion of total exports represented 
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by its primary exports would have steadily 
declined. And thus the cyclical movement 
of total exports would have been less 
sweeping; but this is not how matters 
have turned out. 
The foregoing situation has another 
major consequence. As a general rule, 
the peripheral countries have overdone 
the import substitution process and have 
frequently extended it to final goods, 
especially in less technically complex 
lines of production. In this way they have 
introduced an element of great rigidity 
into imports, the effect of which is felt 
above all during the cyclical downturns. 
Through substitution, the proportion 
of total imports represented by final goods 
has considerably decreased. And imports 
are made up chiefly of raw materials, 
intermediate products and capital goods, 
i.e., items whose compression would have 
serious effects on economic activity; or 
again of products, such as foodstuffs and 
other esential consumer goods, in respect 
of which substitution policy has seldom 
been inspired by far-reaching foresight. 
With this loss of flexibility, more and 
more difficulties attend upon an expan-
sionist policy, however cautious, aimed at 
mitigating the adverse effects of a decline 
in exports on internal development. The 
compressible margin of imports has largely, 
if not entirely, disappeared. And if the 
periphery persists in following such an 
expansionist policy, there is nothing it 
can do but resort to international loans. 
The main object of such operations is no 
longer to increase capital accumulation, 
but to cover, in the last analysis, the 
requirements of consumption and debt-
servicing itself. Consequently, the growth 
of the external debt is not always ac-
companied by a correlative increase in 
production capacity. It is needless to 
underline the gravity of these facts in 
themselves, when they reach a certain 
pitch, especially if a little thought is given 
to their significance in dependence relations. 
When starting to discuss this point 
we said that external vulnerability, inten-
sified in the way that that has just been 
shown, is a consequence of the structural 
time-lag and of the centripetal dynamics of 
capitalist development. A time-lag which, 
as h as already been explained, is also 
reflected in the fragmentation of the 
periphery. This fragmentation has been 
among the factors that have made import 
substitution more difficult and costly in 
respect of intermediate and capital goods, 
which, in addition to their technical com-
plexity, necessitate broader markets than 
those of individual countries. Perhaps 
this is the principal reason for overdoing 
final goods substitution, since it is easier 
and more expeditious. But, as pointed 
out elsewhere, the periphery has not yet 
been able to face up resolutely to the task 
of changing the old system of the peripheral 
countries' convergence upon the centres. 
6. The terms of trade 
This is the subject of one of CEPAL'S 
original theses, and was among the con-
siderations upon which the inescapable 
necessity of industrialization was grounded. 
Set forth in somewhat simplified fashion, the 
thesis aroused criticisms which sometimes 
made useful contributions to its refinement. 
I will go on to state its main propositions, 
already partly dealt with in an earlier 
chapter. 
It relates first and foremost to the 
weakness that generally affects primary 
commodities, especially foodstuffs, in 
structural changes in demand and employ-
ment. Demand for such products tends to 
grow relatively slowly in comparison with 
demand for industrial goods, which becomes 
increasingly diversified as per capita income 
rises. Similar disparities arise in demand 
for simple services. All these phenomena 
are intensified by the great inequalities 
in income distribution. 
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Employment of course follows in the 
track of these changes in demand. As 
will be recalled, manpower moves from the 
labour-expelling to the labour-absorbing 
activities. 
This switch-over takes a considerable 
time, and all the longer, of course, the 
greater is the waste of capital accumulation 
potential, apart from other factors. 
The labour force in the strata concerned 
is engaged largely in the periphery's 
primary production, particularly agricul-
ture. And when it shifts into labour-
absorbent activities, regressive competition 
on the part of the manpower remaining 
in these strata prevents it from raising 
its income correlatively with the increase 
in productivity, as was explained at the 
appropriate point. 
When, moreover, thanks to technical 
progress, productivity rises in the case of 
primary commodities, the fruits of this 
higher productivity are diverted away 
from agriculture. To prevent this from 
happening, it would be indispensable for 
the labour-absorbent activities to fulfil 
their role very vigorously indeed; but they 
do not. 
To whom are the fruits of the higher 
productivity transferred, in greater or 
lesser degree? Mainly to middlemen in 
the production process or to the consumers 
of the final goods which emerge from that 
process; but if the natural resource in 
question is in short supply, this trend is 
counteracted, and land rent in agricultural 
or mining areas rises proportionally. 
Where primary exports are concerned, 
the transfer is usually made to the centres, 
because of the relative deterioration in the 
prices of such commodities in comparison 
with those of the diversified goods which 
are imported. This is a matter of market 
laws. If in one way or another their play 
is counteracted, the trend towards deterio-
ration is promptly interrupted. This is, 
in essence, the CEPAL thesis. 
It is certainly not a question of some-
thing inherent in primary commodities, but 
of a trend which predominates throughout 
a long period of transition until the system 
reaches its maximum absorption capacity. 
And upon industrialization is incumbent 
a role of supreme importance in this 
connexion. 
A long period of transition. So long 
that even the centres have had to adopt 
measures to counteract the trend towards 
deterioration, especially when the increase 
in productivity has been intense. We will 
refer to this when we deal, in another 
study, with neo-classical theories. 
Let us now look at a further highly 
important aspect of this question, relating 
to the diversification mentioned above. 
It is worth while to recall the sequence of 
events: growing productivity and rising 
income, inequitable income distribution, 
progressive shift of demand towards goods 
that are being increasingly diversified. 
Now, the more intensive is this movement 
of demand, the more capable are the 
labour-absorbing activities of retaining 
the fruits of productivity in the form of 
a surplus; and the less the extent to which 
those fruits are retained in the labour-
expelling activities. 
We have seen that the explanation of 
this last phenomenon lies in the abundance 
of manpower in those layers of technology 
where productivity is very low, as well as 
in the inadequate performance of capital 
accumulation's absorbent role. We might 
assume the contrary, i.e., such intense 
fulfilment of the process of absorption 
that the differences in workers' earnings 
would be gradually smoothed out until 
incomes came to be the same for all oc-
cupations requiring the same technical 
skills, whether they were labour-absorbing 
or labour-expelling activities. As this 
happened, the tendency for the productivity 
increment in these latter to be transferred 
would be modified, with no decline in the 
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relative prices of the goods they produced; 
and the income relation between labour-
expelling and labour-absorbing activities 
would progressively improve. But this is 
a highly unlikely hypothesis, in view of 
the insufficient absorption capacity of 
the system. 
An increase in productivity is therefore 
not enough to ensure the improvement of 
income relations. It is also indispensable 
that the labour force should be able to 
obtain higher salaries and wages so that 
it can participate in the absorption of the 
productivity increment. 
From the centres, again, comes the 
reiterated recommendation to raise pro-
ductivity in agriculture. Of course this 
would have to be done by improving 
technique, especially as regards land 
yields; but such action is far from enough, 
for if the absorption capacity of the system 
does not increase, the productivity incre-
ment will tend to be transferred, either 
internally or externally, according to the 
product concerned. And as this process 
takes time, it is understandable that the 
labour force resorts to its trade-union and 
political power in order to share in the 
fruits of higher productivity. At all events, 
the basic solution depends essentially 
upon intense use of the accumulation 
potential. And this, as we know, is incom-
patible with the consumer society and its 
increasingly close linkages with the trans-
national corporations: a patent manifes-
tation of the centripetal trend of capitalism 
to which we alluded at the beginning of the 
present chapter. 
As long as the labour force employed 
in agriculture fails to improve its sharing 
capacity, the productivity increment will 
be transferred outside it or will push up 
land rent, according to the degree of 
liveliness of demand. When land tenure is 
concentrated in the upper strata, as is 
generally the case in the Latin American 
region of the periphery, the regressive 
trend in income distribution will be streng-
thened. 
Hence an argument stems of which 
the centres are wont to avail themselves 
in order to oppose commodity price 
stabilization agreements, even when these 
are not aimed at systematically improving 
the terms of trade; it is alleged that their 
adoption would represent artificial inter-
ference in market laws, to the greater 
benefit of the privileged sectors of the 
periphery. It has already been pointed 
out, and moreover is common knowledge, 
that fluctuations of external origin are 
seriously prejudicial to the regularity 
of development, to the disadvantage of 
all concerned. What is more, conjunctural 
deterioration of the terms of trade does 
much to stiffen the periphery's attitude 
of insistence on measures that will steadily 
improve those terms. It seems worth while 
to dwell for a moment on this point. 
When a conjunctural improvement 
takes place in the terms of trade and 
income relations in export activities, the 
landowners' surplus rises and so also 
does the income of the skilled labour 
force. Its demand for diversified goods 
therefore increases and it acquires new 
habits of consumption. When the downswing 
supervenes, it becomes very difficult to 
squeeze the consumption thus expanded. 
Protests are then raised against distributive 
inequity at the international level, without 
a moment's regard for internal inequity. 
To put it another way, the terms of 
trade relate to the goods formerly imported 
and not to the new goods that are technically 
more advanced; these are generally higher-
priced and strictly speaking are different 
goods. It is, of course, quite explicable 
that any who purchase them after recovering 
the same income as before should consider 
that their situation has worsened. The 
terms of trade could have been kept stable 
throughout the cyclical fluctuations, but 
the income relation between centres and 
periphery would have deteriorated. And 
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so it would within the periphery itself, 
as between labour-expelling and labour-
absorbing activities. 
The centres object to these so-called 
artificial interferences with market laws, 
maintaining that they will benefit the great 
landowners whose land rent is very large. 
Although it is not so in all cases, since a 
number of medium-scale and even small 
producers participate in export activities, 
this argument undeniably has something 
to be said for it when the problem is viewed 
from the standpoint of the social equity 
of development. 
Be that as it may, those who receive 
this large land rent form part of the upper 
strata on which the consumer society is 
based; and it is well known that their interests 
tie in very closely with those of the trans-
national corporations. 
This is yet another proof of a certain 
inconsistency on the part of the centres. 
For fluctuations in prices, and to a far 
greater extent their deterioration, seriously 
jeopardize the orderly development of the 
consumer society. 
7. The concentration of power and the 
hegemony of the centres 
We remarked elsewhere that the centrip-
etal trend of capitalism accounted for the 
time-lag in peripheral development. We 
have also explained the principal conse-
quences that ¿lis involves, except for those 
concerning power relations, to which we 
will now devote some attention. 
While the centres steadily increase their 
economic and political power, the periphery 
perpetually lags behind. And the growing 
power of the former is accompanied by very 
significant manifestations of economic and 
technological superiority, together with 
the emergence of ideas, ideologies and new 
cultural patterns which tend to spread to 
the periphery in those processes of pro-
pagation and irradiation to which we have 
attached so much importance in peripheral 
development. 
This, in short, is the historical phenom-
enon of the economic, political and strategic 
hegemony of the centres, especially of 
the leading dynamic centre, which has 
become a capitalist superpower. 
Long before this, the United States 
constituted the hegemonic power of the 
American continent, always ready to prevent 
the intervention of other powers in what 
it used to —and still does— regard as its 
own sphere of influence. In those days, 
fundamental differences in economic and 
social systems did not enter into play at 
the international level. But now they 
carry a great deal of weight. And the 
socialist superpower finds in the way in 
which the other exercises its influence, as 
well as in the conflictive and exclusive 
character of peripheral capitalism, a very 
important front on which to undermine, 
by the propagation and irradiation of its 
own ideologies, the hegemony of the 
capitalist superpower. 
The interests of the hegemonic centres 
are promoted and defended through many 
different forms of action and persuasion: 
trade concessions, financial resources, 
military aid, certain methods of exerting 
overt or covert influence on public opinion 
and governments, and, as an ultimate 
possibility, punitive measures which some-
times culminate in the use of force. 
The centres, especially the capitalist 
superpower, apply these various forms of 
action and persuasion in such a way that 
the peripheral countries, in widely varying 
degrees, find themselves subject to decisions 
made in the central countries, or constrained 
either to adopt decisions which otherwise 
they would not take, or to refrain from 
adopting them even when they would have 
liked to do so. Such is the phenomenon 
of dependence, which must not be confused 
with other important elements in centre-
periphery relations. 
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This is not the place to deal with 
political and strategic interests, however 
important they may be, but with economic 
interests. 
We have already noted the leading role 
played by the transnational corporations 
in these economic interests. Clustered 
around t&em in the centres there is a 
constellation of diverse interests; and 
among these one common denominator 
of solidarity exists, which, although not 
always visible, becomes vividly apparent 
when from time to time friction occurs in 
centre-periphery relations. 
Underlying these relations is always 
to be detected the weight carried by the 
transnational in the centres within the 
sphere of the State. And thanks to this 
and to their economic and technological 
superiority, they also exercise considerable 
influence in the periphery, and acquire 
a great deal of internal political power, 
even when they do not openly participate 
in party politics: a political power which 
sometimes outrivals that of national 
enterprises and appreciably sways the 
decisions of peripheral governments. 
The transnational also exert a powerful 
influence on the press and other mass 
media, especially on account of their close 
linkage with the privileged-consumer 
society. This influence transcends the 
sphere of economic interest, and sometimes 
extends to the promotion or defence of 
certain political or strategic interests of 
the capitalist superpower, whether in the 
form of open support or through discreet 
unwillingness to countenance subversive 
criticism. All this, of course, with the 
collaboration of certain international news 
agencies that are highly skillful in their 
selection or presentation of information 
or in giving a subtle slant to their comments. 
As regards the economic interests of 
the transnationals, their most important 
decisions are taken in the centres with an 
eye to their global interests, which may or 
may not coincide with the interests of 
development. For example, from this last 
standpoint, in a specific peripheral country 
it might be economically expedient to 
promote certain branches of production 
or exports, although other countries might 
be better qualified from the angle of 
economic efficiency or viability. 
There are cases in which decisions are 
not adopted by the transnational cor-
porations but by governments in the centres 
which are guided by their own interests 
and take no account of the unfavourable 
impact of those decisions on peripheral 
interests. Examples that always come to 
mind are provisions that place a ban on 
exports to specific countries or on proces-
sing materials coming from countries to 
which the leading centre, whether the 
others follow suit or not, is applying 
punitive measures. Nor can those directives 
be forgotten which, prompted by consider-
ations of external disequilibrium, have 
led to the untimely repatriation of profits 
obtained in the periphery. 
Large countries possessing broad 
markets, or endowed with an abundance 
of natural resources that are in short 
supply in the world, are in a better position 
to confine this penetration of the trans-
national corporations to specific fields 
of activity and to negotiate the terms on 
which it is allowed. All the more so if their 
leaders have a lively awareness of present 
and future national interests, and are able 
to rid themselves of those doctrinaire 
notions which attribute to the transnational 
corporations a very different role from the 
one they really play in peripheral devel-
opment. 
Everyone knows what pains the govern-
ments of the centres take to encourage 
the expansion of the transnational in 
the periphery, emphasizing their dynamic 
significance, both in the so-called moderniz-
ation of the countries concerned, and in 
the internationalization of production. 
i 
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This attitude is usually accompanied by 
a few trade concessions to peripheral 
countries, as well as by a flow of financial 
resources, through either bilateral or 
multilateral channels. 
When granted mining or petroleum 
concessions, the transnational corporations, 
thanks to their economic and technological 
superiority, have been able to appropriate 
a substantial proportion of the surplus. 
Although with the passage of time the 
peripheral countries have strengthened 
their formerly feeble bargaining capacity, 
the image of the transnational that was 
built up in the past still casts its shadow 
on public opinion, whether the question 
at issue is one of natural resources or of 
the penetration of the transnational into 
industry and other domestic activities. 
In industry, their acknowledged capacity 
to generate surpluses is often reinforced 
by protection or subsidies, although these 
are less justifiable than in the case of 
domestic enterprises because of the higher 
productivity of the transnational. 
Furthermore, the very fact of exploiting 
their innovations enables the transnational 
corporations to restrict competition and 
enlarge their surpluses. And the extension 
of their operations to many countries 
makes possible certain arrangements or 
practices which are very understandably 
considered questionable because of their 
potential adverse effects on development. 
This uneasiness is enhanced by the secrecy 
surrounding such operations and the 
suspicion it arouses, which is intensified 
by the impressive size of the transnational. 
As we were saying, the introduction of 
innovations facilitates restrictions on 
domestic competition. But furthermore, 
in foreign trade, there are usually tacit 
or explicit understandings between enteprises 
in respect of prices or operational margins, 
to the decided benefit of their surplus. 
We have mentioned more than once 
that the transnational exalt the consumer 
society. But theirs is not the merit of 
establishing it. It could not exist without 
the great distributional disparities whose 
origin lies in the social structure of the 
periphery. The transnational take ad-
vantage of them with acknowledged dexterity. 
It would be a great mistake to suppose 
that the periphery invariably resigns 
itself to the idea that these and other 
problems are adamantine facts which have 
to be lived with. Whether we call it national-
ism or not, awareness of their own identity 
and of the autonomy of their decisions is 
certainly displayed by the peripheral 
countries, especially when democratization 
makes headway. But the possibilities of 
translating this awareness into terms of 
practical attitudes are a very different 
matter. 
This is not the place for a systematic 
analysis, but merely for reference to a few 
significant cases, such as that of countries 
which attempt to attract the transnational 
in some branches of their developing 
industry, while they reserve for public 
enterprise the exploitation of certain 
resources or basic activities. Positive 
results have also been obtained by the 
establishment of a commitment on the 
part of certain transnational corporations 
to export a specific quqta of their output, 
in exchange for the opportunity to take 
advantage of a growing domestic market 
which holds out considerable promise. 
Clearly, the fragmentation of the 
periphery is a serious obstacle to a policy 
of this kind, as well as to the effective role 
that the transnational might play in the 
development of certain important lines of 
reciprocal trade. 
8. Underdevelopment and dependence 
We have given a definition of dependence 
relations in order to forestall not uncom-
mon misunderstandings. For instance, 
underdevelopment, as it is sometimes 
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called, is attributed to dependence. This 
is to confuse dependence and periphery. 
The concept of the periphery covers at 
once the manifestations of dependence 
and the exclusive as well as the conflictive 
trends which characterize underdevelop-
ment. As remarked elsewhere, if all the 
tokens of dependence were to disappear 
by magic, the exclusive and conflictive 
trends would still persist. 
In contrast, if the dynamics of capital-
ism were what it is usually imagined to be 
and the transnational invested and re-
invested indefinitely in the periphery, 
the absorption capacity of the system 
would be strengthened and underdevelop-
ment would be progressively eliminated. 
Whence this paradoxical conclusion would 
be reached: the higher the degree of de-
pendence, the greater would be the social 
efficiency of the system! 
But the system does not function like 
this. And the aim pursued by the trans-
nationals is not to achieve social efficiency 
but to reap, sooner or later, the harvest 
of their investments. 
Those who blame dependence for under-
development are forgetting a very important 
fact which we have repeatedly explained 
in the present article: the exclusive character 
of peripheral capitalism, and also its 
conflictive trends, are primarily due to 
the internal waste of capital accumulation 
potential, largely imputable to the con-
sumer society and the great distributional 
disparities upon which it is based. Without 
these disparities, the transnationals would 
not find such fertile ground for their 
expansion in the periphery. 
Let us not lay upon other shoulders, 
therefore, responsibilities that are the 
periphery's own. The responsibility of 
the centres is very great; so is that of the 
periphery. It is a shared responsibility. 
To think otherwise is not objective. But 
undoubtedly, as the ideological controversy 
of the two superpowers is reflected in the 
periphery, to attribute underdevelopment 
to dependence is a persuasive political 
argument. 
Dialectics certainly has inexhaustible 
resources to draw on. Since technology 
and patterns of consumption come from 
the centres, to these —we are told— 
peripheral underdevelopment is ultimately 
due. And why not go farther and pin the 
guilt on the scientists of the centres, to 
whose efforts we owe the stupendous 
development of the techniques of pro-
duction and consumption? And also the 
technology that protects and prolongs 
human life! 
Equally extravagant is another idea 
according to which the prosperity of the 
centres is due to the siphoning-off of 
income from the periphery. This process 
is of great importance for the peripheral 
countries. But to ascribe to it such an 
effect means overlooking the consequences 
of the enormous technological progress 
made in the centres, which, of course, is 
not exempt from the evils characteristic 
of its ambivalence. 
The truth is that the scientific, tech-
nological and cultural legacy inherited 
by the periphery is immeasurable. The 
problem does not lie there but in the pas-
siveness of the periphery, in the definitely 
imitative nature of its capitalism. It is 
not a question of forgoing this incessantly 
enlarged and renewed inheritance, but of 
turning it to account in a spirit of creative 
adaptation. 
9. Cultural dependence 
There is certainly room for adaptation of 
this kind in technology, as already noted. 
But the essential thing is to take the 
utmost advantage of its accumulation 
potential. This is frittered away in the 
consumer society, in the disproportionate 
growth of the State, in the siphoning-off 
of income by the centres. In our eagerness 
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to develop in the image and likeness of 
the centres, we have failed to establish 
authentic ways and means of our own 
whereby to influence the forces of develop-
ment deliberately and with clearly-defined 
objectives in view. 
It is true that propagation and ir-
radiation from the centres are becoming 
more and more intense. And they do not 
occur in the economic field alone, but 
also in a wide range of cultural manifest-
ations, thanks chiefly to the mass com-
munication media. This is a very serious 
problem, which has been discussed by 
thinkers who possess an authority that I 
lack. Nevertheless, I will venture to make 
the following brief observations. The 
strength of a peripheral country's personal-
ity depends largely upon its ability to 
take advantage of the cultural heritage 
to which we referred and use its creative 
capacity to promote the formation of its 
own culture. Whithout for a moment 
denying that internal factors of great 
significance enter into this, it would be 
idle to disregard the influence of the mass 
communication media. They propagate 
and irradiate the intellectual and artistic 
manifestation of the centres not only on 
account of their intrinsic value, but also 
because of the technical superiority of 
the media themselves, because of the 
considerations of economic interest by 
which they are usually guided, and also 
because of their ideological intention. 
It is a very difficult (although not an 
impossible) task to rise superior to these 
propagation phenomena, especially in a 
fragmented periphery. 
If we have always spoken of propagation 
and irradiation it is in order to draw at-
tention to an important distinction. 
Propagation is something deliberate, in 
which the mass media play a powerful part, 
whereas irradiation is spontaneous. It 
often happens, however, that these two 
forms are inextricably combined. 
10. Ideological dependence 
This is the case with something that 
touches us very closely, namely, the ideas 
and ideologies of the centres. The spon-
taneous irradiation of what is thought and 
written there has been and still is very 
vigorous. But deliberate and systematic 
propagation is also carried out. 
The intellectual irradiation of the 
neo-classical theories which form the basis 
of the contemporary version of economic 
liberalism — with which we will deal 
elsewhere — dates back to the mid-
nineteenth century. Neoclassicism, apart 
from its intrinsic significance, represents 
an alternative to Marxism. The spon-
taneous irradiation of these two theories 
in the periphery has been and still is 
powerful. But highly intense too is their 
deliberate propagation as part of the 
ideological contest between the two great 
superpowers. 
It is true that economic liberalism is 
a good deal adulterated in practice. Its 
principal manifestation in the periphery 
is usually the suppression of the trade-
union and political power of the labour 
force in order to overcome a crisis of the 
system: a proceeding patently divorced 
from democratic liberalism. 
It is not generally understood in the 
capitalist superpower that economic 
liberalism and dependence relations are 
incompatible with the march of democracy 
and die inalienable exercise of human 
rights. For the many who suffer the 
consequences of this incompatibility, the 
expressions of human solidarity that 
emanate especially from the main centre 
of capitalism when human rights are 
violated come as a great relief. And with 
a little imagination, with a little pious 
hope, it might be possible to see in them 
signs of a fundamental change of attitude 
towards the periphery, and, if the reader 
likes, towards the radical transformations 
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that it needs to undergo if thriving and 
equitably-balanced development is to be 
made compatible with a genuine democratiz-
ation process. Preaching the cause of 
democracy is of supreme importance, but 
it is far from enough; just as international 
acts of exorcism do not suffice to stop 
the aforesaid violations of human rights, 
especially when repression makes it pos-
sible to restore, in some cases, the 
harmonious articulation of the trans-
nationals with the consumer society. 
Such is the option that economic 
liberalism offers as a means of weathering 
the crisis: the consolidation of social 
inequity. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the opposite alternative proves 
alluring. Experience highlights, however, 
the anxious perplexity of those who 
expected that the concentration and 
management of the means of production 
in the hands of the State would bring 
with it democratization and all that 
democracy implies for personal freedom. 
But that of course calls for a very different 
conception of the political regime and of 
human rights. 
Between these two diametrically-op-
posed alternatives, promoted by the 
ideological contest between the two super-
powers, comes the irradiation of re-
distributive democracy. The political 
parties that incarnate this ideology in 
Western Europe are also expending effort 
upon propagation and on support for 
the parties which are striving to restore 
institutional normality in peripheral 
countries where the rule of force prevails, 
or to forestall the imposition of such a 
regime. This trend towards the inter-
nationalization of democracy might be of 
incalculable value, over and above its 
immediate significance. Nevertheless, 
what is fully justified in Western Europe 
does not entirely meet the demands of 
the peripheral situation. To shake off 
a regime of force and restore institutional 
normality so as to clear the way for re-
distributive democracy without making 
radical changes in the system would be 
once again to risk the advent of another 
crisis, in the possible course of a subsequent 
political cycle. What is required is to change 
the system with a view to much intenser 
capital accumulation than at present, or, 
in other words^ so as to exploit the ac-
cumulation potential of the surplus to the 
full, and alter the composition of the 
capital accumulated. This must be the 
starting-point for a dynamic and rational 
distribution of income, although not to the 
exclusion of immediate measures to improve 
the position of the lower strata: the trans-
formation of the system and the institutional 
transformation of the State. 
A tenacious effort to convince outsiders 
is needed, but we shall have to begin by 
convincing ourselves. Convincing ourselves 
that it is possible to change the system 
in such a way as to reconcile equity, thriving 
development and the advance and con-
solidation of the democratic process. With 
all this I hope to deal in another article. 
11. A far-reaching outlook 
Meanwhile I should like to close this 
chapter with a final observation. In my 
long life first as a national and then as 
an international civil servant, I have seen 
the capitalist superpower —even when 
it had not yet attained that s t a t u s -
make tremendous mistakes in relation to 
the periphery and particularly to the 
Latin American region, which certainly 
cannot claim exemption from them. And 
I think that the biggest of these mistakes, 
that of the greatest significance for the 
future, perhaps for a not very distant 
future, is to play all its cards in favour 
of a system which is becoming more and 
more vulnerable from the social and 
political angles, and, above all, from the 
ethical standpoint: a system which is 
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increasingly exposed to subversion, repres-
sion and the betrayal of democracy. 
It is easy to understand the strategic 
concern of the capitalist superpower to 
prevent the ideologies of the socialist 
superpower from influencing political 
movements in the periphery which, if they 
come to power, will naturally seek the 
latter's support, with all the diverse 
consequences that can be imagined. But 
I do not want to harp on the old strings 
of the cold war. Though deliberate propa-
gation might be avoided in a conceivable 
separation of spheres of influence —a 
new manifestation of dependence—, the 
irradiation of ideologies will continue to 
flourish in face of the great defects of 
peripheral capitalism: irradiation of 
today's ideologies or perhaps of tomorrow's. 
However efficacious countersubversion 
measures, internal repression and the 
external use of force may prove in given 
sets of circumstances, it is obvious that 
1. The dynamics of the system and the 
vulnerability of the surplus 
The vicissitudes to which the system is 
exposed are many and various. But when 
I speak of its crisis I am confining myself 
to the sort of situation in which the 
exacerbation of the distribution struggle, 
for want of a political consensus —very 
difficult to obtain, anyhow—, leads to 
the use of force to restore its dynamics. 
The tendency of the system to move 
towards a crisis is an expression of the 
structural changes that take place in it 
they attack symptoms but not deep-lying 
causes. Hence the need for a far-reaching 
outlook, if in this nuclear age some value 
still attaches to certain political and 
strategical considerations of the capitalist 
superpower in this hemisphere: long-term 
considerations which contrast with the 
very narrow view of things reflected in the 
play of economic interests in centre-
periphery relations. Thus in the attitude 
of the centres to the Latin American 
region of the periphery there is a flagrant 
contradiction which it has not yet been 
possible to resolve. 
In centre-periphery relations a far-
sighted outlook is required, such as, 
without necessarily impairing fundamental 
economic interests of the centres, will 
endeavour to find broad areas of agreement 
which, besides being compatible with the 
autonomy of peripheral development, 
will allow dependence to be gradually left 
behind and the way to be cleared for progres-
sive forms of interdependence. 
and the concomitant changes in power 
relations. When in the course of structural 
change the trade-union and political 
power of the middle strata develops over 
against the power of the upper strata, the 
distribution struggle waxes increasingly 
fierce until it culminates in the aforesaid 
critical denouement. 
This is why we have so insistently 
emphasized the role played by the demo-
cratization process. While it is incipient, 
or is contained in one way or another, 
the trade-union and political power of the 
labour force is non-existent or very slight. 
VI 
The crisis of the system 
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And the system, from the standpoint of 
distribution, functions without major 
upheavals. 
It should not be understood, however, 
that the crisis originates exclusively in 
the endeavours of the labour force disad-
vantaged by market laws to secure a better 
share in the fruits of higher productivity, 
either by means of wage increases or by 
recourse to State machinery with a view 
to obtaining employment and improving 
its income. For it also resorts to its trade-
union and political power to recoup itself 
for the adverse effect of other factors on 
the improvements already won. Of course, 
when the power in question is negligible, 
these other factors can operate with no 
significant resistance from the labour 
force. The system may suffer disturbances, 
but without reaching such a crisis as may 
fundamentally jeopardize its dynamics. 
Its dynamics is endangered, however, 
when the redistribution struggle adversely 
affects capital accumulation and the 
consumer capacity of the upper and upper-
middle strata. It is worth while to recall 
what has been explained elswhere about 
the evolution of the surplus. There are 
structural phases during which the growth 
rate of the total surplus is higher than 
that of the product because of the weak 
redi stribution c apacity of the \ abo ur 
force. But as trade-union and political 
power develops and this weakness is rem-
edied, whether the aim of the labour force 
is to recoup losses or to improve its share 
in the fruits of higher productivity, the 
growth rate of the surplus gradually 
disminishes until it is the same as that of 
the total product. Thus a limit is reached 
which cannot be overstepped, for if trade-
union and political pressure continues 
the surplus will decrease in relation to 
the product. 
The significance of this last point 
must be clearly understood. Before that 
limit is reached, the consumption of the 
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upper strata has also been growing faster 
than the product. Consequently, even 
at the limit there is still a great deal left 
that is, so to speak, redistributable. But 
the consumer society fights for its privilege 
and, sooner than accepting any such 
compression, which would also affect capital 
accumulation, will react by raising prices. 
And this triggers off the inflationary 
spiral, which, sooner or later, leads to the 
use of force. 
The truth is that no system can 
develop its dynamics without an increase 
in capital accumulation. Only in view 
of the nature of peripheral capitalism, if 
it is to regain its andangered dynamics, 
the consumer society must also be re-
established, and this is done at the expense 
of the participation achieved by the 
labour force. 
We will now try to explain these aspects 
of the problem, beginning with the internal 
factors which build up the internal crisis, 
and then going on to deal with the external 
factors with which they are usually combin-
ed. We start with the former not only for 
methodological reasons, but also to show 
that their action alone suffices to unleash 
the crisis. The external factors, according 
to their direction and intensity, may 
either mitigate or accentuate the effects 
of the play of power relations. 
2. Internal factors of participation 
The internal factors make themselves felt 
in the sphere of the market and in that 
of the State, as the trade-union and political 
power of the middle strata develops. This 
power does not reach the lower strata until 
they are belatedly caught up in the demo-
cratization process. 
In the sphere of the market, trade-
union power struggles to push up salaries 
and wages and to defend the improvements 
already obtained and, therefore, the 
private consumption of the said middle 
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strata; this power, as we know, enables 
the labour force that is not favoured by 
market laws to counteract the regressive 
competition of those working in lower 
layers of technology. The consumption 
increment thus achieved, as long as it 
does not reach the critical limit, is not 
obtained at the expense of the consumption 
of the upper strata, but is superimposed 
upon it. In reality the disadvantaged 
strata use for consumption almost every-
thing they gain in the struggle and do 
not contribute to reproductive capital 
accumulation. In so far as they do save, 
it will be mainly in the form of consumptive 
capital. The latter is not taken into ac-
count in our analysis, since it does not 
invalidate our argument. 
Manifestations of trade-union power 
are also found among the labour force 
favoured by its social power, when, in ad-
dition to the effects of this latter, it 
increases its earnings by means of 
restrictions on entry into certain activities 
or on their exercise. Here too, the result 
is an increase in consumption, although 
among the upper strata of the labour 
force investment often takes the form of 
reproductive as well as of consumptive 
capital. 
In the sphere of the State, the middle 
strata, thanks to their political power, 
evolve different ways of sharing in the 
fruits of higher productivity; for example, 
they seek to obtain services which are of 
special benefit to them, to extend the 
scope of these and other services, and to 
secure in all of them spurious absorption 
of manpower that they do not really need. 
Let us now look at the significance of 
these three aspects which have just been 
mentioned. 
The services that the middle strata 
seek to develop for their own benefit relate 
above all to their social consumption in 
respect of education, health, social security 
and housing. As in the case of the exercise 
of trade-union power, however, this im-
provement is additional to the consumption 
of State services by the upper income 
strata, thanks to their political power. 
But there is also another very important 
factor. State activities are not subject to 
the same economic criteria as prevail 
in the sphere of the market. As already 
pointed out elsewhere, they obey a 
dynamics of their own which leads to 
hypertrophic growth, both through the 
influence of the technological progress 
in State activities, and through propensities 
to swell the ranks of the bureaucracy 
beyond what is justified by the needs of 
the community. 
The dynamics of State services, in 
addition, fosters the spurious absorption 
of labour, and here too the political power 
of the middle strata makes its influence 
felt. This is a tendency which primarily 
reflects the system's lack of capacity for 
genuine absorption of the labour force 
increment, owing to the insufficiency of 
capital accumulation. But it is also further-
ed by those who possess convention al 
qualifications and who, for reasons of 
tradition or social prestige, use their 
political influence to gain a foothold in 
State services. 
Thanks to the economic criteria to 
which we have referred, there is usually 
a higher degree of efficiency in the sphere 
of the market than in that of the State, 
especially when public enterprises are 
affected by political motivations. But it 
would be a mistake to make this comparison 
without adding a not unimportant rider. 
It is true that economic efficiency helps 
to increase the global surplus; but since 
a large proportion of this is wasted in the 
consumer society, it also does much to 
aggravate the social inefficiency of 
peripheral capitalism, with effects similar 
to those produced by the economic inef-
ficiency of the State services. 
We have mentioned State investments. 
There are some, such as those in infras-
tructure, which help to step up productivity, 
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whereas others involve waste of capital, 
especially investment in public monuments 
and of other conspicuous types; the 
resources diverted into these tend, in the 
last analysis, to reduce the surplus more 
and more as the power of participation of 
the labour force is strengthened. 
Lastly, price increases occur which, 
although they are in origin nothing to 
do with the distribution struggle, help to 
exacerbate it; the most outstanding case 
in point, because of its dimensions and 
persistence, is that of land rent. It has 
already been explained elsewhere how the 
increase in demand for space, owing to 
the growth and concentration of the 
urban population, as well as the overall 
rise in productivity, tend to push up urban 
land rent. The rise in the cost of land 
services, so to speak, affects the surplus 
in two different ways. On the one hand, 
it increases the costs which the enterprises 
try to transfer to prices; on the other 
hand, the rents paid by the labour force 
are higher. In both instances the latter 
will strive to improve its earnings when it 
has the power to do so. The effects, of 
course, are unfavourable to the surplus. 
Much the same thing happens when 
internal demand for agricultural com-
modities, if unaccompanied by increases 
in productivity or by the expansion of 
the area under cultivation, causes prices 
to rise. 
There are other external factors whose 
incidence is similar, but the time has 
not yet come to discuss them. 
3. Power relations and the tax burden 
Power relations largely determine the 
nature of State services, except those of 
a general nature which are of interest to 
the entire community, although to an 
unequal extent. They influence these 
latter much less than the others, or not 
at all. Nevertheless, power relations are 
always of great importance in connexion 
wih the levying of tax revenue, which is 
required both to cover the costs of such 
services and for State investment. 
We know, moreover, that power relations 
keep pace with the changes in the social 
structure. When in the initial phases of 
these modifications the trade-union and 
political power of the labour force is non-
existent or incipient, the burden of the 
resources required to cover State dis-
bursements falls largely upon the middle 
and lower strata, whether the services 
concerned are of interest to the whole 
community or only to the upper strata. 
But as time goes by, the former groups 
gradually acquire some capacity to recoup 
themselves, especially the middle strata, 
and by virtue of their trade-union and 
political power they endeavour to shift part 
of the tax burden on to the upper strata. 
Obviously, however, under the political 
compromises between the different strata, 
much of the expenditure relating to social 
consumption is covered with taxes which 
affect the middle strata, although not 
necessarily the same people that they 
benefit; and sometimes too the burden 
falls on the lower strata who obtain none 
of these benefits, or only a fraction of 
them. 
In short, the taxes in question impel 
the labour force to try to recoup their 
losses by recourse to their trade-union 
power. 
In this process, of which the object is 
to shift the tax burden upwards, two 
important cases arise. 
The first is that of the labour force 
which has acquired skills, mainly in con-
sequence of its social power. If demand 
for these skills is in keeping with the in-
creasing requirements of the propagation 
of technique, wages and salaries tend to 
rise correlatively, and there is no need 
for trade-union power to secure compen-
sation for part, if not the whole, of the 
tax burden. The labour force with con-
ventional qualifications is in a different 
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position, and its weakness in respect of 
the relation between demand and supply 
does not permit it to recoup itself in this 
way. In order to do so, therefore, it has 
to resort to its political or trade-union 
power. 
If the labour force favoured by market 
laws does not need trade-union power to 
ease the tax burden, the workers who are 
disadvantaged in the play of market forces 
do indeed need it, and achieve it to a 
greater or lesser extent as their position 
is strengthened with the advance of the 
democratization process; in this case all 
these pressures bear on the surplus. The 
same applies to the tax burden which 
falls on the owners of the means of pro-
duction in the shape of taxes on their 
income from the surplus, whether from 
that of the same enterprises in which it 
is generated, or from that of others to 
which it is transferred in its process of 
circulation. 
4. The critical limit of the system and the 
inflationary spiral 
Thus we approach the system's critical 
limit. In order to understand what hap-
pens when this is reached, it is worth 
while to recall an indispensable require-
ment of the dynamics of the system. If 
the consumer society is to operate 
smoothly, it is essential that the growth 
rate of the surplus should be at least the 
same as that of the global product. Other-
wise, if the pressure of the middle strata 
through the various forms of participation 
which have just been described, and the 
incidence of the tax burden on the surplus, 
were to prevent the fulfilment of this 
requisite, the attenuation of the surplus 
would reduce the rate of accumulation, 
and that would bring down the growth 
rate of the product and would correspon-
dingly reduce the part of the surplus 
earmarked for the consumption of the 
upper strata. In this case, enterprises 
would endeavour to retrieve the surplus 
by raising prices in order to restore the 
dynamics of the system. 
Whether price increases can really be 
put into effect in the market ultimately 
depends upon the reaction of the monetary 
authority, which in this case has two options 
open to it: to restrict credit in order to 
prevent prices from going up, in line with 
the traditional formula; or to agree to 
expand it so as to allow them to do so. The 
decisions involved are of course of con-
siderable importance. 
If the first option is chosen, the only 
way in which enterprises can cope with the 
increase in salaries and wages is by recourse 
to the surplus. In this connexion, suffice 
it to recall the mechanism of monetary 
appropriation of the surplus in order to 
understand the serious consequences of 
such an attitude. If future production is 
to expand, it is essential to increase present 
employment. The resultant income in-
crements are reflected in an expansion of 
demand whereby the present increase in 
production can be absorbed. This demand 
must be accompanied by the corresponding 
monetary expansion; otherwise, if the 
monetary authority were not to make a 
positive response, and enterprises had 
to resort to the surplus in order to pay 
out the additional income earned by the 
labour force, there would be no such ex-
pansion of demand, since the increase 
resulting from the higher income paid out 
to the labour force would be offset by the 
decrease in demand on the part of those 
who had the surplus at their disposal. 
Demand would therefore prove to be insuf-
ficient to absorb the production increment, 
and prices would fall. This is, in summarized 
form, the explanation we gave in the ap-
propriate chapter. 
In the case we were considering, if the 
production increment is combined with 
the effects of wage increases, the former 
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could not be absorbed on the market unless 
demand grew more vigorously, and mon-
etary expansion too would have to be 
greater if the pay increases were to be 
transferred to prices. Otherwise, the fall 
. in prices would be accentuated, with the 
consequent contraction in production. 
Here we have something more serious 
than the conjunctural contractions which 
frequently occur in the system, since this 
latter can spontaneously overcome them. 
But the case under consideration is dif-
ferent. The lower level of activity resulting 
from the contraction will tend to persist 
indefinitely if the monetary authority 
withholds its consent to expansion; and 
the adverse consequences which this in 
volves are all too well known. Sooner or 
later, therefore, the monetary authority 
will be compelled by force of circum-
stances to change its attitude, if trade-union 
power makes it impracticable to squeeze 
wages. Higher prices and the inevitable 
monetary devaluation will then allow the 
surplus to be re-established. 
It must be understood, however, that 
for this to happen an indispensable requisite 
is that salaries and wages should not be 
raised again in proportion to the rise in 
prices. This is a technical requirement 
without whose fulfilment the inflationary 
spiral could not be averted. 
The problem that this poses is not, 
however, of a purely technical nature, but 
has profound social implications. The 
re-establishment of the dynamics of the 
surplus makes it possible to restore not 
only the system's accumulation capacity, 
but also the evolution of the consumer 
society. This means, all things considered, 
that if the privileged consumption of the 
upper strata is to be recovered, it will be 
necessary to squeeze the consumption of 
a sizeable part of the labour force which 
has previously exercised its trade-union 
and political power of participation. Herein 
lies, in my opinion, a basic flaw in the 
system. But let us not anticipate what will 
be discussed at the appropriate point in 
the present chapter. Suffice it to say here, 
that in view of the nature of the system, in 
order to fulfil the technical requisite which 
consists in keeping salaries and wages 
down to prevent an inflationary spiral, 
trade-union and political power must be 
brought to heel by the use of force. Such 
is the foredoomed outcome of an exclusive 
and conflictive system! 
We said before that the intention of 
the monetary authorities to prevent in -
flation by applying the brake of a restrictive 
policy ends, sooner or later, by making 
monetary expansion unavoidable. Thus 
the monetary authority is faced with an 
insuperable dilemma: either to accept 
inflationary expansion from the start, 
or to find itself compelled by force of 
circumstances to bow to it later. 
In any event, the inflationary spiral, 
rather than securing the re-establishment 
of the dynamics of the system, culminates 
in its economic breakdown and its social 
disintegration. Although these are familiar 
phenomena, a few points of great significance 
for our analysis may be briefly noted here. 
First and foremost, a rise in earnings 
to compensate for price increases does not 
allow the dynamics of the surplus to be 
restored until prices go up again. Even 
then, the recovery of the surplus is ephem-
eral, for in its turn it involves a further 
wage and salary increase in the course of 
the spiral. Capital accumulation and the 
rate of development suffer by this, with 
all the ensuing adverse consequences, 
among them the flight of capital abroad. 
Next, attempts to control the effects 
of inflation by stabilizing prices, or keeping 
up the external value of the currency, or 
preventing the necessary readjustment 
in public utility tariffs, or abstaining from 
increasing tax rates, sooner or later end by 
giving fresh impetus to the inflationary 
spiral. 
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The distribution struggle is exacerbated 
as the social groups that have been lagging 
behind extend their capacity to obtain 
redress, so that the spiral becomes still 
more uncontrollable. 
And this veritable anarchy in the matter 
of participation seriously weakens the 
incentives to enterprises to place new 
investment and discourages labour from 
increasing productivity. 
In all these ways conditions are created 
that are propitious to the use of force for 
the purpose of re-establishing normality. 
5. External factors 
We shall now take a look at the main 
external factors which influence these 
phenomena; but the question at inssue is 
no longer the effect of factors which help 
to squeeze the surplus, but that of external 
factors which affect its actual size. In 
this case again, it wilt be impossible to 
achieve the dynamic recovery of the system 
without adverse consequences for the 
labour force. 
There are three main factors that 
affect the surplus in this way, namely: the 
cyclical fluctuations of external origin and 
the conjunctural deterioration of the terms 
of trade; the structural deterioration of 
the terms of trade; and the negative 
movement in inflows of international finan-
cial resources. 
In discussing the first factor it is worth 
while to recall what was said in another 
chapter about the surplus in export ac-
tivities, which is considerably influenced 
by the cycle and price fluctuations in the 
centres. 
During boom periods in the periphery, 
the exogenous increase in the surplus, 
caused by the rise in the value of exports, 
is augmented by that resulting from the 
domestic production process, and thus the 
total surplus is enlarged with the consequent 
increase in accumulation and consumption 
capacity, especially in the upper strata, 
because of both the direct and the indirect 
effects of this supplementary contribution. 
This affords a wider margin for the middle 
strata to improve their sharing capacity, 
according to their degree of trade-union 
and political power. 
When the downswing supervenes, the 
surplus is reduced because of the contraction 
in exports; but as in the meanwhile con-
sumption will have increased and State 
services will have been expanded, the 
restoration of the dynamics of the system 
cannot be secured unless both are squeezed, 
except in so far as a countercyclical 
compensatory policy can be applied. 
Such countercyclical measures call for 
a far-sighted and cautious policy which 
is seldom adopted. Moreover, they do not 
possess the merit of compensating export 
activities for the fall in prices. Consequently, 
here again we find ourselves faced with 
power relations. The producers of export 
commodities will use their power, which 
is generally great, in an endeavour to 
attain that end by recourse to devaluation 
of the currency. And if they succeed in 
this attempt and thus restore their own 
surplus, they will once again have done 
so at the expense of the labour force, 
both in the sphere of the market and in 
that of the State. Devaluation, provided 
that the labour force has sufficient trade-
union and political power to react against 
its repressive effects, suffices to trigger 
off the inflationary spiral, or to intensify 
it if it already exists. 
I am not, of course, advocating a pol-
icy, but pointing out certain exigencies of 
a system that functions, as I am trying to 
show, on vicious lines. 
When a deterioration takes place in 
the terms of trade for exports, it is impos-
sible to determine whether it is of a con-
junctural or of a structural character; only 
time can tell. If it were structural, the action 
called for would no longer consist in cir-
cumstantial measures such as I have just 
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mentioned, but in a policy of production 
adjustments through which the external 
imbalance caused by the deterioration 
could be counteracted. All the more 
reason still for the re-establishment of 
the surplus to entail, as before, devalu-
ation of the currency, under the influence 
of the political power of primary pro-
ducers. 
In this as in the foregoing case, 
obviously it would not take long for the 
dynamic effects of devaluation to be dis-
sipated in an inflationary spiral, if the 
concomitant rise in prices were to be 
followed by increases in income and taxes, 
apart from other consequences. 
A deterioration in the terms of trade 
also takes place when import prices rise, 
as has happened in the case of petroleum, 
among others, owing to inflation in the 
centres. 
This involves internal price increases 
which, if they bring about the correspond 
ing rise in pay for the labour force, also 
have the effect of squeezing the surplus. 
This suffices to generate the inflationary 
spiral and a devaluation of the currency 
when the trade-union power of the labour 
force disadvantaged by market laws is 
strong enough to offset the real damage 
to its income in the distribution struggle. 
In contrast, in countries exporting 
oil and other natural resources whose 
prices improve in relative terms, it is poss-
ible to satisfy the various demands of the 
distribution struggle without affecting 
the surplus - rather, in fact, contributing 
to its increase. By this means the crisis of 
the system is warded off, although perhaps 
not indefinitely. 
In conclusion, consideration should 
be given to the last aspect mentioned: the 
inflow of external financial resources. 
In this there is a positive phase, followed 
sooner or later by another of a negative 
character, which makes its appearance 
in two important instances: through the 
resources brought in by the transnational 
enterprises and through contributions to 
the State for its investment. 
In the first instance, the transnational, 
when they make their investments, in-
crease the rate of accumulation, as well 
as the growth rate of the surplus, by virtue 
of their acknowledged efficiency, with 
favourable effects on the rate of develop-
ment. But all this is paid for when the net 
inflow is reduced or becomes negative 
as new investment decreases and the fi-
nancial remittances from earlier invest 
ments increase. Much the same thing 
happens with funds for State investment. 
It is understandable that when the 
trade-union and political power of the 
disadvantaged labour force has developed 
very substantially, these financial move-
ments, according to whether they are posi-
tive or negative help to relieve or to inten-
sify the distribution struggle and the 
system's tendency to reach a crisis. 
6. The crisis of the system and the use 
of/orce 
Let us return to the crisis of the system 
and the use of force to suppress or contain 
the trade-union and political power of 
the labour force, in which event the currency 
can be devaluated in order to allow prices 
to rise, without a correlative increase in the 
pay of the labour force. And if the pay 
squeeze transfers income to the privileged 
strata and especially to the owners of the 
means of production, it may even be pos-
sible to succeed in raising the rate of capital 
accumulation, and therefore the rate of 
development, above that prevailing before 
the system's critical limit was passed. 
The increase in the rate of development 
steps up demand for manpower equipped 
with the ever-widening range of skills which 
that development requires, in contrast 
with the harm inflicted on the bulk of the 
labour force by the squeezing of their real 
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pay. What is more, these circumstances 
are usually attractive to the transnational 
and to funds from abroad, which brings 
in a new factor that is favourable to develop-
ment, provided that this movement remains 
positive. 
Unquestionably, the re-establishment 
of the dynamics of the system entails a 
significant social cost, in addition to the 
huge political cost incurred by the use of 
force. 
The pay squeeze is an answer to vari-
ous needs. It is necessary, of course, in 
order to restore the rate of capital accumu-
lation and perhaps to raise it; but alto to 
give fresh impetus to the consumer society 
since in this accumulation and privileged 
consumption are closely linked. Thus 
the consumption of the many who have 
lost their redistributive power is squeezed 
in favour of the consumption of the few 
who have regained their power to increase 
the surplus. Nor is this all. 
The consumption of the adversely-
affected labour force will have to be 
squeezed still more in so far as it has not 
been deemed desirable, or possible, to 
reduce state expenditure, the expansion 
of which has contributed to the critical 
attenuation of the surplus. The incidence 
of this phenomenon is very different, in a 
regime in which the power of the labour 
force is suppressed, according to whether 
it is social consumption that is concerned, 
or the spurious absorption of the labour 
force in State services, or the services that 
by their own dynamics have grown beyond 
what would be permitted by considerations 
of economic efficiency. It should be borne 
in mind, moreover, that the use of force 
generally involves a considerable increase 
in the expenditure in question. 
As has already been remarked, in 
peripheral capitalism the production 
effort is strongly slanted towards the privi-
leged-consumer society of the upper strata. 
It is there that the rate of development is 
usually high, sometimes very high, whereas 
it remains minimal at the other extreme, 
that of the sub-consumer society of the 
lower strata. It is essential that this should 
be so if the surplus is to grow continuously 
for the greater benefit of the privileged 
group. And another essential requisite is 
that, up to a point, the aspirations of the 
middle strata that are disadvantaged under 
market laws should be contained. It would 
not be wise to allow their power of partici-
pation to penetrate too far into the domain 
of the surplus, especially when this is 
already somewhat circumscribed by the 
expansion of State services, or by an un-
favourable trend in relations with the 
centres. And these requisites can only be 
effectively met if the democratization 
process is contained, or if, when it has 
reached a certain pitch, it is suppressed by 
the use of force. 
Any system, if it is to be dynamic, re-
quires ceaseless capital accumulation. 
Accumulation must necessarily be effected 
at the expense of the growth rate of con-
sumption. But when, in order to weather 
the crisis, the consumption of the labour 
force is squeezed, the idea is not to allow 
the latter to accumulate for itself, but 
to enable the upper strata to do so once 
again, while at the same time they recover 
their ever-increasing consumption ca-
pacity. Moreover, the characteristic 
process of concentration of capital con-
tinues, generating new surpluses and 
bestowing upon those who have the capital 
in their hands the true key to development 
in peripheral capitalism. 
7. The crisis of the system in relations 
with the centres 
The world-wide nature of development 
explains why the consequences of advan-
cing democratization in the periphery 
extend beyond its geographical frontiers. 
They are sufficent in themselves to provoke 
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redistributive reactions, but the problem 
is deeper-seated and more complicated 
than that. 
As they forge increasingly close links 
with the consumer society, the transnational 
enterprises share political influence with 
the most powerful strata in the periphery. 
Thus they participate in the distribution 
struggle and, as it becomes polarized, 
increasingly feel its effects. 
But the consequences of the march 
of democracy are not confined to these. 
They go farther, for in the periphery they 
include a growing awareness of its own 
personality, aspirations to participate 
increasingly in decisions affecting the 
community, efforts to learn to do what 
outsiders, by virtue of their technological 
and financial superiority, are doing inside 
the countries themselves. The trans-
nationals cannot escape the implications 
of this growing sense of national identity; 
on the contrary, they lay a flank wide 
open to criticism, especially on the 
part of those who impugn the system from 
within or from outside it. Their gigantic 
size, their tendency to penetrate inordi-
nately far into the peripheral economy, 
the impenetrable secrecy in which their 
operations are shrouded, the suspicion 
that their international sphere of action 
is favourable to certain manipulations, 
are well known to constitute matters of 
great concern in the periphery. Accord-
ingly, feelings and aspirations antagon-
istic to this new manifestation of the 
hegemony of the centres assert themselves, 
and gain renewed vigour. 
All this is added to the siphoning-off 
of peripheral income by the trans-
nationals and to their over-large share in 
the fruits of the technical progress which, 
it is true, they themselves introduce, but 
mainly to serve the consumer society. And 
their increasing influence in the latter 
affords them the possibility of adopting 
decisions which do not take the national 
interest into account. 
Thus it is understandable that not 
only in the distribution struggle but also 
in the political struggle the trans-
nationals are the object of diverse and 
sometimes vehement reclamations. The 
lack of a regime to settle the limits of 
their action, to stipulate reciprocal 
rights and duties, means that measures 
adopted unilaterally by a peripheral coun-
try, whether justified or arbitrary, mobil-
ize against it all that formidable constel-
lation of hegemonic interests which 
surround the transnationals in the centres; 
and then punitive measures of various 
kinds ensue, which, as must not be forgot-
ten, sometimes go so far as the use of 
external force. 
In this case too, as in that of internal 
affairs, political liberalism is self-devour-
ing, largely because of the adulteration of 
economic liberalism in international re-
lations. 
Democracy and national sovereignty 
are essential and indefeasible concepts of 
political liberalism. But when the advance 
of democracy tends by its own dynamics 
to lead to the internal use of force, that 
same dynamics jeopardizes the sovereignty 
of the weakest in the play of international 
power relations. 
Clearly, then, the internal use of 
force and the democratic regression it 
implies help not only to re-establish the 
smooth evolution of the consumer society, 
but also to promote its con substantiation 
with the transnational. 
But the use of force cannot be kept 
up indefinitely. Sooner or later internal 
pressures begin to be exerted in favour of 
a return to institutional normality, as is 
the current phrase. 
I ask myself now whether those of us 
who devote ourselves to disentangling the 
complex problems of development have 
offered solutions that are capable of 
extirpating the deep-seated flaws in the 
system and at the same time are inspired 
by inviolable human principles. To 
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confine ourselves to holding those who 
have the means of using force responsible 
for doing so to surmount the crisis, or laying 
on those who advocate the return to 
institutional normality the responsibility 
for opening up the way to new political 
Is there an element of determinism in the 
system? 
We have discussed the various forms 
of power and their interrelationships, and 
have explained too how the play of these 
power relations leads in time to a crisis 
of the system. But nothing has been said 
so far of the protagonists of development, 
except for a few observations relating to 
social mobility. The various forms of 
power find expression through different 
protagonists, outstanding among whom 
are those who in the discharge of their 
role show the greatest ability and dynamism 
both in taking advantage of conditions 
favourable to development —alike in the 
internal field and in the international 
sphere— and in endeavouring to cope with 
and counteract unfavourable changes in 
those conditions. 
This is really deliberate action on the 
part of the aforesaid protagonists to serve 
their aspirations and interests to the 
extent permitted by their degree of power 
and their ability and dynamism. At all 
events, it goes on within the system and 
in line with the structural changes taking 
place therein. 
In the course of the development of 
the centres certain principles have emerg-
ed, together with the corresponding rules 
of the game, which the periphery has 
endeavoured to follow in order to ensure 
cycle, really means shirking our own 
responsibility for finding solutions 
that will meet the inescapable demands 
of the periphery's situation at the present 
vital moment in its history. 
the smooth functioning of the system. But 
these principles are not automatic; the 
timeliness with which they are applied, 
and the manner of doing so, depend upon 
the decision and ability of the protagonists. 
And this relates both to the system's regular 
operation, and to the rules that have to 
be followed when it has been thrown into 
disorder by violations of the principles in 
question. 
The possibility of abiding by these 
principles varies appreciably in different 
structural phases. It ultimately depends 
upon how much power to share in the fruits 
of higher productivity has been acquired 
by part of the middle and perhaps the lower 
strata. 
This possibility is considerable when 
the power of participation is non-existent 
or very slight; but it is not so when that 
power, in the course of structural change, 
grows to such an extent that in its clash 
with the power of the upper strata the 
distribution struggle is exacerbated and 
the inflationary spiral supervenes. In 
this case, the rules of the game become 
inapplicable; or there simply are none to 
cope with the crisis of the system. 
It would seem, therefore, that the system 
is subject in its evolution to a measure of 
determinism in which its re-establishment 
depends upon the use of force, i.e., 
VII 
The protagonists and the crisis of the system 
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upon the intervention of new protagonists 
formerly marginal to the system. 
1. The role of the various protagonists 
We observed above that the protagonists 
of development are an expression of the 
various forms of power and the changes 
that occur in power relations. They act 
in two different although closely related 
scenarios: that of the market and that of 
the State. And when these modifications 
in power relations take place, the protag-
onists who play their role in both scenarios 
during the early phases of structural change 
are joined in the course of the process by 
new ones whose action influences the 
changes in its turn. 
During periods of outward-directed 
growth, as we already know, the upper 
strata are dominant in the market scenario 
by virtue of their economic power and their 
social power, and also in the State scenario, 
thanks to their great political power. The 
State machinery is of use to the upper 
strata both in buttressing and defending 
the bases of the system, and in obtaining 
State services for their own benefit and 
shifting the tax burden to the lower strata, 
as explained above. 
It is the political protagonists that 
offer this response to the interests and 
aspirations of the upper strata. And in 
fulfilling such a role they also share, in 
one way or another, in the fruits of higher 
productivity, and at the same time avail 
themselves of the State apparatus to 
secure the largely spurious absorption of 
their electoral clienteles, formed mainly 
by the traditional middle classes. This, 
however, does not represent the advance 
of the democratization process during the 
phase of outward-directed growth, but is 
one of the ways of containing it. 
With the expansion of the middle 
strata the trade-union protagonists come 
to the fore, their aim being to satisfy the 
interests and aspirations of the labour 
force in the market scenario; and in the 
sphere of the State, new political protag-
onists emerge. But the power of partici-
pation which the two sets of protagonists 
represent is limited, both by the weakness 
of the democratization process and by 
different combinations of manipulation, 
repression, mobilization of clienteles and 
co-opting of the protagonists in question 
which contain or obstruct the genuine 
progress of the democratic movement. 
We have already spoken of this elsewhere, 
but a reminder is worth while to give a 
better grasp of our explanations. 
These new trade-union and political 
protagonists acquire increasing influence 
as the changes in the social structure clear 
the way more freely for the march of 
democracy. The impediments that restrict-
ed their action begin to melt away, and as 
this happens the power of participation of 
the middle strata increases, as well as 
their capacity to defend the share they 
have managed to obtain during the 
struggle. 
This phase, as will be recalled, is 
followed by another during which the 
trade-union and political protagonists 
carry the power of participation to such 
a pitch that the inflationary spiral becomes 
inherent in the system. 
Then it is that the protagonists of 
dissidence make their appearance: those 
who repudiate the system in its entirety. 
The lower strata have very little share, if 
indeed any at all, in the participation 
process. This serious manifestation of 
social injustice, and the anarchical parti-
cipation of those who have in one way or 
another obtained the benefits of develop-
ment, are active elements in the creation 
of this dissidence; and so are the inca-
pacity of the system to absorb the increment 
in the middle-strata labour force, and the 
displacement of manpower from the 
lower strata, whence unmistakable signs of 
frustration and rebellion emanate. Dissi-
dence, in its zeal to destroy the system, is 
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thus conducive to violent action, especially 
when insufficient dynamism is combined 
with external factors that produce adverse 
effects. 
All these are circumstances increas-
ingly favourable to the appearance of 
the final protagonists, namely, the holders 
of other State instruments, those of force, 
hitherto potential, but now brought into 
effective operation, and used deliberately 
to restore the smooth functioning of the 
system. 
2. The protagonists and inflation 
We stated earlier that when the critical 
phase of development supervenes it be-
comes manifestly impossible to regular-
ize the functioning of the system by the 
mere application of the familiar rules of 
the game for combating inflation. 
The same is not true of those phases 
of development in which the trade union 
and political power of the middle strata is 
non-existent or merely incipient. Inflation 
has been frequent, of course, in the past, 
but it has' been due to pressures very dif-
ferent in kind from those which are exerted 
later, when the power of the middle strata 
develops. 
The former are inflationary pressures 
due to factors that derive not from the 
middle strata, but from certain groups in 
the upper strata. The interests of these 
groups are served by political protagonists 
who are powerful enough to overcome the 
more or less energetic opposition of the 
monetary authority and to secure inflation-
ary expansion of credit, or who violate on 
their own account the State's principles 
of financial austerity, with similar results. 
The fact that the middle and lower 
strata react weakly or not at all means 
that in this way inflationary enlargement 
of the surplus is possible. But this course 
cannot be followed indefinitely, since those 
groups, and others who have suffered in 
the upper strata themselves, end by making 
their unrest felt and even bringing about 
a change of political protagonists that 
reinstates monetary and financial con-
trol. And to that end the rules of the game 
that have been infringed are applied once 
again. 
Let us now look at the difference 
between this kind of inflation and the sort 
that occurs when the power of the middle 
strata to share in the surplus has acquired 
great importance. When the process 
thrusts on towards the critical limit of the 
system, price increase and the consequent 
inflationary spiral become inevitable, 
however much the monetary authority may 
strive to prevent it, as has already been 
explained in the appropriate context. 
This social type of inflation becomes even 
more acute if it is accompanied by the 
other forms of traditional inflation. 
In the case of traditional inflation, 
the monetary and financial authorities 
suppress it and the surplus is reduced to the 
dimensions that are consonant with the 
orderly functioning of the system. In the 
other case, that of social inflation, there is 
no really effective way of staying the course 
of the spiral; only attempts can be made, 
which end in frustration. The authorities 
have grown impotent, however much 
influence has come to be exercised again 
in the political scenario by protagonists 
who try to contain economic disruption 
and social disintegration. Rather than 
succeeding in this, they will often end by 
supporting the claims of the affected 
groups, or will step down in favour of other 
protagonists prepared to do so, as a result 
of which new impetus is given to the spiral. 
3. The deliberate action of the 
protagonists 
If in the critical phase of the system very 
little can be done to avert these serious 
consequences, the question may well be 
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asked whether in previous phases of its 
evolution deliberate influence could be 
brought to bear on the course of events so 
as to prevent the system from heading 
towards that critical phase. 
I believe that the combined effort of 
protagonists with ability and dynamism in 
the political and economic scenarios may 
greatly influence the rate of development 
and its regularity during certain structural 
phases. But this positive influence weakens 
and ultimately vanishes when the distri-
bution struggle is exacerbated. 
As far as the political protagonists 
are concerned, their positive influence 
manifests itself when they show themselves 
capable of discerning the requirements 
of development with foresight, especially 
as regards infrastructure, the training of 
human resources, orderly and efficient 
administration, and satisfactory external 
co-operation; and if they are wise in 
their application of the rules of the monet-
ary and financial game when the trade-
union and political power of the middle 
strata is non-existent or still very slight. 
As regards the protagonists in the 
economic scenario, it should be recalled 
that upon their ability and dynamism, as 
well as upon their decision to accumulate 
capital, depends the introduction of new 
layers of technology. And this in turn 
necessitates considerable skill in recruit-
ing personnel for enterprises who will meet 
the more and more exigent requirements 
resulting from the propagation of tech-
nique, — a point on which so much stress 
has been laid elsewhere. 
In this connexion it should not be 
forgotten that the surplus contains not 
only a structural but also a dynamic-
element. And the dynamic element 
depends essentially upon these various 
protagonists in the scenario of the State 
and in that of the market. 
4. The system and its integrated 
components 
Unquestionably, the combined action of 
protagonists possessed of great ability and 
dynamism, both in the State and in the 
market scenario, can speed up the rate of 
development and the growth of the surplus, 
especially when external circumstances 
are favourable. This combined action, 
however effective it may be, is accompanied 
in the course of time by structural changes 
and the corresponding changes in power 
relations, which confront the former 
protagonists with the new protagonists of 
the political and trade-union movement. 
This is the internal logic of a system 
increasingly open to propagation from 
the centres and imitation of their patterns. 
Propagation of new layers of techno-
logy and of the patterns of consumption of 
the centres; a serious contradiction, to 
which is added the siphoning-off of part 
of the surplus by some of the transnationals, 
whose protagonists do much to build it up. 
But this is not all; from those very 
centres the scientific and technological 
discoveries which protect and prolong 
human life are likewise propagated, and 
all the more intensively, the more dynamic 
and capable are the agents working in this 
field of social activity. 
Such is the system. All these elements 
are an integral part of it, and in explaining 
its operation they cannot be arbitrarily 
separated, nor can any one of them be set 
aside. The system has its internal logic, 
as was pointed out before, and when in 
the course of its structural changes the 
political and trade-union protagonists 
emerge in the middle strata and their power 
is strengthened, this power is increasingly 
used to counteract the adverse effects of 
market laws on the earnings and employ-
ment of the labour force. 
Here too the ability and dynamism of 
the political and trade-union protagonists 
reveals itself under the impetus of another 
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form of propagation from the centres. 
This favourable environment fosters the 
spread of the democratic ideas and insti-
tutions whose advancement is indispensable 
if the protagonists in question are to play 
their part in the development of the middle 
strata. But neither are these strata immune, 
of course, to the propagation of the 
patterns of consumption of the centres. 
There is no cordon sanitaire around the 
upper strata; on the contrary, the middle 
strata —especially at the higher levels-
try to imitate them too. And the public 
enterprise usually constitutes one way of 
doing so through political channels, 
besides playing its role in the spurious 
absorption of labour. 
If the growing power of these political 
and trade-union protagonists oversteps 
the system's critical limit, the final 
outcome is the disruption and social 
disintegration of the system. For, as has 
been explained, its dynamies preclude a 
reduction in the surplus, to whatever extent 
the size of the latter may have allowed the 
consumer society to flourish. It is then 
that the protagonists of force make their 
appearance in the political scenario, in 
default of deliberate action to change the 
system. 
The surplus, moreover, is exposed to 
the unfavourable effects of the external 
bottleneck. The relatively slow growth 
of exports resulting from the structural 
disparities between centres and periphery 
reduces the surplus, and this entails a decline 
in the rate of development, with all its 
negative implications. 
The consequences are more serious 
still when the external bottleneck is aggra-
vated by a deterioration in the terms of 
trade. If the political protagonists who 
represent the exporters' interests make 
an effort to restore the surplus by means 
of devaluation of the currency, the social 
cost of this other operation will be borne 
mainly by the labour force, and not by a 
part of it only. And in this case, as in the 
foregoing, if the power of the middle 
strata prevents the full re-establishment 
of the surplus, the suppression of this power, 
by the use of force, will make it possible to 
give new momentum to the dynamics of the 
system, at the huge social and political cost 
which cannot be too often stressed. 
5. Technobureaucracy and planning 
Mention has more than once been made 
of the technobureaucracy, a manifest 
effect of the penetration of technique on 
the evolution of the State. Its members 
are not political protagonists, but usually 
influence them; and they do so with widely 
differing degrees of technical ability in 
their purpose of bringing deliberate ac-
tion to bear on development. 
The technobureaucracy carries, among 
other responsibilities, that of applying 
the rules of the game, which are not auto-
matic in character. They call for discern-
ment, foresight and ability to withstand 
the various pressures exerted by economic 
and political interests, which increase 
commensurately with the complexity of 
development. 
Because of this same complexity, a 
quarter of a century ago, planning began 
to be viewed as an effective instrument of 
development. Effective in diagnosis, and 
also, as it was hoped, in carrying conviction 
to the political protagonists so that delib-
erate influence could be exerted on the 
course of events; all of which considerations 
induced CEPAL to advocate planning. 
It was assumed that planning would 
correct two great defects of the market so 
that it could work properly: its lack of a 
time horizon and its lack of a social 
horizon. 
With regard to the first aspect, it was 
believed that planning would make it 
possible to anticipate the structural 
changes that needed to be introduced 
with foresight into the economic and social 
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infrastructure, and into the composition 
of production so as to counteract certain 
persistent trends towards internal and 
external disequilibrium, and to strengthen 
the peripheral economy besides, by simul-
taneously raising its rate of develop-
ment. 
Orderly internal development of 
industrialization was necessary, and at 
the same time the introduction of technical 
progress in agriculture, for which purposes 
vigorous impetus had to be given to 
capital accumulation. International financial 
resources would serve to encourage the 
periphery's own accumulation. And all 
this necessitated planning. By this time 
we had reached the early 1960s. It was 
clear that capital accumulation was insuf-
ficient in face of the effects of the increase 
in productivity brought about by the 
introduction of new layers of technology, 
and in view of the high rate of population 
growth over the past two decades. 
All the greater, therefore, was the 
need for planning, that is, for deliberate 
and systematic action to influence the forces 
of development and encourage individual 
initiative, so that it might contribute to 
the attainment of the major objectives of 
the plan. 
The euphoria of the early days was 
succeeded by disillusionment and indif-
ference, if not actual repudiation of the 
whole concept of planning. Several 
factors contributed to this result, and 
are worth placing on record because they 
are the very same that lead to the crisis of 
the system. 
Insufficient accumulation led CEPAL, 
in the early 1960s, to present some pro-
jections which sought to show, in statistical 
terms, the possibility of stepping up the 
rate of accumulation, raising the rate of 
development and securing faster and 
larger-scale absorption of the labour 
force, especially from the lower strata. 
But that entailed some sacrifice of the 
consumption, or the consumption in-
crement, of the upper strata. This was the 
first attack —very prudent and circum-
spect, to be sure— on the consumer society. 
The course indicated would permit of 
dynamic rather than static income distri-
bution, while not precluding some immedi-
ate redistributive measures. 
But very little has been done to fulfill 
these objectives, despite the efforts made 
by enlightened actors on the political 
scene. And in the meantime, the distri-
bution struggle has been growing more 
and more heated in the countries that had 
already entered upon the advanced phase 
of peripheral development. Planning is 
impossible in the midst of economic 
disruption and social disintegration. 
Another factor, however, has done 
much to produce this result. We have just 
referred to the trend towards external 
disequilibrium. In the boom years that 
preceded the economic recession in the 
centres, development proceeded in a 
very favourable external environment. 
The terms of trade improved, successes 
were achieved in a policy to encourage 
exports of manufactures and the flow of 
international financial resources was 
voluminous. It is not surprising, then, that 
the tendency towards external disequili-
brium was thought to have been overcome. 
What is more, the very existence of such a 
tendency was denied, and it was viewed as 
a mischievous notion spawned by CEPAL 
to justify the import substitution which it 
advocated. No wonder, therefore, that 
with the disappearance of the earlier 
concern for the external bottleneck 
another of the justifications of planning 
lost its cogency. 
6. The protagonists of populism 
As already pointed out, deliberate action 
can do very little to counteract the devel-
opment of the crisis which the distribution 
struggle brings in its train. This cannot be 
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achieved through the use of State mechan-
isms by either the political or the economic 
protagonists. However great the capacity 
and experience acquired by these latter, 
they are as powerless as are the politicians 
and the trade-union leaders to contain 
the process, in default of a political 
consensus. 
But although it is impossible to exert 
a positive influence on the course of 
events in such circumstances, they do 
afford a favourable opportunity to political 
protagonists of another type, those of 
populism. 
These last try to utilize the State 
machinery on their own behalf or on that 
of their electoral clientele. And they 
infringe the rules of the game, when these 
might be effective, and throw the system 
into worse disorder when the distribution 
struggle makes application of the rules 
impossible, Sometimes their lack of 
financial restraint starts the inflationary 
spiral, or accentuates it if it has already 
been developing. 
These protagonists operate in all 
the structural phases, and in all they are 
liable to find groups of entrepreneurs 
and financiers predisposed to abuse, to 
speculation or to collusion with the agents 
in question to serve their reciprocal 
interests. 
How do the protagonists of populism 
emerge in the system? The elements we 
have been discussing here do not give 
us the key, which might perhaps be found 
in the Paretian theories of the undulatory 
movement of dominant groups. Or will 
anthropological research have to be 
conducted in order to understand these 
phenomena of human behaviour? 
7. The protagonists of economic 
liberalism 
Under a regime of force, planning might 
be a positive instrument to encourage the 
development of the consumer society, but 
as under such a regime economic liberalism 
usually flourishes, doctrinaire resistance 
to planning has been very strong. 
The main reason for this blossoming 
of economic liberalism is that in the light 
of certain neo-classical interpretations 
the trade-union and political power of 
the labour force is the principal factor 
counteracting the system's inherent 
propensity to equilibrium; this power, 
therefore, should plainly and simply be 
suppressed. 
Once this paramount aim has been 
achieved, there is nothing to prevent the 
principles of economic liberalism from 
being conveniently trimmed to accom-
modate dominant interests, or to fit in 
with certain technocrats' particular 
conception of the requirements of reality. 
All this covers a whole range of atti-
tudes combining the theoretical capacity 
and the practical skill of the new technico-
bureaucratic constellation which shares 
responsibility in the system with those 
who have decided upon the use of force. 
Inter alia, the way in which inflation 
is combated illustrates this clearly. The 
monetary authorities, which had formerly 
become powerless, regain their strength, 
although they do not always show a thorough 
understanding of the nature of the 
present new type of inflation. It is now a 
social inflation which is different from 
although often accompanied by the 
traditional kind. 
For example, when traditional in-
flation is due to excessive monetary ex-
pansion, the raising of the rate of interest, 
if not direct restrictions on credit, consti-
tute the only way back to monetary nor-
mality, after a transient phase of contrac-
tion in economic activity. 
What happens, however, is that the 
monetary authorities, impelled by a sort 
of dogmatic virtuosity, resort to the same 
procedure when they are faced with social 
inflation. However tight a pay squeeze is 
imposed on the labour force, the correction 
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of inflation is not instantaneous, but 
entails a difficult period of transition, 
during which other factors, of infflation 
must be attacked. In order to speed up 
the treatment, recourse is had to what 
are known as real rates of interest, that is, 
rates in which the degree of inflation is 
incorporated, and which therefore are, 
obviously, counterproductive in their ef-
fects. 
As already explained, in order to 
increase production an essential and 
inescapable requirement is to expand 
employment and raise the income paid out 
to the labour force; and if to these higher 
earnings —however severely real earn-
ings may have been squeezed— is added 
the generally exorbitant cost of the real 
rates of interest, the only way out for 
enterprises is to transfer this new cost 
component to prices. 
And so great is the contradiction 
implicit in this policy, that far from increas-
ing production it ends by discouraging it, 
since the expansion of credit, in so far as it 
takes place, absorbs in itself its very 
high cost, to the detriment of employment: 
inflation is damped down by poking up 
the fire? 
I make this assertion because what I 
have been describing militates against 
the very dynamic effects that are pursued. 
For in order to prevent enterprises from 
obtaining inflationary profits, by the 
application of real rates of interest, these 
profits are switched over to banking and 
financial activities. Moreover, the very 
understandable difficulties in which 
enterprises find themselves do not attract 
investment of the profits thus transferred. 
In contrast, a new type of consumer society 
thrives in this way, for the profits in 
question, diverted from genuine invest-
ment, are used outright to boost imitation 
of the consumption of the centres, es-
pecially when these imports are encour-
aged that are necessary to meet the 
demands of privileged consumption. Con-
sumption and the accumulation of con-
sumptive capital are exalted alike. 
Serious differences of opinion also 
arise in connexion with unemployment. 
While some see in it a cause for concern, 
others maintain that real salaries and 
wages ought to drop until unemployment 
is absorbed when the system achieves equi-
librium. The surplus, of course, is disre-
garded. 
Views on the subject of international 
trade are also widely divergent. Some 
take prudent steps to correct the abuses of 
protection ism and withstan d pressures 
from outside to go further and abolish 
protection altogether, just when the struc-
tural bottlenecks are beginning to make 
their appearance again. While others, 
impelled by their unshakeable faith in 
market laws, which are bound to carry 
harmony and balance on to the inter-
national level, hope that if protection is 
done away with, the centres will facilitate 
the entry of peripheral exports. 
The attitude of certain neo-classicists 
to the transnational enterprises is too 
important not to be mentioned here. But 
according to some, the doors should be 
flung wide to allow them, in specific cases, 
to fill up the room left by the elimination 
of public enterprises; whereas others 
propose to improve the public enterprise 
and impose conditions on the activity of 
the transnationals, so that particular 
development objectives, such as exports 
of manufactures, can be fulfilled. 
Be this as it may, however high the 
degree of intelligent virtuosity with 
which neo-classical principles are follow-
ed, there will be no possibility of simul-
taneously attaining the great objectives 
of economic efficiency, social efficiency 
and respect for fundamental human rights. 
